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Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom :. by Steven Metz Pdf
One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.--
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Steven Metz Pdf
In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged, with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision, could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.--
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Steven Metz Pdf
One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Steven Metz,John R. Martin Pdf
Understanding the ways that military leaders advise those who exercise civilian control over the military is important for the continuing prosecution of that war, but also for the inevitable next time that the United States considers embarking on such an endeavor. A second objective of this series is to provide military and civilian leaders a clearer picture of what they must do to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly prepared-with strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment, training, and leadership-for future operations. Literature about the war in Iraq is already extensive, although-as the Foreword states-the definitive history of the war is still undoubtedly years away. However, most of the writing-by policymakers, journalists, scholars, and other students of national security issues-focuses on the effects of various decisions, not on the decisions themselves. For example, there is ample writing about how the 2003 decision to "de-Ba'athify" the Iraqi government was executed and what effects it had. How that decision was made, though, has been studied less. With this series, SSI intends to make a valuable addition to the literature on the war in Iraq by addressing the how and why of various key strategic decisions that were made over the past 8-plus years of planning and fighting. Some of the effects will inevitably be discussed as well, but the focus will clearly be on the decisionmaking processes, not the subsequent results. The facts and data presented and the ensuing analysis will identify the nature of the decisionmaking process involved as either idiosyncratic or systemic. Idiosyncratic decisions can be made based on the circumstances of a particular situation; a unique decision might have been required by the facts on the ground. The sectarian divisions, the long years of repression under Saddam, and the history of American inaction after Operation DESERT STORM in 1991- among other factors-might have combined to create distinctive conditions that led decisionmakers down idiosyncratic paths. The early years of the Iraq conflict offer several examples of another idiosyncrasy: the personalities of the different people making the key decisions. Different people viewing the same facts of a situation might draw different conclusions and make different decisions. Some key people making decisions about Iraq made dramatically different decisions than would have been expected of other reasonable people. At the very top of the pile is the strong personality of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, balanced somewhat by equally forceful Secretary of State Colin Powell. Coordination of the activities of their two Departments, though, was left to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, perhaps hopelessly outweighed-at least in public-by these two longtime players in major national security issues. Whether challenges in decisionmaking were idiosyncratic by personality or situation, though, differentiating them from systemic challenges is clearly important. Some analysts and pundits argue for procedural changes, either by executive fiat or legislative action, that are not supported by the relevant facts of the particular decision involved. One is the continuing call for a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire interagency. 1 Attempting to address idiosyncratic issues through systemic changes may not be the right approach; this monograph series should help identify the nature of the factors-processes or personalities- that led to certain decisions and to suggest ways to address any shortcomings.
Decision Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Steven Metz Pdf
One of the defining characteristics of strategy making in the Bush administration was the treatment of any decision involving transnational terrorism as a crisis with a limited slate of participants and a minimal role for professional expertise except on operational and technical considerations. When the administration broke from its predecessors and chose to approach the Iraq issue as part of the war on terrorism rather than as simply an element of regional stability, it shifted to a crisis decision mode. This was unusual since the Iraq conflict did not meet the usual requirements for a crisis: a very high threat and limited decision time. This initial volume provides a review of decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq, and focuses on the how and why certain decisions were made.
