Army S Ground Combat Vehicle Gcv And Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team Eibct Programs Background And Issues For Congress
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Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (EIBCT) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress by Andrew Feickert Pdf
This report looks at budget requests for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, and brigade combat teams (BCTs). It ends with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.
Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program by Isak Lundgren Pdf
The Army is planning to develop and purchase a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that will serve the dual purposes of operating as a combat vehicle and transporting soldiers to, from, and around the battlefield. The GCV is intended to replace the current fleet of Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), which operate with the service's armoured combat brigades. The Congressional Budget Office(CBO) estimates that implementing the GCV program on the most recent schedule would cost $29 billion over the 2014-2030 period. This book compares the Army's plan for the GCV with four other options the service could pursue instead. Although none of those alternatives would meet all of the Army's goals for the GCV program, all are likely to be less costly and less risky (in terms of unanticipated cost increases and schedule delays) than the CBO anticipates will be the case under the Army's plan. Some of the options would also offer advantages relative to the GCV in meeting the Army's mission.
The Army's Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program by Andrew Feikert Pdf
In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization strategy and designated the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) as the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and to add additional vehicle programs to what would be called the NGCV Program. The M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley-the Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program-were cancelled for programmatic and cost-associated reasons. In late 2018, the Army established Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort while consolidating the Army's modernization process under one roof. AFC is intended to play a significant role in OMFV development and acquisition. Hoping to field the OMFV in FY2026, the Army plans to employ Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority for rapid prototyping. The Army plans to develop, in parallel, three complementary classes of Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs) intended to accompany the OMFV into combat both to protect the OMFV and provide additional fire support. For RCVs to be successfully developed, technical challenges with autonomous ground navigation may need to be resolved and artificial intelligence likely must evolve to permit the RCVs to function as intended. The Army has stated that a new congressionally granted acquisition authority-referred to as Section 804 authority-might also be used in RCV development. The Army requested $219 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the OMFV program and $160 million in RDT&E funding for the RCV in its FY2020 Budget Request. FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2500) authorizes an additional $ 6 million for OMFV RDT&E. H.R. 2500 also authorizes an additional $10 million for RCV RDT&E. FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790) authorizes an additional $15 million for OMFV RDT&E. S. 1790 also authorizes an additional $25 million for RCV RDT&E. The Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2020 (H.R. 2968), appropriates an additional $32 million for OMFV RDT&E. H.R. 2968 appropriates an additional $55 million for RCV RDT&E. S. 2474 appropriates an additional $26 million for OMFV RDT&E. S. 2474 decreases the RCV RDT&E funding by $46.621 million.
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Ibct) Mobility, Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs by Andrew Feikert Pdf
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) constitute the Army's "light" ground forces and are an important part of the nation's ability to project forces overseas. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as current thinking by Army leadership as to where and how future conflicts would be fought, suggest IBCTs are limited operationally by their lack of assigned transport and reconnaissance vehicles as well as firepower against hardened targets and armored vehicles. There are three types of IBCTs: Light, Airborne, and Air Assault. Light IBCTs are primarily foot-mobile forces. Light IBCTs can move by foot, by vehicle, or by air (either air landed or by helicopter). Airborne IBCTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct parachute assaults. Air Assault IBCTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct helicopter assaults. Currently, the Army contends IBCTs face a number of limitations: The IBCT lacks the ability to decisively close with and destroy the enemy under restricted terrains such as mountains, littorals, jungles, subterranean areas, and urban areas to minimize excessive physical burdens imposed by organic material systems. The IBCT lacks the ability to maneuver and survive in close combat against hardened enemy fortifications, light armored vehicles, and dismounted personnel. IBCTs lack the support of a mobile protected firepower capability to apply immediate, lethal, long-range direct fires in the engagement of hardened enemy bunkers, light armored vehicles, and dismounted personnel in machine gun and sniper positions; with all-terrain mobility and scalable armor protection; capable of conducting operations in all environments. To address these limitations, the Army is undertaking three programs: the Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV)/Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), formerly known as the Ultra-Light Combat Vehicle (ULCV); the Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV); and the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) programs. These programs would be based on vehicles that are commercially available. This approach serves to reduce costs and the time it takes to field combat vehicles. The GMV/ISV is intended to provide mobility to the rifle squad and company. The LRV would provide protection to the moving force by means of scouts, sensors, and a variety of medium-caliber weapons, and the MPF would offer the IBCT the capability to engage and destroy fortifications, bunkers, buildings, and light-to-medium armored vehicles more effectively. The FY2020 Army GMV budget request for $37 million in procurement funding supports the procurement of 69 GMVs for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and 15 ISVs for the Army. The FY2020 GMV Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) request is for $3 million to support operational testing. The Army did not submit a FY2020 budget request for the LRV program. The FY2020 Army MPF budget request for $310.152 million in RDT&E funding supports the continuation of rapid prototyping efforts and the completion of 24 prototypes.
