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Between November 1950 and the end of fighting in June 1953, China launched six major offensives against UN forces in Korea. The most important of these began on April 22, 1951, and was the largest Communist military operation of the war. The UN forces put up a strong defense, prevented the capture of the South Korean capital of Seoul, and finally pushed the Chinese back above the 38th parallel. After China's defeat in this epic five-week battle, Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership became willing to conclude the war short of total victory. China's Battle for Korea offers new perspectives on Chinese decision making, planning, and execution; the roles of command, political control, and technology; and the interaction between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow, while providing valuable insight into Chinese military doctrine and the reasons for the UN's military success.
This book re-visits the history of the Korean War of 1950-1953 from a Chinese perspective, examining Chinese strategy and exploring why China sent three million troops to Korea, in Mao’s words, to “defend the homeland and safeguard the country”—giving rise to what became the war’s common name in China. It also looks into the relatively neglected historical factors which have redefined China’s security concerns and strategic culture. Using newly available sources from China and the former Soviet Union, the book considers how interactive the parameters of defense changes were in a foreign war against Western powers, how flexible Chinese strategy was in the context of its intervention, and how expansive its strategic cultural repertoire was at the crucial moment to “defend the country.” Providing a re-examination of China’s military decisions and strategy evolution, this text narrates the story of successive generations of Chinese leaders and provides a key insight into security issues in China and Northeast Asia today.
"Breaks new ground in analyzing China's decision to enter the war and its subsequent struggle to hold its own against the world's most powerful nation. Should stand for some time as the standard comprehensive treatment of China in the Korean War". -- William Stueck, author of The Korean War. "Offers provocative insights into Mao's thinking about strategy, tactics, and the human costs of warfare. Highly recommended". -- John Lewis Gaddis, author of The Long Peace.
The Korean War was, years before Vietnam, the first great East-West military misadventure, eventually engaging sixteen countries under the U.N. flag in war against China and North Korea. Enter the Dragon examines the Chinese side of the Korean War for the first time, re-creating and dramatizing Communist China's reluctant role in the undeclared war against the U.S. in Korea. Russell Spurr's military classic is drawn from firsthand recollections of observers and participants on both sides, and focuses on six pivotal months, beginning in August 1950, when China first deliberated intervention, through their first strike in October, to the standstill at the end of January 1951.Based on five years of research and over 20 fact-finding trips to the People's Republic of China and Korea, Enter the Dragon describes why China became involved in Korea and how its strategy evolved, and recreates life on the front lines, conference rooms, and in the streets of the embattled cities. Spurr discovers a growing underground movement among the Chinese to re-evaluate their position in the Korean War, and contends that had the U.N. forces, led by General MacArthur, stayed on their side of the parallel, China would not have joined the North Korean action.
The Korean conflict was a pivotal event in China's modern military history. The fighting in Korea constituted an important experience for the newly formed People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), not only as a test case for this fledgling service but also in the later development of Chinese air power. Xiaoming Zhang fills the gaps in the history of this conflict by basing his research in recently declassified Chinese and Russian archival materials. He also relies on interviews with Chinese participants in the air war over Korea. Zhang's findings challenge conventional wisdom as he compares kill ratios and performance by all sides involved in the war. Zhang also addresses the broader issues of the Korean War, such as how air power affected Beijing's decision to intervene. He touches on ground operations and truce negotiations during the conflict. Chinese leaders placed great emphasis on the supremacy of human will over modern weaponry, but they were far from oblivious to the advantages of the latter and to China's technological limitations. Developments in China's own air power were critical during this era. Zhang offers considerable materials on the training of Chinese aviators and the Soviet role in that training, on Soviet and Chinese air operations in Korea, and on diplomatic exchanges over Soviet military assistance to China. He probes the impact of the war on China's conception of the role of air power, arguing that it was not until the Gulf War of the early 1990s that Chinese leaders engaged in a broad reassessment of the strategy they adopted during the Korean War. Military historians and scholars interested in aviation and foreign affairs will find this volume of special interest. As a unique work that presents the Chinese point of view, it stands as both a complement and a corrective to previous accounts of the conflict. Xiaoming Zhang earned his Ph.D. in history at the University of Iowa in 1994. He has had works published in various journals, including the Journal of Military History, which has twice selected him to receive the Moncado Prize for excellence in the writing of military history. Zhang currently resides in Montgomery, Alabama, where he teaches at the Air War College. Zhang's study is masterful in placing the Chinese air war in Korea in the context of China's development in the twentieth century. In addition to providing important new evidence on China's role in the Korean War, Zhang offers a particularly noteworthy analysis of Sino-Soviet relations during the early 1950s. William Stueck, Distinguished Research Professor of History, University of Georgia; author of The Korean War: An International History (1995) and Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (2002)
The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry Into the Korean War by Jian Chen Pdf
"With the support of recently-released Chinese sources, this paper will try to shed some novel lights on (1) the making the Sino-Soviet Alliance, (2) the Sino-Soviet connection with the outbreak of the Korean War, and (3) contacts between China and the Soviet Union during the days when the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] leadership made the final decision to enter the Korean War"--Page 1.
