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Communist Indochina And U.s. Foreign Policy by Joseph J Zasloff Pdf
This study examines the important political and economic developments in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia since the Communist victories in 1975 and analyzes the critical policy issues facing the Carter administration in dealing with these states. Summarizing the major options immediately available to U.S. policymakers who confronted the new regimes in I
Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy by Alan R. Beals Pdf
This study of ten fateful decisions made on Indochina between 1961-75 highlights the ascent of the civilian militarists and of strategy over diplomacy in United States policymaking and reveals the inexorably interlinked and escalating character of the decisions and the central purpose of American presidents: not to have to face the expected domestic political consequences of defeat in Indochina. As a result, we were led into a prolonged stalemate in which "acting" and the management of programs became a more important preoccupation than thinking about our purposes and values, in which analysis become wholly subjective and therefore defective, and in which decision-making occurred in a closed system which did not allow for divergent inputs.
Based on extensive research in the Russian archives, this book examines the Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict between the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and late 1963, when the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of John F. Kennedy radically transformed the conflict. The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.
U. S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina by William Duiker Pdf
From the end of World War II down to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy has been to prevent the expansion of communism. Indeed, that objective was directly embodied in the so-called strategy of containment, a global approach to the pursuit of U.S. national security interests that was first adumbrated by George F. Kennan in 1947 and later became the guiding force in U.S. foreign policy. At first, the concept of containment was applied primarily to Europe. It was there that the threat to U.S. interests from international communism directed from Moscow was first perceived, in the form of Soviet efforts to dominate the nations of Eastern Europe and extend Soviet influence into the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Other areas of the world—Asia, Africa, and Latin America—were considered to be less threatened by forces hostile to the free world or more peripheral to U.S. foreign policy concerns. At least that was the view initially proclaimed by George Kennan himself, who identified five areas in the world as vital to the United States: North America, Great Britain, Central Europe, the USSR, and Japan. Only the latter was located in Asia. By the end of the decade, however, the focus of U.S. containment strategy was extended to include East and Southeast Asia, primarily because of the increasing likelihood of a communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, which, in the minds of some U.S. policymakers, would be tantamount to giving the Soviet Union a dominant position on the Asian mainland. Added to the growing threat in China was the increasingly unstable situation in Southeast Asia, where the long arc of colonies that had been established by the imperialist powers during the last half of the nineteenth century was gradually but inexorably being replaced by independent states. The emergence of such colonial territories into independence was generally viewed as a welcome prospect by foreign policy observers in Washington, but when combined with the impending victory of communist forces in China it raised the unsettling possibility that the entire region might be brought within the reach of the Kremlin.
The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy by Paul M. Kattenburg Pdf
This study of ten fateful decisions made on Indochina between 1961-75 highlights the ascent of the civilian militarists and of strategy over diplomacy in United States policymaking and reveals the inexorably interlinked and escalating character of the decisions and the central purpose of American presidents: not to have to face the expected domestic political consequences of defeat in Indochina. As a result, we were led into a prolonged stalemate in which "acting" and the management of programs became a more important preoccupation than thinking about our purposes and values, in which analysis become wholly subjective and therefore defective, and in which decision-making occurred in a closed system which did not allow for divergent inputs.
Vietnamese Communists' Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 by Cheng Guan Ang Pdf
According to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, general elections were to be held in July 1956 that would lead to the reunification of North and South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement, however, was doomed from the start, as the South Vietnamese leaders did not suscribe to it and the leaders of the Communist North saw its value as primarily a propaganda tool. By 1956 it was obvious to all that reunification in accordance with the agreement was impossible, and the North Vietnamese looked to China for advice and assistance. Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources--many only recently made available--this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists' goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced. The book shows that the Hanoi government was remarkably in control of its own decision-making.
U.S. Policy Toward Indochina Since Vietnam's Occupation of Kampuchea by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs Pdf
Author : Ronald H. Spector Publisher : U.S. Government Printing Office Page : 422 pages File Size : 43,7 Mb Release : 1983 Category : History ISBN : STANFORD:36105081524048
Advice and Support describes the activities of the U.S. Army in Vietnam during World War II, military advice and assistance to the French government during the immediate postwar years, and the advisory program that developed after the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Its scope ranges from high-level policy decisions to low-echelon advisory operations in the field, presented against a background of relevant military and political developments. Useful not only as a study of military assistance but as a view of the Army as an agent of national policy, Ronald Spector2s interesting book is a fitting introduction to the overall study of the conflict in Vietnam.
