Contingent Liabilities From Banks Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Contingent Liabilities From Banks book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.
Contingent Liabilities from Banks by Mr.Serkan Arslanalp,Yin Liao Pdf
In this paper, we develop a methodology to assess potential losses to the government that could arise from bank failures. The approach is intended to be simple, parsimonious, and used in real time. It generates an index that we call the banking sector contingent liability index (BCLI), based on the banking sector’s size, concentration, diversification, leverage, and riskiness of assets. The index is illustrated for 32 advanced and emerging market economies from 2006 to 2013, as well as a group of banks including global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
Author : Anthony Saunders,Berry Wilson Publisher : World Bank Publications Page : 24 pages File Size : 47,8 Mb Release : 1995 Category : Bank liabilities ISBN : 8210379456XXX
Author : Stuart I. Greenbaum,John Soss,Anjan V. Thakor Publisher : Unknown Page : 72 pages File Size : 48,8 Mb Release : 1986 Category : Bank capital ISBN : UCLA:L0050999820
Government at Risk by Hana Polackova Brixi,Allen Schick Pdf
Many governments have faced serious instability as a result of their contingent liabilities. But conventional public finance analysis and institutions fail to address such fiscal risks. This book aims to provide motivation and practical guidance to governments seeking to improve theirmanagement of fiscal risks. The book addresses some of the difficult analytical and institutional challenges that face reformers tooling up to manage government fiscal risks. It discusses the inadequacies of conventional practices as well as recent advances in dealing with fiscal risk.
Author : Mario I. Bléjer,Liliana Schumacher Publisher : International Monetary Fund Page : 24 pages File Size : 50,9 Mb Release : 2000-03 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : UCSD:31822028586352
Central Banks Use of Derivatives and Other Contingent Liabilities by Mario I. Bléjer,Liliana Schumacher Pdf
Whereas some central bank derivatives and other contingent liabilities arise from anomalous circumstances, there are a number of positive reasons that explain their popularity. After analyzing the rationale for these operations, we stress that most of these operations, being off-balance sheet, increase the risk and reduce the transparency of central bank accounts. This in turn makes more difficult the assessment of the financial position of the monetary authority and, by implication, of the macroeconomic conditions of the country. To deal with this issue, we suggest a comprehensive portfolio approach that values, in an economic sense, all assets and liabilities of the central bank.
Central Banks Use of Derivatives and Other Contingent Liabilities by Mario I. Blejer Pdf
Whereas some central bank derivatives and other contingent liabilities arise from anomalous circumstances, there are a number of positive reasons that explain their popularity. After analyzing the rationale for these operations, we stress that most of these operations, being off-balance sheet, increase the risk and reduce the transparency of central bank accounts. This in turn makes more difficult the assessment of the financial position of the monetary authority and, by implication, of the macroeconomic conditions of the country. To deal with this issue, we suggest a comprehensive portfolio approach that values, in an economic sense, all assets and liabilities of the central bank.
