Inventing The Schlieffen Plan Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Inventing The Schlieffen Plan book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.
Inventing the Schlieffen Plan by Terence Zuber Pdf
The existence of the Schlieffen Plan has been one of the basic assumptions of 20th-century military history. Terence Zuber challenges this assumption and presents a different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914. He concludes that there never really was a Schlieffen Plan.
German War Planning, 1891-1914 by Terence Zuber Pdf
Germany's Schlieffen Plan of the First World War is much talked of but little understood. Translations of primary sources recently available clarify the issues involved. The great deficiency in the discussion of German war planning prior to the Great War has been the dearth of reliable primary sources. Practically nothing was made public before the German Reichsarchiv was destroyed in April 1945, and this problem is compounded for Anglophone historians by the fact that the most interesting secondary literature was printed in German periodicals in the early 1920s. This book makes available in English translationmany of the documents concerning German war planning before 1914 that survived the war, but were kept closely guarded by the East German army archives, and only became available with the fall of the wall. Included are the only archival history of German war planning, Wilhelm Dieckmann's Der Schlieffenplan, Hellmuth Greiner's secret history of the German west front intelligence estimate from 1885 to 1914, and two of the younger Moltke's General Staff exercises. The book also presents other little-known documents found in other German archives as well as the most important parts of the 1920s literature concerning the debate on the German war plan. The picture ofGerman war planning which now emerges is both more complex and more credible than the previous single-minded emphasis on the 'Schlieffenplan'. TERENCE ZUBER has also written Inventing the Schlieffen Plan and The Moltke Myth; born in Cleveland, Ohio, he is currently living in Wurzburg, Germany.
Hans Ehlert,Michael Epkenhans,Gerhard P. Gross,David T. Zabecki
Author : Hans Ehlert,Michael Epkenhans,Gerhard P. Gross,David T. Zabecki Publisher : University Press of Kentucky Page : 520 pages File Size : 46,7 Mb Release : 2021-05-11 Category : History ISBN : 9780813182605
The Schlieffen Plan by Hans Ehlert,Michael Epkenhans,Gerhard P. Gross,David T. Zabecki Pdf
With the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance and the failure of the Reinsurance Treaty in the late nineteenth century, Germany needed a strategy for fighting a two-front war. In response, Field Marshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen produced a study that represented the apex of modern military planning. His Memorandum for a War against France, which incorporated a mechanized cavalry as well as new technologies in weaponry, advocated that Germany concentrate its field army to the west and annihilate the French army within a few weeks. For generations, historians have considered Schlieffen's writings to be the foundation of Germany's military strategy in World War I and have hotly debated the reasons why the plan, as executed, failed. In this important volume, international scholars reassess Schlieffen's work for the first time in decades, offering new insights into the renowned general's impact not only on World War I but also on nearly a century of military historiography. The contributors draw on newly available source materials from European and Russian archives to demonstrate both the significance of the Schlieffen Plan and its deficiencies. They examine the operational planning of relevant European states and provide a broad, comparative historical context that other studies lack. Featuring fold-out maps and abstracts of the original German deployment plans as they evolved from 1893 to 1914, this rigorous reassessment vividly illustrates how failures in statecraft as well as military planning led to the tragedy of the First World War.
The Real German War Plan, 1904-14 by Terence Zuber Pdf
The Real German War Plan, 1904–14 fundamentally changes our understanding of German military planning before the First World War. On the basis of newly discovered or long-neglected documents in German military archives, this book gives the first description of Schlieffen's war plans in 1904 and 1905 and Moltke's plans from 1906 to 1914. It explodes unfounded myths concerning German war planning, gives the first appraisal of the actual military and political factors that influenced it, shows that there never was a 'Schlieffen Plan' and reveals Moltke's strategy for a war against Russia from 1909 to 1912. Tracing the decline in the German military position and the recognition by 1913 that Germany would be forced to fight outnumbered on both the eastern and western fronts, it is an essential read for anyone with an interest in the First World War.
