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Author : United States. Department of State Publisher : Government Printing Office Page : 1168 pages File Size : 42,7 Mb Release : 2016 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : UCBK:C098385513
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972 by United States. Department of State Pdf
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. The series, which is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes published over the last two decades increasingly contain declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies.
Author : United States. Department of State Publisher : Unknown Page : 0 pages File Size : 46,9 Mb Release : 2001 Category : United States ISBN : OCLC:1027483870
Author : United States. Department of State Publisher : Unknown Page : 1458 pages File Size : 49,8 Mb Release : 2018 Category : Arab-Israeli conflict ISBN : UCBK:C120053747
Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980 by United States. Department of State Pdf
Description of Volume 13. China : "This volume is the first publication in a new subseries of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important foreign policy issues of the Jimmy Carter presidential administration." From U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian website.
This study analyzes the unique triangular relationship between Israel’s diplomatic representatives, pro-Israel advocates, and US administrations draws on a wealth of Hebrew and English primary documentation that includes; government archives, surveillance records, wiretappings, personal oral interviews, and diaries of key individuals. Natan Aridan demonstrates how a small new state succeeded in establishing a level of political, economic and military aid that has made for an alliance that is unique in the American experience. Revealed in considerable depth are the dilemmas facing Israeli and US leaders, and pro-Israel organizations and the extent to which individual Jewish leaders maneuvered as conduits between Israeli governments and US administrations, whose senior dramatis personae in turn attempted to influence, moderate, restrain, and change the course of policy decisions and actions. Each administration had multiple voices and international contingencies presented different challenges, all of which had a major impact in fluctuations, and shifts in policies toward Israel. There was nothing inevitable about military and financial support for Israel. It was only by the end of the period that a distinct pattern began to emerge. Eventual qualified US support took a long and complicated path developed over many decades on multidimensional levels. The book refutes insidious allegations that from Israel’s inception Jewish influence and a powerful Israel lobby hijacked US foreign policy to achieve unreserved military and financial support for Israel that undermined the best interests of the US. The author illustrates one of the poorly misunderstood aspects on the subject by demonstrating how Israeli governments were more astute and powerful than previous scholars have realized and that they were in fact pulling the strings far more than AIPAC and wealthy Jews. He also demonstrates that a contributing factor on the decision to aid Israel (understated in previous research) lay in Israel exploiting its ‘nuisance value.’
The October 1973 Middle East War transformed the region’s politics and had a huge impact on the international political system as a whole. Arguments about the causes, effects, and meaning of the war and about why it ran its course the way it did have played a key role in shaping the understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of American policy in the Middle East, and of many other major issues. For the 50th anniversary of the war, this book grapples with these issues in an objective way by using the mass of declassified material that has recently become available.
The United States maintains defense ties with as many as 60 countries, which not only enables its armed forces to maintain command globally and to project its force widely, but also enables its government to exert leverage over allies' foreign policies and military strategies. In Defending Frenemies, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro presents a historical and comparative analysis of how successive US presidential administrations have employed inducements and coercive diplomacy toward Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan over nuclear proliferation. Taliaferro shows that the ultimate goals in each administration, from John F. Kennedy to George H. W. Bush, have been to contain the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East and South Asia and to enlist China as an ally of convenience against the Soviets in East Asia. Policymakers' inclinations to pursue either accommodative strategies or coercive nonproliferation strategies toward allies have therefore been directly linked to these primary objectives. Defending Frenemies is sharp examination of how regional power dynamics and US domestic politics have shaped the nonproliferation strategies the US has pursued toward vulnerable and often obstreperous allies.
One of the defining features of United States foreign policy since World War II has been the nation's special relationship with Israel. This informal alliance, rooted in shared values and culture, grew out of a moral obligation to promote Israel's survival in the aftermath of the Holocaust as US policymakers provided military aid, weapons, and political protection. In return, Israel served American interests through efforts to contain communism and terrorism in the region. Today, the US provides almost four billion dollars in military aid per year, which raises questions regarding interest and propriety: At what point does US support for Israel exceed the boundaries of the countries' unconventional relationship and become counterproductive to other national interests, including the pursuit of peace in the Middle East? Kenneth Kolander provides a vital new perspective on the US-Israel bond by focusing on Congress's role in developing and maintaining the special relationship during a crucial period. Previous studies have focused on the executive branch, but Kolander demonstrates that US-Israel relations did not follow a course preferred by successive presidential administrations, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, he illuminates how influential lobbyists, America's affinity for Israel and antipathy towards Arabs, and economic pressures influenced legislators and inspired congressional action in support of Israel. In doing so, he presents an essential investigation of the ways in which legislators exert influence in foreign policy and adds new depth to the historiography of an important dynamic in postwar world politics.