Author : Department of Defense,U. S. Army,U. S. Government Publisher : Unknown Page : 45 pages File Size : 41,7 Mb Release : 2017-04-15 Category : Electronic ISBN : 1521072388
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Department of Defense,U. S. Army,U. S. Government Pdf
In 1946, General Walter Bedell Smith wrote a series of articles describing six great decisions made in World War II by General Dwight David Eisenhower, for whom General Smith worked as Chief of Staff, Allied Expeditionary Forces. Writing so soon after the war, General Smith could not hope to produce a definitive history, but felt that writing then would document an important viewpoint of one of the major participants in Eisenhower's many significant decisions.With this initial volume of its Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) also attempts to write about key decisions while they are still fresh in the memories of the participants. As with General Smith's articles, this series will not produce a definitive history; that is still years away. However, the series will make a major contribution to understanding decisions made by senior military and civilian leaders during the several years thus far of the war in Iraq. I am pleased to inaugurate the series, which looks more at the how and why of certain decisions than at the results of those same decisions. This will be particularly useful to senior leaders -- both uniformed and civilian--as they reflect on how decisions were made regarding Iraq and how better decisions might be made in future conflicts.Without taking anything away from Eisenhower's momentous decisions, they seem in some ways to be simpler than those made over the past 8-plus years for the planning and execution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As General James Mattis at Joint Forces Command recently said, the challenges of operating in a counterinsurgency can be greater than in large-scale conventional combat, "since the adversary has more flexibility to determine how, when, where, and whether to fight." This fact--plus the fact that irregular combat is the more likely challenge of the future operating environment--makes it even more important to examine the key decisions of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as soon as possible.The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to initiate its latest monograph series, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions. SSI started this project in an effort to give leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces some important insights into how military advice was provided to the Nation's civilian leadership during the many years--including the months before the invasion--of the war in Iraq. Understanding the ways that military leaders advise those who exercise civilian control over the military is important for the continuing prosecution of that war, but also for the inevitable next time that the United States considers embarking on such an endeavor. A second objective of this series is to provide military and civilian leaders a clearer picture of what they must do to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly prepared--with strategy, doctrine, force structure, equipment, training, and leadership--for future operations.Literature about the war in Iraq is already extensive, although--as the Foreword states -- the definitive history of the war is still undoubtedly years away. However, most of the writing--by policymakers, journalists, scholars, and other students of national security issues -- focuses on the effects of various decisions, not on the decisions themselves. For example, there is ample writing about how the 2003 decision to "de-Ba'athify" the Iraqi government was executed and what effects it had. How that decision was made, though, has been studied less. With this series, SSI intends to make a valuable addition to the literature on the war in Iraq by addressing the how and why of various key strategic decisions that were made over the past 8-plus years of planning and fighting. Some of the effects will inevitably be discussed as well, but the focus will clearly be on the decisionmaking processes, not the subsequent results.
Decision-Making in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Steven Metz,John R. Martin Pdf
By the time Fred Kagan penned the comment cited above, victory had already long been the wrong word to describe whatever outcome was going to befall the American adventure in Iraq. An argument can be made that victory-success against military foes in war-was an appropriate term in April 2003, when U.S. military forces deposed Saddam Hussein, but a military-only victory was far out of reach by 2007. The goal of victory articulated by Kagan and President George W. Bush perhaps still had merit in galvanizing public support of the war.2 However, the better goal- particularly by late 2006, when a virulent insurgency and sectarian violence were raging in Iraq's cities- was some semblance of strategic success, which would not come about purely by military action. That success would necessarily include a significant military component, but also required a broader approach that would support Iraq's economic, political, and societal development. Just as victory over Adolf Hitler in World War II required the Marshall Plan to cement the achievements of combat in Europe, the "victory" of 2003 in Iraq would require by 2007 much more than just military force to produce conditions that would ultimately be helpful to advancing American interests in the Middle East. The military component of the 2007 effort to achieve a positive result in Iraq became popularly known as "the surge." In this second volume of the Strategic Studies Institute's Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz covers this critical decision in the Iraq war, but correctly posits that the surge was only part of a broad strategic shift that produced the success-still tenuous-of 2008 and beyond. In doing so, Dr. Metz debunks some of the "surge triumphalism." In this view, the surge was almost solely responsible for the improvements in security that enabled the emerging positive results in Iraq. General David Petraeus-the man whose name became synonymous with the surge-sees it differently. General Petraeus, who led the surge of troops into Iraq in 2007, freely admits that the success of the surge was due to a confluence of factors. Those factors include Iraqis tiring of both Sunni and Shi'a extremists, Iraqi Security Forces achieving at least limited capacity to provide security, and the U.S. military's growth in tactical and operational prowess in counterinsurgency. Dr. Metz argues that a "perfect storm" of conditions, accompanied by "good thinking, good luck, and good timing," were what allowed the success of the strategic shift that he describes. Dr. Metz may give short shrift to President George W. Bush's resolve and to the skill that General Petraeus and other senior leaders brought to the surge-or the strategic shift-but he presents a solid case against using the surge as a model for future operations, including in Afghanistan. Without similar conditions-and good thinking, luck, and timing- the surge of troops in Afghanistan may not produce anything like the positive strategic results that appear to be emerging in Iraq.
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom by Steven Metz Pdf
The author looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible-perhaps probable-strategic success. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged-with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision-could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the goal of removing Saddam Hussein¿s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction. The focus of OIF has shifted from regime removal to helping the Gov¿t. of Iraq improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. This report addresses these policy issues: Identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and Laying the groundwork for a traditional bilateral relationship. Map. A print on demand report.
