Mexico S Drug Trafficking Organizations Source And Scope Of The Rising Violence
Mexico S Drug Trafficking Organizations Source And Scope Of The Rising Violence Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Mexico S Drug Trafficking Organizations Source And Scope Of The Rising Violence book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.
Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Rising Violence by June S. Beittel Pdf
Report which provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico, identifies the major drug trafficking organizations, and analyzes the context, scope, and scale of the violence. It examines current trends of the violence, analyzes prospects for curbing violence in the future, and compares it with violence in Colombia.
Mexico's Drug-Related Violence by June S. Beittel Pdf
Drug-related violence in Mexico spiked in recent years as drug trafficking org. (DTOs) competed for control of smuggling routes into the U.S. For at least 40 years Mexico has been among the most important producer and supplier of heroin, marijuana and (later) meth. to the U.S. market. Now, it is the leading source of all three drugs and is the leading transit country for cocaine coming from S. Amer. to the U.S. Contents of this 5/09 report: (1) Drug Trafficking in Mexico: Background on Mexico¿s Anti-drug Efforts; Major DTOs in Mexico; Other Groups and Emergent Cartels; Pervasive Corruption and the Drug Trade; (2) Escalation of Violence in 2008 and 2009: Causes; Location; (3) U.S. Policy Response; The Mérida Initiative. Charts and tables.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States and have "the greatest drug trafficking influence," according to the annual U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment. These organizations work across the Western Hemisphere and globally. They are involved in extensive money laundering, bribery, gun trafficking, and corruption, while causing Mexico's homicide rates to spike. They produce and traffic illicit drugs into the United States, including heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and powerful synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and they traffic South American cocaine. As Mexico's transnational crime groups expanded their control of the opioids market, U.S. overdoses rose sharply to a record level in 2017, with more than half of the 72,000 overdose deaths (47,000) involving opioids. Although preliminary 2018 data indicate a slight decline in overdose deaths, many analysts believe trafficking continues to evolve toward opioids making possible a future rise of overdose deaths from opioids. This prospect deeply concerns Congress. In July 2019, the notorious crime boss Joaquin Guzmán Loera ("El Chapo") received a life sentence in a maximum-security U.S. prison for his role leading the Sinaloa Cartel. Guzmán had been extradited by Mexico to the United States in January 2017, following two escapes from Mexican prisons. The major Mexican DTOs, while increasing their business in opioid supply, have continued to diversify into such crimes as human smuggling and oil theft. According to the Mexican government's latest estimates, illegally siphoned oil from Mexico's state-owned oil company costs the government about $3 billion annually. Mexico's DTOs have been in constant flux. Former Mexican President Felipe Calderón (20062012) launched an aggressive campaign against the country's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government; the DTOs violently resisted this campaign. By some accounts, there were four dominant DTOs in 2006: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which increased instability among the groups and violence. Over the past 12 years, Mexico's large and comparatively more stable DTOs fragmented, creating at first seven major groups, and then nine, which are briefly described in this report. The DEA has identified those nine organizations as Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, La Familia Michoacana, the Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco-New Generation (CJNG). Mexico's intentional homicide rate reached new records in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, Mexico's national public security system reported more than 17,000 homicides between January and June, setting a new record. For some Members of Congress, this situation has increased concern about a policy of returning Central American migrants to cities across the border in Mexico to await their U.S. asylum hearings in areas with some of Mexico's highest homicide rates. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected in a landslide in July 2018, heads a new party, MORENA. He campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime, including the drug trade. He aimed to avoid the previous two administrations' failure to lower violence and insecurity. According to some analysts, challenges for López Obrador since his inauguration include a persistently ad hoc approach to security; absence of strategic and tactical intelligence concerning an increasingly fragmented, multipolar, and opaque criminal market; and endemic corruption of Mexico's judicial and law enforcement systems.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States and have "the greatest drug trafficking influence," according to the annual U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment. These organizations work across the Western Hemisphere and globally. They are involved in extensive money laundering, bribery, gun trafficking, and corruption, and they cause Mexico's homicide rates to spike. They produce and traffic illicit drugs into the United States, including heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, and powerful synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, and they traffic South American cocaine. Over the past decade, Congress has held numerous hearings addressing violence in Mexico, U.S. counternarcotics assistance, and border security issues. Mexican DTO activities significantly affect the security of both the United States and Mexico. As Mexico's DTOs expanded their control of the opioids market, U.S. overdoses rose sharply to a record level in 2017, with more than half of the 72,000 overdose deaths (47,000) involving opioids. Although preliminary 2018 data indicate a slight decline in overdose deaths, many analysts believe trafficking continues to evolve toward opioids. The major Mexican DTOs, also referred to as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), have continued to diversify