China’S Military Intervention in Korea: by Dr. David Tsui Pdf
This study examines how and why Chinas military intervention in the Korean War came into existence within the time span from May 1949 to July 1951. China was involved in the war preparations much earlier and deeper than was previously known. Beijings preconditions to enter the war boiled down to three: (1) its full control of China; (2) foreign enemy forces invasion of North Korea; and (3) Moscows logistic and air support. Beijing had incorrectly calculated that Washington would dispatch only Japanese field forces to Korea, which is the very reason underlying its inadequate though early preparations for the war, while it had correctly calculated that Washington would not invade China proper via Korea before it entered the war. Expecting an enemy troops landing at Inchon followed by their invasion of North Korea, Beijing planned to ambush them in northern North Korea. It therefore failed to dispatch a symbolic force into Korea to give credibility to diplomatic deterrence against Washingtons possible invasion of North Korea. China developed ten prime interventionist goals as follows: (1) to save North Korea; (2) to dispel Stalins suspicions and to pay Maos political debt owed to Stalin in 1941 and 1942; (3) to have the PLA experienced in modern warfare; (4) to have the PLA modernized with Soviet weaponry; (5) to have its economy revitalized with overall Soviet assistance; (6) to enter the United Nations; (7) to exchange South Korean territories for an American withdrawal from Taiwan; (8) to have Nationalist forces in Taiwan; (9) to defuse an American retaliatory or nuclear attach upon China proper; and (10) to have North Korea and South Korea almost return to the status quo ante bellum. It was Maos de facto dependence upon rather than his alleged independence from Stalin that had made him rise to power in 1949. This Soviet reign turned out to be considerably more decisive than the American threat in driving China into the war in 1950.
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir by Charles River Pdf
*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading "It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory." - Douglas MacArthur, 1951. The Korean War is often labeled "the forgotten war," and though it has received renewed attention in recent years, it still pales compared to others in recent history, like the Vietnam War or even the more recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What's mostly overlooked is that the Korean War was one of the most intense conflicts the United States fought, and the soldiers who served in it were arguably in greater peril than in any other war over the last 75 years. While the Truman administration and the Chiefs of Staff had a clear plan for the conflict, seemingly everything went horribly wrong once China entered the conflict, and despite the United Nations coalition forces' technological and logistical superiority, they found themselves on the defensive. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir was a dramatic example of a battle plan gone awry. General Douglas MacArthur had conceived of a triumphant march to the Yalu River, ending the war and uniting Korea. The UN troops, led by the United States, had turned the fight around with the amphibious landing in Inchon, which took place in September 1950. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) tried to contain the Pusan Perimeter invasion, but they broke through, and before long the coalition troops were headed deep into North Korean territory. Some units had reached the Yalu River, which marks the frontier between North Korea and China. At this point, the mission's goal was to eliminate the NKPA and reunite Korea under a pro-Western regime, but the forces under MacArthur's command found themselves surrounded and beleaguered in sub-zero temperatures. As it turned out, the United States and its allies badly mishandled China's entry into the Korean War, a dramatic and critical development in the conflict that completely changed the balance of power in the theater. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir was one of the most decisive battles that followed, one where both the Americans and the Chinese underestimated their rivals and thought that victory could be achieved easily. As it turned out, nothing was easy at the Chosin Reservoir, and both sides would pay a heavy toll for the miscalculations of their superiors, but the result would mark a major turning point that helped determine how the war ended, and how the map of Asia looks today. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir: The History of the Chinese Victory that Pushed UN Forces Out of North Korea during the Korean War looks at one of the Korean War's most important fights, from its origins to its aftermath. Along with pictures depicting important people, places, and events, you will learn about the Battle of Chosin Reservoir like never before.
Early in the seventeenth century, Northeast Asian politics hung in a delicate balance among the Chosŏn dynasty in Korea, the Ming in China, and the Manchu. When a Chosŏn faction realigned Korea with the Ming, the Manchu attacked in 1627 and again a decade later, shattering the Chosŏn-Ming alliance and forcing Korea to support the newly founded Qing dynasty. The Korean scholar-official Na Man’gap (1592–1642) recorded the second Manchu invasion in his Diary of 1636, the only first-person account chronicling the dramatic Korean resistance to the attack. Partly composed as a narrative of quotidian events during the siege of Namhan Mountain Fortress, where Na sought refuge with the king and other officials, the diary recounts Korean opposition to Manchu and Mongol forces and the eventual surrender. Na describes military campaigns along the northern and western regions of the country, the capture of the royal family, and the Manchu treatment of prisoners, offering insights into debates about Confucian loyalty and the conduct of women that took place in the war’s aftermath. His work sheds light on such issues as Confucian statecraft, military decision making, and ethnic interpretations of identity in the seventeenth century. Translated from literary Chinese into English for the first time, the diary illuminates a traumatic moment for early modern Korean politics and society. George Kallander’s critical introduction and extensive annotations place The Diary of 1636 in its historical, political, and military context, highlighting the importance of this text for students and scholars of Chinese and East Asian as well as Korean history.