U. S. Military,Department of Defense (DoD),U. S. Army (USA),U. S. Government
Author : U. S. Military,Department of Defense (DoD),U. S. Army (USA),U. S. Government Publisher : Unknown Page : 73 pages File Size : 50,9 Mb Release : 2017-04-16 Category : Electronic ISBN : 1521078424
Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom by U. S. Military,Department of Defense (DoD),U. S. Army (USA),U. S. Government Pdf
This unique study in the Operation Iraqi Freedom Key Decisions Monograph Series looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible -- perhaps probable -- strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged--with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision -- could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph is especially timely and shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another where different conditions applied.An argument can be made that victory--success against military foes in war--was an appropriate term in April 2003, when U.S. military forces deposed Saddam Hussein, but a military-only victory was far out of reach by 2007. The goal of victory articulated by Kagan and President George W. Bush perhaps still had merit in galvanizing public support of the war. However, the better goal -- particularly by late 2006, when a virulent insurgency and sectarian violence were raging in Iraq's cities -- was some semblance of strategic success, which would not come about purely by military action. That success would necessarily include a significant military component, but also required a broader approach that would support Iraq's economic, political, and societal development. Just as victory over Adolf Hitler in World War II required the Marshall Plan to cement the achievements of combat in Europe, the "victory" of 2003 in Iraq would require by 2007 much more than just military force to produce conditions that would ultimately be helpful to advancing American interests in the Middle East.The military component of the 2007 effort to achieve a positive result in Iraq became popularly known as "the surge." In this second volume of the Strategic Studies Institute's Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Key Decisions Monograph Series, Dr. Steven Metz covers this critical decision in the Iraq war, but correctly posits that the surge was only part of a broad strategic shift that produced the success -- still tenuous -- of 2008 and beyond. In doing so, Dr. Metz debunks some of the "surge triumphalism." In this view, the surge was almost solely responsible for the improvements in security that enabled the emerging positive results in Iraq. General David Petraeus--the man whose name became synonymous with the surge -- sees it differently. General Petraeus, who led the surge of troops into Iraq in 2007, freely admits that the success of the surge was due to a confluence of factors. Those factors include Iraqis tiring of both Sunni and Shi'a extremists, Iraqi Security Forces achieving at least limited capacity to provide security, and the U.S. military's growth in tactical and operational prowess in counterinsurgency. Dr. Metz argues that a "perfect storm" of conditions, accompanied by "good thinking, good luck, and good timing," were what allowed the success of the strategic shift that he describes. Dr. Metz may give short shrift to President George W. Bush's resolve and to the skill that General Petraeus and other senior leaders brought to the surge--or the strategic shift--but he presents a solid case against using the surge as a model for future operations, including in Afghanistan.
The author examines the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM environment and concludes that the complexity, unpredictability, and ambiguity of postwar Iraq is producing a cohort of innovative, confident, and adaptable junior officers. They are learning to make decisions in chaotic conditions and to be mentally agile in executing counterinsurgency and nation-building operations simultaneously. As a result, the Army will soon have a cohort of company grade officers who are accustomed to operating independently, taking the initiative, and adapting to changes. The author warns that the Army must now acknowledge and encourage this newly developed adaptability in our junior officers or risk stifling the innovation critically needed in the Army's future leaders.
Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War by Anonim Pdf
David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration's conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers -- criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups -- were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. The authors draw attention to a variety of lessons, including the danger that the imperatives of "force protection" may sacrifice the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) overthrew Saddam's regime and opened up one of the world's most secretive governments to outside analysis, presenting a once-in-a-generation opportunity for military leaders and historians to delve deep into the decision-making processes of a former adversary. This study presents a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drove our opponent's decisions through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders and by making extensive use of thousands of official Iraqi documents. The author and his team have crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein's leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision-making process.
Saddam is Iraq by Jerrold M. Post,Amatzia Baram Pdf
Identified as a member of the "axis of evil" by President George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein's Iraq continues to pose a major threat to the region and to Western society. Saddam has doggedly pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction, despite U.N. sanctions imposed at the conclusion of the Gulf crisis. To deal effectively with Saddam Hussein requires a clear understanding of his motivations, perceptions, and decision-making. To provide a framework for this complex political leader, a comprehensive political psychology profile has been developed, and his actions since the crisis analyzed in the context of this political psychology assessment
