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Author : David Ryan,John Dumbrell
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 257 pages
File Size : 53,5 Mb
Release : 2007-01-24
Category : History
ISBN : 9781134135288
The essays in this book offer a series of perspectives on connections and parallels between the Vietnam War and the 2003 invasion of, and current conflict in, Iraq.
Author : Lloyd C. Gardner,Marilyn B. Young
Publisher : The New Press
Page : 479 pages
File Size : 48,9 Mb
Release : 2011-07-19
Category : History
ISBN : 9781595587374
Essays by Christian G. Appy, Andrew J. Bacevich, John Prados, and others offer “history at its best, meaning, at its most useful.” —Howard Zinn From the launch of the “Shock and Awe” invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush’s declaration of “Mission Accomplished” two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true—that US foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the “Vietnam Syndrome.” Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country’s leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, this book assembles a distinguished group to consider how America found itself once again in the midst of a quagmire—and the continuing debate about the purpose and exercise of American power. Also includes contributions from: Alex Danchev * David Elliott * Elizabeth L. Hillman * Gabriel Kolko * Walter LaFeber * Wilfried Mausbach * Alfred W. McCoy * Gareth Porter “Essential.” —Bill Moyers
Author : Kenneth J. Campbell,Richard A. Falk
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 137 pages
File Size : 43,6 Mb
Release : 2015-12-03
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781317251033
Is Iraq becoming another Vietnam? Author Kenneth Campbell received a Purple Heart after serving 13 months in Vietnam. He then spent years campaigning to get the US out of the war. Here, Campbell lays out the political similarities of both wars. He traces the chief lessons of Vietnam, which helped America successfully avoid quagmires for thirty years, and explains how neoconservatives within the Bush administration cynically used the tragedy of 9/11 to override the "Vietnam syndrome" and drag America into a new quagmire in Iraq. In view of where the U.S. finds itself today -- unable to stay but unable to leave -- Campbell recommends that America re-dedicate itself to the essential lessons of Vietnam: the danger of imperial arrogance, the limits of military force, the importance of international and constitutional law, and the power of morality.
Author : Raymond M. Scurfield
Publisher : Algora Publishing
Page : 244 pages
File Size : 41,6 Mb
Release : 2006
Category : History
ISBN : 9780875864860
A nationally renowned PTSD authority reveals the psychiatric impact of war on soldiers and veterans, dented or minimized by government and the military. Through efforts to treat veterans of past conflicts he illustrates the inevitability of lifelong psychiatric scars from today's conflicts as well.
Author : James H. Lebovic
Publisher : JHU Press
Page : 311 pages
File Size : 52,8 Mb
Release : 2010-06-30
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780801897504
Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts—especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
Author : Jeffrey Record,W. Andrew Terrill
Publisher : Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
Page : 88 pages
File Size : 42,5 Mb
Release : 2004
Category : History
ISBN : UOM:39015061093053
U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. The authors conclude that the military dimensions of the two conflicts bear little comparison. Among other things,the sheer scale of the Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs that of the Iraq War. They also conclude; however, that failed U.S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic political support for U.S. war aims in Vietnam are issues pertinent to current U.S. policy in Ira
Author : James H. Lebovic
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 240 pages
File Size : 40,7 Mb
Release : 2019-03-07
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780190935337
The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.
Author : Robert K. Brigham
Publisher : PublicAffairs
Page : 240 pages
File Size : 49,9 Mb
Release : 2008-07-22
Category : History
ISBN : 9780786731732
Since the first days of the Iraqi invasion, supporters of the war have cautioned the public not to view this conflict as another Vietnam. They rightfully point to many important distinctions. There is no unified resistance in Iraq. No political or religious leader has been able to galvanize opposition to U.S. intervention the way that Ho Chi Minh did in Vietnam. And it is not likely that 580,000 American troops will find their way to Iraq. However, there are two similarities that may dwarf the thousands of differences. First, in Iraq, like Vietnam, the original rationale for going to war has been discredited and public support has dwindled. Second, in both cases the new justification became building stable societies. There are enormous pitfalls in America's nation building efforts in Iraq as there were in Vietnam. But it is the business we now find ourselves in, and there is no easy retreat from it morally. As American frustration increases, some policy makers are making the deadly mistake of approaching problems in Iraq as if we are facing them for the first time. It is crucial that we apply the lessons of Vietnam wisely and selectively.
