Iran S Nuclear Program Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Iran S Nuclear Program book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.
Contents: (1) Background; (2) Recent Nuclear Controversy: Iran¿s Cooperation with the IAEA; (3) Status of Iran¿s Nuclear Programs: Fuel Manufacturing Plant; Uranium Enrichment; Plutonium; Arak Reactor; Bushehr Reactor; (4) Does Iran Have a Nuclear Weapons Program?: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate; Living with Risk; Other Constraints on Nuclear Weapons Ambitions.
Iran's Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons by David Albright,Sarah Burkhard Pdf
"The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. The first part of the book concentrates on Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons and an industrial complex to produce many more. By 2003, responding to growing pressure from European powers to freeze its publicly known nuclear programs and fearing a possible U.S. military attack, Iran’s leaders decided to downsize, but not stop, their secret nuclear weapons effort. The second part of the book discusses Iran’s nuclear path post-2003, revealing a careful plan to continue nuclear weapons work, overcome bottlenecks and better camouflage nuclear weapons development activities. Since 2003, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear scientists and weaponeers have concentrated on establishing capabilities to make weapon-grade uranium and developing more reliable, longer-range ballistic missiles."--Publisher description.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. In 2002, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began investigating allegations that Iran had conducted clandestine nuclear activities. Ultimately, the agency reported that some of these activities had violated Tehran¿s IAEA safeguards agree. The IAEA referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council in Feb. 2006. The Security Council required Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA¿s investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. This report provides an overview of Iran¿s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA and the Security Council.
Reassessing the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran by Judith S. Yaphe Pdf
This monograph reexamines the strategic implications for the United States in the event Iran moves ahead to acquire nuclear weapons capability. This study draws on expert workshops held in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in January and February 2005, as well as meetings, interviews, and research conducted at NDU and elsewhere over the past several years. Chapters are as follows: "Iran's Perspective: National Rights and Nuclear Weapons," "Neighbors, Negotiators, and Nonproliferators," and "U.S. Policy Options." Appendixes include "Timeline of Iran's Path to Nuclear Weapons," "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects," and "Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments."
Iran's Nuclear Program: Status by Paul K. Kerr Pdf
Although Iran claims that its nuclear programs are exclusively for peaceful purposes, they have generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the UN Security Council has responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment and heavy-water nuclear reactor programs by adopting several resolutions which imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite this pressure, Iran continues at its Natanz centrifuge facility to enrich uranium, expand the number of operating centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also continued to produce centrifuge feedstock, as well as work on its heavy-water reactor and associated facilities. Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program is, however, unknown. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in December 2007 assessed that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program, defined as Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment related work, in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is inherently reversible. Although Iran has cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to an extent, the agency says that Tehran has not gone far enough to alleviate all of the agency's concerns about Iran s enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. The IAEA continues to investigate the program, particularly evidence that Tehran may have conducted procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. This report expands and replaces RS21592, Iran s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni, and will be updated as necessary.
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Author : The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Publisher : Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Page : 24 pages File Size : 52,7 Mb Release : 2017-10-02 Category : Antiques & Collectibles ISBN : 9789948008484
Iran's Nuclear Program by The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Pdf
International suspicion surrounding Iran's nuclear activities was first aroused in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it was not until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) launched an intensive investigation into the Iranian nuclear program in 2002, that it was revealed that Iran had enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities in the absence of IAEA safeguards. In January 2006, Iran began to ignore limitations on nuclear fuel cycle activities yet again, in defiance of the broad opinion of the international community and despite both offers of assistance and the threat of sanctions. To discuss the issue of Iran's nuclear program and its possible future repercussions on regional and global security, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) hosted a symposium entitled Iran's Nuclear Program: Realities and Repercussions, in Abu Dhabi on February 26, 2006. Visiting experts were invited to share their views on the Iranian nuclear program, its likely development and the extent to which the potential threat of nuclear weapons could destabilize the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East region. This volume represents a valuable collection of these expert views, covering Iran's current nuclear capability and its potential to develop atomic weapons; the changes and developments in Iran's nuclear program since the 2005 Iranian presidential elections; Israeli foreign policy in relation to Iran; the possible impact that an Iranian nuclear program could have on the security of the GCC; and the prospect of military action against Iran.
Iran?s Nuclear Program by Congressional Research Service Pdf
Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities, which can produce both Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) suitable for power plans, and weapons grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), is currently the main source of proliferation concern. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is "inherently reversible." Obtaining fissile material is viewed as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium-the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and resolution. Then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.
Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The United States has assessed that Tehran has technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress in February 2016 that "[w]e do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons." Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235 which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran has also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU would, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its uranium enrichment program and heavy-water reactor program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, comprise the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution. Then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government made the decision to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has lengthened this time to one year, according to Clapper's February 2016 testimony. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.
Getting Ready for Nuclear-Ready Iran by Anonim Pdf
Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran's nuclear program, Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran's nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran's continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats. These questions are the focus of this volume. The book is divided into four parts. The first presents the endings of the NPEC's working group on Iran. It reflects interviews with government officials and outside specialists and the work of some 20 regional security experts whom NPEC convened in Washington to discuss the commissioned research that is contained in this book. Some of this report's endings to keep Iran and others from overtly deploying nuclear weapons or leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are beginning to gain official support. The U.S. Government, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an increasing number of allies now support the idea that states that violate the NPT be held accountable for their transgressions, even if they should withdraw from the treaty. There also has been increased internal governmental discussion about the need to clarify what should be permitted under the rubric of "peaceful" nuclear energy as delineated under the NPT. The remaining report recommendations, which were presented in testimony before Congress in March of 2005, remain to be acted upon.
Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions by Henry D. Sokolski,Patrick Clawson Pdf
Considering the latest Iranian nuclear developments, one might question whether a study now on how best to restrain Tehran is simply one that's come too late. To be sure, estimates vary as to when Iran could build its first bomb. Some believe Tehran could do it before the end of 2005; others think Iran would only be able to do so by the end of the decade. In either case, though, the die seems cast: If Iran wants, it has all that it needs eventually to build a bomb on its own. Certainly, trying to deny Iran further nuclear technology in the hopes that this will prevent it from getting nuclear weapons is no longer a credible strategy. The questions this edited volume addresses are whether or not any strategy can prevent Iran from going nuclear, what the proper goals of such a strategy might be (deterring use, keeping Tehran from deploying weapons, getting it to dismantle its nuclear program, etc.), and what other nonproliferation goals ought to be attempted (including trying to dissuade other nations from following Iran's example). The answers this volume offers are: 1) in the long-run Iran will gain little from going nuclear, and 2) much can be gained by enforcing the nonproliferation rules Iran agreed to and spelling out the costs to Iran of its continuing acquisition of nuclear weapons- related capabilities.
Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Can the World Tolerate an Iran with Nuclear Weapons? by Amos Yadlin,Charles Krauthammer,Fareed Zakaria,Vali Nasr Pdf
With tensions between Iran, Israel, and Western powers reaching new highs over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear enrichment program, the tenth edition of the Munk Debates investigates how the world should respond to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. For some, the case for a pre-emptive strike on Iran is ironclad. An Iranian bomb would flood the volatile Middle East with nuclear weapons and trap Israel in a state of perilous insecurity — along with much of the world’s oil supply. Others argue that a nuclear Iran could be the very stabilizing force that the region needs, as the threat of nuclear war makes conventional conflicts more risky. These same voices also ask: can the West and Israel afford to attack Iran when doing so could roll back the Arab Spring and re-entrench reactionary forces throughout the Middle East? In this edition of the Munk Debates — Canada’s premier international debate series — former Israel Defense Forces head of military intelligence Amos Yadlin, Pulitzer Prize–winning political commentator Charles Krauthammer, CNN host Fareed Zakaria, and Iranian-born academic Vali Nasr debate the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. For the first time ever, this electrifying debate, which played to a sold-out audience, is now available in print, along with candid interviews with the debaters. With tempers flaring between governments, the world’s oil supply in peril, and global security at risk, the Munk Debate on Iran tries to answer: Can the world tolerate an Iran with nuclear weapons?
Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Author : Robin B. Wright Publisher : US Institute of Peace Press Page : 282 pages File Size : 47,8 Mb Release : 2010 Category : History ISBN : 9781601270849
A comprehensive but concise overview of Iran's politics, economy, military, foreign policy, and nuclear program. The volume chronicles U.S.-Iran relations under six American presidents and probes five options for dealing with Iran. Organized thematically, this book provides top-level briefings by 50 top experts on Iran (both Iranian and Western authors) and is a practical and accessible "go-to" resource for practitioners, policymakers, academics, and students, as well as a fascinating wealth of information for anyone interested in understanding Iran's pivotal role in world politics.