Technical Challenges of the U.s. Armys Ground Combat Vehicle Program by Congressional Budget Office Pdf
The U.S. Army plans to spend about an additional $34 billion in 2013 dollars to develop and purchase a new armored vehicle for its infantry, the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). The GCV is supposed to operate across the full range of potential conflict types while providing unprecedented levels of protection for the full squad of soldiers it will carry. To achieve the Army's goals, the GCV would weigh from 64 to 84 tons, making it the biggest and heaviest infantry fighting vehicle that the Army has ever fielded—as big as the M1 Abrams tank and twice as heavy as the Bradley, the Army's current infantry fighting vehicle. Designing such a vehicle presents important technical challenges.To aid the Congress in its oversight of the GCV program, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has prepared two reports. This CBO working paper provides background information for understanding the technical challenges that the program faces. It presents the Army's technical goals for the GCV program, examines the threats that the vehicle could face in combat, and explores the variety of approaches that vehicle designers can take to protect the vehicle and its passengers and to meet the Army's other requirements. A companion report, The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives, examines the GCV program (including the number of vehicles, the production schedule, and the cost) and alternative approaches that the Army could take that would cost less but still provide substantial improvements over today's fleet of combat vehicles.
The Army's Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives by Anonim Pdf
In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. In the analysis presented in this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the current status of the Army's fleet of armored vehicles and assessed the speed of deployment of the service's heavy forces. It also evaluated the FCS program, considering the program's costs as well as its advantages and disadvantages and comparing it with several alternative plans for modernizing the Army's heavy forces.
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program by Isak Lundgren Pdf
The Army is planning to develop and purchase a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that will serve the dual purposes of operating as a combat vehicle and transporting soldiers to, from, and around the battlefield. The GCV is intended to replace the current fleet of Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), which operate with the service's armored combat brigades. The Congressional Budget Office(CBO) estimates that implementing the GCV program on the most recent schedule would cost $29 billion over the 2014-2030 period. This book compares the Army's plan for the GCV with four other options the service could pursue instead. Although none of those alternatives would meet all of the Army's goals for the GCV program, all are likely to be less costly and less risky (in terms of unanticipated cost increases and schedule delays) than the CBO anticipates will be the case under the Army's plan. Some of the options would also offer advantages relative to the GCV in meeting the Army's mission.
The U.S. Combat and Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Fleets by Terrence K. Kelly Pdf
Congress recently requested a study of the U.S. ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The authors reveal risks in the technologies required to close capability gaps, the business processes used by the U.S. Department of Defense in managing vehicle production and modification initiatives, and the modeling and simulation process supporting research, development, and acquisition, making recommendations for mitigating these risks.
The Army's Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives by Frances Lussier,United States. Congressional Budget Office Pdf
The Army is planning to develop and purchase a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that will serve the dual purposes of operating as a combat vehicle and transporting soldiers to, from, and around the battlefield. The GCV is intended to replace the current fleet of Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), which operate with the service’s armored combat brigades. It is estimated that implementing the GCV program on the most recent schedule would cost $29 billion (in 2013 dollars) over the 2014–2030 period. This report compares the Army’s plan for the GCV with four other options the service could pursue instead. Although none of those alternatives would meet all of the Army’s goals for the GCV program, all are likely to be less costly and less risky (in terms of unanticipated cost increases and schedule delays) than will be the case under the Army’s plan. Some of the options also would offer advantages relative to the GCV in meeting the Army’s mission. Tables and figures. This is a print on demand report.
Integrating Operational Energy Implications Into System-level Combat Effects Modeling by Endy M Daehner,John Matsumura,Thomas J. Herbert Pdf
The RAND National Defense Research Institute assessed the potential impact that fielding the five Army vehicle modernization programs would have on the operational energy requirements of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. The modernization programs planned at the start of the research were the Ground Combat Vehicle (since cancelled), the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Paladin Integrated Management program vehicle, and the Modular Fuel System. The authors developed and applied a methodology that leveraged detailed combat effectiveness models to account for the operational energy needs associated with supporting combat missions.
Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems Program by Christopher G. Pernin,Elliot Axelband,Jeffrey A. Drezner,John Gordon, IV,Brian B. Dille Pdf
The U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems program aimed to field an ambitious system of systems, with novel technologies integrated via an advanced wireless network. The largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army's history, it was cancelled in 2009, and some of its efforts transitioned to follow-on programs. This report documents the program's complex history and draws lessons from its experiences.
The Army Modernization Imperative by Andrew Hunter,Rhys McCormick Pdf
This report characterizes the context and nature of the U.S. Army’s modernization challenge and recommends ways the Army can maximize the effectiveness of its modernization budget going forward.
The Pursuit of Technological Superiority and the Shrinking American Military by Daniel R. Lake Pdf
Why has the US military begun to suffer from overstretch in recent decades? Why is one of the largest militaries in the world, and the most expensive by far, periodically stressed by the operational demands placed upon it? This book argues that recent problems with overstretch are the result of a heavy reliance on technology to solve tactical and strategic problems. Over the last seven decades, the US armed services have consistently chosen to push the technological frontier out in an effort to first gain, and then maintain, qualitative superiority over potential foes. The high procurement and support costs associated with cutting-edge weapon systems has resulted in a military that is shrinking in both absolute size and in the relative share of combat forces. The culmination of this process is a US military that increasingly lacks the capacity needed to conduct operations without putting significant stress on its personnel and equipment. Lake argues that this pattern is a manifestation of an American cultural disposition favoring technology. He shows that this affinity for technology is present in the organizational cultures of all the armed services, though not to the same degree. By examining procurement programs for each armed service, this book reveals how attempts to develop and leverage superior technology has resulted in some notable program failures, high procurement costs for the latest generation of equipment with associated production cuts, and the high support requirements that are causing the relative share of combat forces to shrink. Lake’s analysis of recent initiatives by the armed services suggests that this pattern is likely to continue, with the US military remaining prone to overstretch whenever its operational tempo increases above the peacetime baseline.
