Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? by Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt,Enrica Detragiache Pdf
"Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability-- the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak"--Cover.
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt Pdf
Explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability - the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak.Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-97, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak.The adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector.This paper - a product of Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study deposit insurance. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Deposit Insurance: Issues of Principle, Design, and Implementation (RPO 682-90). The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Ensuring Failure by Jack Carr,G. Frank Mathewson,Neil Clayton Quigley,C.D. Howe Institute Pdf
Federal deposit insurance in Canada is provided by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), created by an act of Parliament in 1967 to guarantee certain types of deposits of member institutions up to a limit currently set at $60,000 for each account. This document examines this question and looks at financial system stability and deposit insurance in Canada. More precisely, it focuses on efficiency and political explanations for deposit insurance; the banking system before 1967; the effect of deposit insurance on the banking system; and regulations and depositor compensation.
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? by Ms.Enrica Detragiache,Asli Demirgüç-Kunt Pdf
This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.
Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? by Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt,Enrica Detragiache Pdf
This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.
Deposit insurance was initiated in the 1930s to help restore confidence in the banking system after thousands of banks failed and millions of dollars in deposits were lost during the Great Depression. In 1990, the federal government insured about $3 trillion in deposits in the nation1s banks, thrifts, and credit unions and has to date fulfilled its goal of maintaining the stability of the banking system. This report discusses issues associated with reforming the deposit insurance system, specifically changes to the system that will promote a safe, sound, and stable banking industry. Charts and tables.
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe by Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt Pdf
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in recent years, even to countries with low levels of financial and institutional development. Economic theory indicates that deposit-insurance design features interact--for good or ill--with country-specific elements of the financial and governmental contracting environment. This paper documents the extent of cross-country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the effectiveness of crisis resolution. This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their informational and supervisory environments.
The salience of deposit insurance has increased enormously in recent years as a result of the thrifts crisis in the USA and its proposed introduction to the European Community.
Deposit Insurance Around the World by Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt,Edward James Kane,Luc Laeven Pdf
Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.
Author : Robert J. Cull,Lemma W. Senbet,Marco Sorge Publisher : World Bank Publications Page : 66 pages File Size : 49,6 Mb Release : 2001 Category : Banking law ISBN : 8210379456XXX
Author : G. G. Garcia Publisher : International Monetary Fund Page : 86 pages File Size : 43,7 Mb Release : 2000-03 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : UCSD:31822028585792
Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management by G. G. Garcia Pdf
A well-designed deposit insurance system (DIS) will provide incentives for citizens to keep the financial system sound. However, a poorly designed DIS can foster a financial crisis. This paper, therefore, makes recommendations for creating and running a limited, incentive-compatible, DIS. The paper also examines factors in the decision to grant, temporarily, a comprehensive guarantee, and the design of that guarantee, should a systemic financial crisis nevertheless occur. It concludes with guidance on the removal of that guarantee.
Deposit Insurance and Financial Development by Robert Cull Pdf
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance on financial development and stability, broadly defined to include the level of banking activity and the stability of the banking sector. We use a unique dataset capturing a variety of deposit insurance features across countries, such as coverage, premium structure, etc. and synthesize available information by means of principal component indices. This paper is the first in this field of the literature to specifically address sample selection concerns by estimating a generalized Tobit model both via maximum likelihood and the Heckman 2-step method. The empirical construct is guided by recent theories of banking regulation that employ an agency framework. The basic moral hazard problem is the incentive for depository institutions to engage in excessively high-risk activities, relative to socially optimal outcomes, in order to increase the option value of their deposit insurance guarantee. The overall empirical evidence is consistent with the likelihood that generous government-funded deposit insurance might have a negative impact on financial development and growth in the long run, except in countries where the rule of law is well established and bank supervisors are granted sufficient discretion and independence from legal reprisals. Insurance premium requirements on member banks, even when risk-adjusted, are instead found to have little effect in restraining banks' risk-taking behavior.
Republic of Belarus by International Monetary Fund. European Dept. Pdf
This paper presents an assessment of financial system stability in Belarus. The findings reveal that the state-dominated financial sector of Belarus confronts several critical challenges. Deep and long-standing structural problems and negative external spillovers are distorting the credit channel and overall financial stability. Financial sector contingent liabilities are on the rise, accentuating an already weak fiscal situation. The government is directing a large proportion of loans from state-owned banks to unhedged state-owned companies. Foreign currency liquidity risk is high, and transition to independent and risk-based oversight of the financial sector is urgently required.