The Real German War Plan, 1904-14 by Terernce Zuber Pdf
The Real German War Plan, 1904-14 fundamentally changes our understanding of German military planning before the First World War. On the basis of newly discovered or long-neglected documents in German military archives, this book gives the first description of Schlieffen's war plans in 1904 and 1905 and Moltke's plans from 1906 to 1914. It explodes unfounded myths concerning German war planning, gives the first appraisal of the actual military and political factors that influenced it, shows that there never was a 'Schlieffen Plan' and reveals Moltke's strategy for a war against Russia from 1909 to 1912. Tracing the decline in the German military position and the recognition by 1913 that Germany would be forced to fight outnumbered on both the eastern and western fronts, it is an essential read for anyone with an interest in the First World War.
The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914 by Terence Zuber Pdf
Like the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Frontiers has often been ignored by military historians, who assumed that the French lost the first battles of the World War I because they launched suicidal bayonet charges against German machine guns. Therefore, for nearly a century, these battles have been considered uninteresting. In reality, these were some of the most important, hard-fought and instructive battles of the First World War. The Battle of the Frontiers is the first history of this battle in English and is based on ground-breaking research conducted in French and German army archives. It also makes use of neglected French and German books and articles, as well as German regimental histories, and includes personal accounts by participants such as Manfred von Richthofen (when he was still a cavalry lieutenant) and the young Erwin Rommel. Terence Zuber here presents a dramatic new perspective on combat in 1914.
The Purpose of the First World War by Holger Afflerbach Pdf
Nearly fourteen million people died during the First World War. But why, and for what reason? Already many contemporaries saw the Great War as a "pointless carnage" (Pope Benedict XV, 1917). Was there a point, at least in the eyes of the political and military decision makers? How did they justify the losses, and why did they not try to end the war earlier? In this volume twelve international specialists analyses and compares the hopes and expectations of the political and military leaders of the main belligerent countries and of their respective societies. It shows that the war aims adopted during the First World War were not, for the most part, the cause of the conflict, but a reaction to it, an attempt to give the tragedy a purpose - even if the consequence was to oblige the belligerents to go on fighting until victory. The volume tries to explain why - and for what - the contemporaries thought that they had to fight the Great War.
Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: The Prewar Years and the Early War -- Chapter 2: The Atlanta Campaign and the March to the Sea -- Chapter 3: The Commanding General versus the North -- Chapter 4: The War of the Memoirs -- Chapter 5: Sherman's Last Years -- Chapter 6: Sherman versus the Lost Cause -- Chapter 7: Embracing the Lost Cause -- Chapter 8: Sherman in Film -- Chapter 9: Sherman and the Modern Historians -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
From the master of alternate history comes an epic of the second Civil War. It was an epoch of glory and success, of disaster and despair. . . . 1881: A generation after the South won the Civil War, America writhed once more in the bloody throes of battle. Furious over the annexation of key Mexican territory, the United States declared total war against the Confederate States of America in 1881. But this was a new kind of war, fought on a lawless frontier where the blue and gray battled not only each other but the Apache, the outlaw, the French, and the English. As Confederate General Stonewall Jackson again demonstrated his military expertise, the North struggled to find a leader who could prove his equal. In the Second War Between the States, the times, the stakes, and the battle lines had changed--and so would history. . .