In A Lost Peace, Galen Jackson rewrites an important chapter in the history of the middle period of the Cold War, changing how we think about the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the June 1967 Middle East war, Israeli forces seized the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. This conflict was followed, in October 1973, by a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel, which threatened to drag the United States and the Soviet Union into a confrontation even though the superpowers had seemingly embraced the idea of détente. This conflict contributed significantly to the ensuing deterioration of US-Soviet relations. The standard explanation for why détente failed is that the Soviet Union, driven mainly by its Communist ideology, pursued a highly aggressive foreign policy during the 1970s. In the Middle East specifically, the conventional wisdom is that the Soviets played a destabilizing role by encouraging the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in an effort to undermine the US position in the region for Cold War gain. Jackson challenges standard accounts of this period, demonstrating that the United States sought to exploit the Soviet Union in the Middle East, despite repeated entreaties from USSR leaders that the superpowers cooperate to reach a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. By leveraging the remarkable evidence now available to scholars, Jackson reveals that the United States and the Soviet Union may have missed an opportunity for Middle East peace during the 1970s.
One message of Peace Process is that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a crucial role in helping Israel and her Arab neighbors reach peace. If American presidents play their role with skill, they can make a lasting contribution. But just as likely, they may misread the realities of the Middle East and add to the impasse by their own errors.
The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Martin Gilbert Pdf
The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict traces the tangled and bitter history of the Arab-Israeli struggle from the early twentieth century to the escalating troubles of the present day and the continuing search for peace.
“An outstanding historical analysis of a core component to the current Middle East dilemma between Israel and the Palestinians.”—Choice Reviews Was Israel’s occupation of the West Bank inevitable? From 1949-1967, the West Bank was the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many Israelis hoped to conquer it and widen their narrow borders, while many Arabs hoped that it would serve as the core of a future Palestinian state. In The Limits of the Land, Avshalom Rubin presents a sophisticated new portrait of the Arab-Israeli struggle that goes beyond partisan narratives of the past. Drawing on new evidence from a wide variety of sources, many of them only recently declassified, Rubin argues that Israel’s leaders indeed wanted to conquer the West Bank, but not at any cost. By 1967, they had abandoned hope of widening their borders and adopted an alternative strategy based on nuclear deterrence. In 1967, however, Israel’s new strategy failed to prevent war, convincing its leaders that they needed to keep the territory they conquered. The result was a diplomatic stalemate that endures today. “Based on a meticulous examination of numerous Israeli, US, and British archives, as well as relevant Arabic and Russian literature, Avshalom Rubin covers the role of the West Bank in the Arab-Israeli conflict in a comprehensive way. His book stands alone at the top of work on Israeli-Jordanian relations of the period.”—Robert O. Freedman, author of Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations
A perceptive and provocative history of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East that illuminates the unique challenges and barriers Kissinger and his successors have faced in their attempts to broker peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “A wealth of lessons for today, not only about the challenges in that region but also about the art of diplomacy . . . the drama, dazzling maneuvers, and grand strategic vision.”—Walter Isaacson, author of The Code Breaker More than twenty years have elapsed since the United States last brokered a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. In that time, three presidents have tried and failed. Martin Indyk—a former United States ambassador to Israel and special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2013—has experienced these political frustrations and disappointments firsthand. Now, in an attempt to understand the arc of American diplomatic influence in the Middle East, he returns to the origins of American-led peace efforts and to the man who created the Middle East peace process—Henry Kissinger. Based on newly available documents from American and Israeli archives, extensive interviews with Kissinger, and Indyk's own interactions with some of the main players, the author takes readers inside the negotiations. Here is a roster of larger-than-life characters—Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Hafez al-Assad, and Kissinger himself. Indyk's account is both that of a historian poring over the records of these events, as well as an inside player seeking to glean lessons for Middle East peacemaking. He makes clear that understanding Kissinger's design for Middle East peacemaking is key to comprehending how to—and how not to—make peace.
This book deals with the diplomatic triangle of Israel, the United States, and Egypt during the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal in 1969–1970. Considering the Egyptian president’s political positions and outlooks on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the pan-Arab sphere, relations with the United States, the study reviews the internal disagreements between the State Department and Henry Kissinger, the national security adviser in the White House. The study demonstrates that the United States and Egypt worked together to thaw their relations after the severance of ties in June 1967, motivated by a desire to protect and advance their interests in the Middle East. The book is based chiefly on textual analysis of political and historical events in the domain of international relations, but with the same attention to internal policy as well. In addition, the research draws chiefly on primary sources that have only recently been released to the general public and that have not yet been the subject of serious analysis. The lion’s share of the work is based on qualitative content analysis of documents from the National Archives in Washington and especially of the US State Department. Providing a reading that is new, comprehensive, and complete, both with regard to the scope of the sources as well as the analysis of developments in the relations between Egypt and the United States, this book is a key resource for students and scholars interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict, political science and diplomacy, Israeli studies and the Middle East.