Author : Raymond M. Scurfield
Publisher : Algora Publishing
Page : 490 pages
File Size : 50,8 Mb
Release : 2006
Category : History
ISBN : 9780875864877
War Trauma draws on the experience of prior wars for valuable insights to help people who are now in the military or in the healing professions, and their families and communities, to deal with todays realities of combat and its aftermath -- which so often entails PTSD (post-traumatic stresss syndrome), depression and the risk of suicide. This is part three in A Vietnam Trilogy, which studies the psychiatric impact of war on soldiers and veterans, and their families. The effects go on for decades after the violence occurred, and we are still just learning to understand the depth and variety of problems it can cause. Further, Scurfield documents his proven innovative therapies for treating PTSD. This third volume looks at what military and mental health professionals -- and the Veterans Administration (VA) -- should have learned from the Vietnam War in order to better protect American servicemen and servicewomen in later conflicts and to help them recover afterwards. The Persian Gulf War, for instance, had an immense impact on veterans of all wars. The author was a national faculty member for joint VA-DOD training programs to enhance mental health response readiness for receiving anticipated medical and psychiatric casualties from the Persian Gulf War. What he found was a resurgence of selective amnesia and denial about the true impact of war. Scurfield notes, "Chillingly, what happened in Vietnam in 1968--69 regarding psychiatric casualties has enormous parallels to what is happening today regarding U.S. psychiatric casualties from the Iraq War."
Author : David Fitzgerald
Publisher : Stanford University Press
Page : 298 pages
File Size : 45,6 Mb
Release : 2013-06-26
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780804786423
Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances. The book outlines how the construction of lessons is tied to the construction of historical memory and demonstrates how histories are constructed to serve the needs of the present. In so doing, it creates a new theory of doctrinal development.
Author : William Rosenau
Publisher : Rand Corporation
Page : 73 pages
File Size : 54,6 Mb
Release : 2001-12-05
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780833032300
In the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf conflict, special operations forces (SOF) conducted reconnaissance operations to locate hidden targets when political and other considerations prevented the deployment of conventional ground units and air power alone was unable to locate and eliminate elusive objectives. In Vietnam, SOF teams crossed the border into Laos to search for truck parks, storage depots, and other assets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail that were obscured by jungle canopy and camouflage. In western Iraq, British and American SOF patrolled vast areas searching for mobile Scud launchers. In both cases, the nature of the terrain combined with adversary countermeasures made it extremely difficult for ground teams to achieve their objectives. There are a number of implications for future operations. Although new technology, such as mini- and micro-unmanned aerial vehicles, may make it easier to teams to reconnoiter wide areas, using SOF in this fashion is unlikely to achieve U.S. objectives. Concerns about casualties and prisoners of war are likely to limit the use of SOF to the most vital national interests. However, unattended ground sensors could play an enhanced role in future operations. Although most will be delivered by air, some will require hand emplacement in difficult enemy terrain, a mission well suited to SOF. SOF in a battle damage assessment role could help ensure that critical targets have been destroyed. Finally, SOF might disable, destroy, or recover nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
Author : Chris Mason,U S Army War College Press
Publisher : Independently Published
Page : 234 pages
File Size : 46,9 Mb
Release : 2019-05-16
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1098969456
The wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were lost before they began, not on the battlefields, where the United States won every tactical engagement, but at the strategic level of war. In each case, the U.S. Government attempted to create a Western-style democracy in countries which were decades at least away from being nations with the sociopolitical capital necessary to sustain democracy and, most importantly, accept it as a legitimate source of governance. The expensive indigenous armies created in the image of the U.S. Army lacked both the motivation to fight for illegitimate governments in Saigon, Baghdad, and Kabul and a cause that they believed was worth dying for, while their enemies in the field clearly did not. This book examines the Afghan National Security Forces in historical and political contexts, explains why they will fail at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war, why they cannot and will not succeed in holding the southern half of the country, and what will happen in Afghanistan year-by-year from 2015 to 2019. Finally, it examines what the critical lessons unlearned of these conflicts are for U.S. military leaders, why these fundamental political lessons seem to remain unlearned, and how the strategic mistakes of the past can be avoided in the future.
Author : John Nagl
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing USA
Page : 273 pages
File Size : 43,5 Mb
Release : 2002-10-30
Category : History
ISBN : 9780313077036
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author : Robert K. Brigham
Publisher : PublicAffairs
Page : 224 pages
File Size : 48,6 Mb
Release : 2006-08-28
Category : History
ISBN : 1586484133
Since the first days of the Iraqi invasion, supporters of the war have cautioned the public not to view this conflict as another Vietnam. They rightfully point to many important distinctions. There is no unified resistance in Iraq. No political or religious leader has been able to galvanize opposition to U.S. intervention the way that Ho Chi Minh did in Vietnam. And it is not likely that 580,000 American troops will find their way to Iraq. However, there are two similarities that may dwarf the thousands of differences. First, in Iraq, like Vietnam, the original rationale for going to war has been discredited and public support has dwindled. Second, in both cases the new justification became building stable societies. There are enormous pitfalls in America's nation building efforts in Iraq as there were in Vietnam. But it is the business we now find ourselves in, and there is no easy retreat from it morally. As American frustration increases, some policy makers are making the deadly mistake of approaching problems in Iraq as if we are facing them for the first time. It is crucial that we apply the lessons of Vietnam wisely and selectively.
Author : Stephen C. Pelletiere,Douglas V. Johnson
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 136 pages
File Size : 49,7 Mb
Release : 1991
Category : Government publications
ISBN : STANFORD:36105082331088