The Schlieffen Plan was the name given after World War I to the theory behind the German invasion of France and Belgium on 4 August 1914. In 1905-1906 Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, the Chief of the Imperial Army German General Staff from 1891-1906, had devised a deployment plan for a war-winning offensive, in a one-front war against the French Third Republic. After the war, the German official historians of the Reichsarchiv and other writers, described the plan as a blueprint for victory. Post-war writing by senior German officers and the Reichsarchiv historians managed to establish a commonly accepted narrative that it was Schlieffen’s successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger’s failure to follow the blueprint, rather than German strategic miscalculation, that resulted in four years of attrition warfare. In 1953, renowned historian Prof. Gerhard Ritter Schlieffen’s unearthed Schlieffen’s papers during a visit to the United States, and he published his findings in the book Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos, presented here in its 1958 English translation, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth. It proved to be an important historical publication, as it set in motion a period of revision, when the details of the supposed Schlieffen Plan were subjected to scrutiny and contextualisation. In Der Schlieffen Plan, Prof. Ritter presents the full text of Schlieffen’s military testament, and the relevant parts of other memoranda which shed light on the evolution of the Plan. They are preceded by Professor Ritter’s masterly exposition of their content and significance, while his accompanying notes add to the illuminating effect. “FOR two generations the Schlieffen Plan has been a magic phrase, embodying one of the chief mysteries and ‘might have beens’ of modern times. The mystery is cleared up and the great ‘If’ analysed in Gerhard Ritter’s book—a striking contribution to twentieth-century history.”—B. H. Liddell Hart
Was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz' plan for naval expansion and the development of a "risk fleet" as a way to position Wilhelmine Germany as a world power to rival Britain so unique? This comparative study of the modern naval strategy of Germany, Britain, France, and the United States seeks to answer that question. First, Hobson is the only naval scholar to simultaneously compare the "Tirpitz Plan" with plans of the other leading nations of that time. Second, Hobson also interacts with how other scholars have assessed the complex interplay between naval history--both in and outside Germany--maritime law, and naval strategy. Hobson offers a unique interpretation of the causes and objectives of the German Imperial Navy at the end of the nineteenth century, forces that ultimately led to the First World War.
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 by G.W.L. Nicholson,Mark Osborne Humphries Pdf
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson's Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 was first published by the Department of National Defence in 1962 as the official history of the Canadian Army’s involvement in the First World War. Immediately after the war ended Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid made a first attempt to write an official history of the war, but the ill-fated project produced only the first of an anticipated eight volumes. Decades later, G.W.L. Nicholson - already the author of an official history of the Second World War - was commissioned to write a new official history of the First. Illustrated with numerous photographs and full-colour maps, Nicholson’s text offers an authoritative account of the war effort, while also discussing politics on the home front, including debates around conscription in 1917. With a new critical introduction by Mark Osborne Humphries that traces the development of Nicholson’s text and analyzes its legacy, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 is an essential resource for both professional historians and military history enthusiasts.
The battle of Verdun lasted ten months. It was a battle in which at least 700,000 men fell, along a front of fifteen miles. Its aim was less to defeat the enemy than bleed him to death and a battleground whose once fertile terrain is even now a haunted wilderness. Alistair Horne's classic work, continuously in print for over fifty years, is a profoundly moving, sympathetic study of the battle and the men who fought there. It shows that Verdun is a key to understanding the First World War to the minds of those who waged it, the traditions that bound them and the world that gave them the opportunity.
"The Moltke Myth is author Terence Zuber's groundbreaking book on Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, the chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years. Often referred to as Moltke the Elder, he is portrayed today as the nearly-infallible victor of the Prussian wars in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria, and in 1871 against France. Moltke the Elder is known as a brilliant, innovative planner and master of the battlefield. The Moltke Myth shows that this "common knowledge" is based solely on hero-worship and simplistic generalizations." "Zuber, a career infantry officer, subjects Moltke's plans and orders to a militarily professional analysis. He asserts a new premise that Moltke was a normal human being who made grave errors like systematically failing to use cavalry reconnaissance and never knowing the location of his enemy. Zuber presents the true story about how realistic peacetime training and tactical excellence in combat helped the Prussian army win battles. The Moltke Myth offers stimulating new perspectives on tactics and strategy in the Wars of German Unification."--BOOK JACKET.
Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning by Arden Bucholz Pdf
Since Germany was the only state in Europe created and destroyed in less than a century by war, an analysis of its war planning system is crucial to a proper understanding of 19th and 20th century German history. This book analyses the first deep-future orientated war planning system, which originated in the Kingdom of Prussia in the early 19th century. Prussia offers a unique case history because of the role its war mechanisms assumed within the bureaucratic forms of the modernising state. Validated in the wars of German unification, these bureaucratic processes were extended into the Second Empire after 1871 and were subsequently employed for both the First and Second World Wars.