Author : Hans Joachim Morgenthau Publisher : Washington, Public Affairs P Page : 124 pages File Size : 50,8 Mb Release : 1965 Category : Political Science ISBN : UCSD:31822003110798
Author : Mark Lawrence Publisher : Univ of California Press Page : 372 pages File Size : 41,9 Mb Release : 2005-05-23 Category : History ISBN : 9780520940857
This beautifully crafted and solidly researched book explains why and how the United States made its first commitment to Vietnam in the late 1940s. Mark Atwood Lawrence deftly explores the process by which the Western powers set aside their fierce disagreements over colonialism and extended the Cold War fight into the Third World. Drawing on an unprecedented array of sources from three countries, Lawrence illuminates the background of the U.S. government's decision in 1950 to send military equipment and economic aid to bolster France in its war against revolutionaries. That decision, he argues, marked America's first definitive step toward embroilment in Indochina, the start of a long series of moves that would lead the Johnson administration to commit U.S. combat forces a decade and a half later. Offering a bold new interpretation, the author contends that the U.S. decision can be understood only as the result of complex transatlantic deliberations about colonialism in Southeast Asia in the years between 1944 and 1950. During this time, the book argues, sharp divisions opened within the U.S., French, and British governments over Vietnam and the issue of colonialism more generally. While many liberals wished to accommodate nationalist demands for self-government, others backed the return of French authority in Vietnam. Only after successfully recasting Vietnam as a Cold War conflict between the democratic West and international communism—a lengthy process involving intense international interplay—could the three governments overcome these divisions and join forces to wage war in Vietnam. One of the first scholars to mine the diplomatic materials housed in European archives, Lawrence offers a nuanced triangulation of foreign policy as it developed among French, British, and U.S. diplomats and policymakers. He also brings out the calculations of Vietnamese nationalists who fought bitterly first against the Japanese and then against the French as they sought their nation's independence. Assuming the Burden is an eloquent illustration of how elites, operating outside public scrutiny, make decisions with enormous repercussions for decades to come.
It was becoming increasingly clear in spring 1988 that the ten-year old war in Cambodia was approaching a turning point. For a variety of reasons, mostly domestic, Vietnam was under pressure to withdraw its forces from the region and had, in fact, pledged to do so by 1990/ However, in order to gain the benefits it sought from the international community, it was evident that Hanoi would need to go beyond merely ending its decade-long occupations and contribute to a political settlement satisfactory to all of the principal Cambodia and outside players. Similarly, Cambodia loomed as the main obstacle to achieving Soviet Party General Secretary Gorbachevs objective of normalizing relations with China. Thus, not only did Moscow encourage a negotiated settlement, but even on what was likely to the Kremlin was willing to see the brutal Khmer Rouge included in an interim structure in order to satisfy China that Beijings interest were being protected. The six member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the principal backers of the noncommunist resistance were actively promoting a peaceful resolution, with certain differences and tensions among them. And, through it remained a second-order issue for the United State, it was obvious that Washington would have to reengage in Indochina, if not despite, their previous role their.
Vietnam, Korea and US Foreign Policy by Christine Bragg Pdf
Written for the Edexcel specification, this in-depth A2 study looks at the US relationship with South East Asia in the context of the Cold War. Emphasis is placed on the roles of Johnson and Nixon which are both heavily covered in the exams and assignments. contains thorough and up-to-date exam preparation, including practice questions, advice on what makes a good answer and help for students on how to interpret the questions and plan essays. is written by an expert author team who have a wide experience of teaching and examining A-level History and focus on exactly what students need to know and how to prepare for the exam.
The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam by Dale Walton Pdf
This book offers a dispassionate strategic examination of the Vietnam conflict that challenges the conventional wisdom that South Vietnam could not survive as an independent non-communist entity over the long term regardless of how the United States conducted its military- political effort in Indochina.