The Contingent Liabilities of the English Commercial Banks, with an Introductory Essay on Their Published Accounts by Herbert Cecil Frederick Holgate Pdf
Author : Hana Polackova Publisher : World Bank Publications Page : 39 pages File Size : 40,7 Mb Release : 1998 Category : Disclosure of information ISBN : 8210379456XXX
Contingent Government Liabilities by Hana Polackova Pdf
October 1998 Many governments have faced serious fiscal instabilities as a result of their growing contingent liabilities. But conventional fiscal analysis and institutions fall short in addressing contingent fiscal risks. What approaches in fiscal analysis and standards for public sector management would foster sound fiscal performance? And how can policymakers be made accountable for recognizing the long-term costs of both direct and contingent forms of government activity in their decisions? Governments are increasingly exposed to fiscal risks and uncertainties for three main reasons: * The increasing volume and volatility of international flows of private capital. * The state's transformation from financing services to guaranteeing that the private sector will achieve particular outcomes. * Moral hazards arising in markets because the government is perceived to have residual responsibility for market outcomes. Sources of fiscal risk may be direct or contingent (a liability only if a particular event occurs). Whether direct or contingent, they are either explicit (recognized as a government liability by law or by contract) or implicit (a moral obligation reflecting public expectations and pressure from interest groups). The recent Asian crisis revealed that major moral hazards exist in markets and that sizable hidden fiscal risks may arise from contingent forms of government support. Governments must understand and know how to handle contingent liabilities if they are to avoid the danger of sudden fiscal instability and realize their long-term policy objectives. They can reduce fiscal risks by incorporating contingent liabilities into their analytical, policy, and institutional public finance frameworks. Governments can address fiscal risk through three channels in particular, says Polackova: * By including contingent and implicit financial risks in their fiscal analysis and (to deter moral hazard in the market) by publicly acknowledging the limits of state responsibilities. * By reflecting the cost of contingent liabilities in policy choices, budgeting, financial planning, reporting, and auditing. * By developing institutional capacity to evaluate, regulate, control, and prevent financial risk in both the public and private sectors. Given the increasingly serious implications of contingent government liabilities for the fiscal outlook of countries, Polackova argues that it is time for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others to: * Incorporate government contingent fiscal risks in their analysis of a country's fiscal sustainability, policies, and institutions. * Require countries to disclose information regarding their exposure to contingent fiscal risks. * Help countries embrace contingent liabilities in their analytical, policy, and institutional public finance frameworks. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to enhance the Bank's analytical and operational work in public finance. The author may be contacted at [email protected].
Abstract: "The author presents evidence that balance sheet effects are critical determinants of both the likelihood of a crisis and of income losses following a crisis. She tests the validity of "insurance" and "liquidity" models of currency crisis. Both models predict that the occurrence of a balance of payments crisis is conditional on the health of the nation's accounts in relation to the rest of the world. Problems in the balance sheet either cause a financial crisis that develops into a run on the central bank, or generate a run on the central bank once contingent liabilities exceed reserves and the yield differential moves against domestic assets. Estimations of crisis likelihoods based on several specifications of single and simultaneous equation probit models confirm that output losses following the crisis are persistent and conditional on the balance sheet indicator, that is, the ratio of the stock of gross external liabilities to assets. Measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and financial depth perform well as crisis predictors, and the marginal effects on the probability of a crisis are of the expected sign. The panel data set covers the time period 1973 through 2003 for 90 countries."--World Bank web site.
Systemic Contingent Claims Analysis by Mr.Andreas A. Jobst,Mr.Dale F. Gray Pdf
The recent global financial crisis has forced a re-examination of risk transmission in the financial sector and how it affects financial stability. Current macroprudential policy and surveillance (MPS) efforts are aimed establishing a regulatory framework that helps mitigate the risk from systemic linkages with a view towards enhancing the resilience of the financial sector. This paper presents a forward-looking framework ("Systemic CCA") to measure systemic solvency risk based on market-implied expected losses of financial institutions with practical applications for the financial sector risk management and the system-wide capital assessment in top-down stress testing. The suggested approach uses advanced contingent claims analysis (CCA) to generate aggregate estimates of the joint default risk of multiple institutions as a conditional tail expectation using multivariate extreme value theory (EVT). In addition, the framework also helps quantify the individual contributions to systemic risk and contingent liabilities of the financial sector during times of stress.