One June 25, 1950, a massive surprise North Korean invasion sent Allied forces reeling back to a last-ditch defensive perimeter around the far-southern port city Pusan.
Reissued to coincide with the 60th anniversary of U.S. involvement in the Korean War, this gripping, dramatic military classic re-creates six pivotal months in the conflict, told from both the Chinese and Allied sides. The Korean War was, years before Vietnam, the first great East-West military misadventure, eventually engaging sixteen countries under the U.N. flag in war against China and North Korea. Enter the Dragon examines the Chinese side of the Korean War for the first time, re-creating and dramatizing Communist China's reluctant role in the undeclared war against the U.S. in Korea. Russell Spurr's military classic is drawn from firsthand recollections of observers and participants on both sides, and focuses on six pivotal months, beginning in August 1950, when China first deliberated intervention, through their first strike in October, to the standstill at the end of January 1951. Based on five years of research and over 20 fact-finding trips to the People's Republic of China and Korea, Enter the Dragon describes why China became involved in Korea and how its strategy evolved, and re-creates life on the front lines, conference rooms, and in the streets of the embattled cities.
Author : Richard Peters,Xiaobing Li Publisher : University Press of Kentucky Page : 312 pages File Size : 46,8 Mb Release : 2014-04-23 Category : History ISBN : 9780813145945
Voices from the Korean War by Richard Peters,Xiaobing Li Pdf
"In three days the number of so-called 'volunteers' reached over three hundred men. Very quickly they organized us into military units. Just like that I became a North Korean soldier and was on the way to some unknown place." -- from the book South Korean Lee Young Ho was seventeen years old when he was forced to serve in the North Korean People's Army during the first year of the Korean War. After a few months, he deserted the NKPA and returned to Seoul where he joined the South Korean Marine Corps. Ho's experience is only one of the many compelling accounts found in Voices from the Korean War. Unique in gathering war stories from veterans from all sides of the Korean War -- American, South Korean, North Korean, and Chinese -- this volume creates a vivid and multidimensional portrait of the three-year-long conflict told by those who experienced the ground war firsthand. Richard Peters and Xiaobing Li include a significant introduction that provides a concise history of the Korean conflict, as well as a geographical and a political backdrop for the soldiers' personal stories.
At first, it might not seem surprising to have a formal military alliance that has endured more than 4 decades between two communist neighbors, China and North Korea. After all, their armed forces fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the Korean War 50 years ago. However, Beijing's ties to Pyongyang have weakened considerably over time, and China now has much better and stronger relations with the free market democracy of South Korea than it does with the totalitarian, centrally planned economy of North Korea. In many ways Pyongyang has become a Cold War relic, strategic liability, and monumental headache for Beijing. Nevertheless, the China-North Korea alliance remains formally in effect, and Beijing continues to provide vital supplies of food and fuel to the brutal and repressive Pyongyang regime. Since the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which emerged in October 2002, the United States and other countries have pinned high hopes on Chinese efforts to moderate and reason with North Korea. Beijing's initiative to bring Pyongyang to the table in the so-called Six-Party Talks and host them seems to substantiate these hopes. Yet, as the author points out, it would be unrealistic to raise one's expectations over what China might accomplish vis-à-vis North Korea. Beijing plays a useful and important role on the Korean Peninsula, but in the final analysis, the author argues that there are significant limitations on China's influence both in terms of what actions Beijing would be prepared to take and what impact this pressure can have. If this analysis is correct, then North Korea is unlikely to mend its ways anytime soon
For members of the U.S. Army’s “Task Force Faith” and the First Marine Division, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir is an epic story of survival, courage, and ingenuity. Their exploits are well known—woven into the storied histories of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Now, for the first time, Attack at Chosin recounts this battle from the Chinese perspective, describing the advance that forced General MacArthur to reorient his strategy, which not only marked a turning point in the Korean War but impacted events in Asia in ways that still resonate today. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, as the Chinese commanders foretold, determined the fate and length of the Korean War. Author Xiaobing Li describes the fighting that began on November 27, 1950, when 150,000 soldiers from the Chinese Ninth Army Group attacked the First Marines and elements of the 7th Infantry Division in the remote mountains of North Korea. It was a calculated attempt to repel MacArthur’s “home-by-Christmas” offensive and to deter UN forces from further advances toward the Chinese border. The fierce fighting that followed, combined with the bitter cold, made Chosin one of the deadliest battles of the war. By December 17, after suffering more than 40,000 casualties and failing to achieve their campaign objectives to destroy the American divisions, the Ninth Army Group was forced to withdraw. One day later, on December 18, 1950, the remaining survivors were recalled to China. As the first book to explore the role of command and control, technology, and combat effectiveness from the point of view of the Chinese, and to examine cooperation and friction between Beijing and Pyongyang, Attack at Chosin sheds new light on the ultimate military success of the UN forces during the Korean conflict. Li also provides invaluable insights into Chinese military doctrine, strategy, and tactics that continue to influence foreign policy and American military institutions today.