Off-Balance Sheet Activities by Joshua Ronen,Anthony Saunders,Ashwinpaul C. Sondhi Pdf
The objective of Off-Balance Sheet Activities is to gain insights into, and propose meaningful solutions to, those issues raised by the current proliferation of off-balance sheet transactions. The book has its origins in a New York University conference that focused on this topic. Jointly undertaken by the Vincent C. Ross Institute of Accounting Research and New York University's Salomon Center for the study of Financial Institutions at the Stern School of Business, the conference brought together academic researchers and practitioners in the field of accounting and finance to address the issues with the broad-mindedness requisite of a group whose approaches to solutions are as different from each other as their respectively theoretical and applied approaches to the disciplines of finance and accounting. The essays are divided into two sections. The first covers issues surrounding OBS activities and banking and begins with a brief introduction that places the essays into context. OBS activities and the underinvestment problem, whether loan sales are really OBS, and money demand and OBS liquidity are examined in detail. Section two, which also begins with a brief introduction, focuses on issues of securitized assets and financing. A report on recognition and measurement issues in accounting for securitized assets is followed by three separate discussion essays. Other subjects covered include contract theoretic analysis of OBS financing, the use of OBS financing to circumvent financial covenant restrictions, and debt contracting and financial contracting. The latter two contributions are also followed by discussion essays. This unique collection of papers will prove to be an interesting and valuable tool for accounting and finance professionals as well as for academics involved in these fields. It will also be an important addition to public, college, and university libraries.
The Fiscal Costs of Contingent Liabilities by Ms.Elva Bova,Marta Ruiz-Arranz,Mr.Frederik G Toscani,H. Elif Ture Pdf
We construct the first comprehensive dataset of contingent liability realizations in advanced and emerging markets for the period 1990–2014. We find that contingent liability realizations are a major source of fiscal distress. The average fiscal cost of a contingent liability realization is 6 percent of GDP but costs can be as high as 40 percent for major financial sector bailouts. Contingent liability realizations are correlated among each other and tend to occur during periods of growth reversals and crises, accentuating pressure on the budget during already difficult times. Countries with stronger institutions are able to better control and address the underlying risks so that they are less exposed to contingent liability realizations.
Contingent Liability in Banking by Anthony Saunders Pdf
November 1995 Could contingent liability systems play an important role in developing countries' banking systems? Bank owner contingent liability has been important in the development of many industrial countries. Unlimited liability on bank owners was an important element in the success of Scottish banking, for example, and lasted until 1862, when banks were allowed to adopt a limited liability designation. As a result, Scotland was relatively free of the banking and monetary upheavals that occurred in Britain and the United States. The unlimited liability provision effectively minimized the losses suffered by bank noteholders and other creditors. Actual losses from Scottish bank failures were well below those suffered by bank creditors in England. And Scottish banks were not prone to the bank runs and contagion effects typical of British and U.S. banks at the time. Scottish noteholders apparently had little incentive to run because of the effective coverage provided by unlimited liability. Three factors were vital to the success of unlimited liability in Scotland: * The identities of bank owners were made publicly available, and their level of wealth could be verified. So the degree of noteholder protection from liability could be assessed by adding up an owner's wealth. * Under Scottish bankruptcy law, owner liability extended to both personal and inheritable wealth. This intergenerational extension of liability expanded the bank creditors' safety net. * The transfer of ownership claims in private and provincial banks required that ownership first be dissolved before a new bank could be formed. This allowed the transfer of control to be monitored, minimizing adverse selection problems that might arise should ownership be transferred to people with less personal wealth. A contingent liability system has three advantages: * Because double liability imposes postclosure losses on bank stockholders, it increases incentives for banks to hold capital and decreases moral hazard incentives, such as a go-for-broke strategy. * A contingent liability system can ameliorate asymmetric information problems between bank creditors and owners. * Contingent liability can lead to more efficient capital formation if potential capital sources are predominantly in the form of fixed wealth, as is true in many developing countries. But a free-rider problem arises when less-wealthy stockholders rely on the monitoring efforts of wealthier stockholders, who have more incentive to monitor. And in a free and anonymous exchange market, investors with less personal fixed wealth will outbid those with greater wealth, so the value of double liability could collapse over time, creating a role for supervisors to ensure that only credible bidders are allowed. This paper -- a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department, and the Financial Sector Development Department -- was presented at a Bank seminar, Financial History: Lessons of the Past for Reformers of the Present, and is a chapter in a forthcoming volume, Reforming Finance: Some Lessons from History, edited by Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Dimitri Vittas.