into such crimes as human smuggling and oil theft while increasing their lucrative business in opioid supply. According to the Mexican government's latest estimates, illegally siphoned oil from Mexico's state-owned oil company costs the government about $3 billion annually. Mexico's DTOs have been in constant flux. In 2006, four DTOs were dominant: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juárez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes Organization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which increased instability among the groups and violence. Over the next dozen years, Mexico's large and comparatively more stable DTOs fragmented, creating at first seven major groups, and then nine, which are briefly described in this report. The DEA has identified those nine organizations as Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juárez/CFO, Beltrán Leyva, Gulf, La Familia Michoacana, the Knights Templar, and Cartel Jalisco-New Generation (CJNG). In mid-2019, leader of the long-dominant Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquin ("El Chapo") Guzmán, was sentenced to life in a maximum-security U.S. prison, spurring further fracturing of a once hegemonic DTO. By some accounts, a direct effect of this fragmentation has been escalated levels of violence. Mexico's intentional homicide rate reached new records in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, Mexico's national public security system reported more than 17,000 homicides between January and June, setting a new record. In the last months of 2019, several fragments of formerly cohesive cartels conducted flagrant acts of violence. For some Members of Congress, this situation has increased concern about a policy of returning Central American migrants to cities across the border in Mexico to await their U.S. asylum hearings in areas with some of Mexico's highest homicide rates. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected in a landslide in July 2018, campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime, including the drug trade. According to some analysts, challenges for López Obrador since his inauguration include a persistently ad hoc approach to security; the absence of strategic and tactical intelligence concerning an increasingly fragmented, multipolar, and opaque criminal market; and endemic corruption of Mexico's judicial and law enforcement systems. In December 2019, Genero Garcia Luna, a former top security minister under the Felipe Calderón Administration (2006-2012), was arrested in the United States on charges he had taken enormous bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel.
Mexico Is Not Colombia by Christopher Paul,Colin P. Clarke,Chad C. Serena Pdf
Despite the scope of the threat they pose to Mexico’s security, violent drug-trafficking organizations are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified. While there is no perfectly analogous case to Mexico’s current security situation, historical case studies may offer lessons for policymakers as they cope with challenges related to violence and corruption in that country.
The notorious drug trafficking kingpin Joaqu�n "El Chapo" Guzm�n is now imprisoned in the United States awaiting trial, following the Mexican government's decision to extradite him to the United States on January 19, 2017, the day before President Trump took office. Guzm�n is charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conducting drug-related crimes as the purported leader of the Mexican criminal syndicate commonly known as the Sinaloa cartel. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains that the Sinaloa cartel has the widest reach into U.S. cities of any transnational criminal organization. In November 2016, in its National Drug Threat Assessment, the DEA stated that Mexican drug trafficking groups are working to expand their presence, particularly in the heroin markets inside the United States. Over the years, Mexico's criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and increasingly the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl.Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have been in constant flux. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Ju�rez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured. In recent years, the DEA has identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Ju�rez/CFO, Beltr�n Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations might be viewed as the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. New crime groups have emerged since the December 2012 inauguration of Mexican President Enrique Pe�a Nieto, who has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and oil syphoning, posing a governance challenge to President Pe�a Nieto as daunting as that faced by his predecessors.Former Mexican President Felipe Calder�n (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. Such violence appears to be rising again in Mexico. In January 2017, the country registered more homicides than in any January since the government began to release national crime data in the late 1980s. In a single weekend in April 2017, more than 35 died in what was assumed to be drug trafficking-related violence.Although the Mexican government no longer estimates organized crime-related homicides, some independent analysts have claimed that murders linked to organized crime may have exceeded 100,000 since 2006, when President Calder�n began his campaign against the DTOs. Mexico's government reported that the annual number of all homicides in Mexico declined after Calder�n left office in 2012 by about 16% in 2013 and 15% in 2014, only to rise in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, the Mexican government reported a 22% increase in all homicides to 22,932, almost reaching the high point of nearly 23,000 murders in 2011, Mexico's most violent year.The 115th Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape has been significantly altered by fragmentation and how the organizational shape-shifting continues.
Mexico's Drug Trafficking Violence by Willis Chambers Pdf
The violence generated by Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in recent years has been unprecedented. Although violence has been an inherent feature of the trade in illicit drugs, the character of the drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has been increasingly brutal. Several politicians and journalists have been murdered and mass killings of young people and migrants using torture and car bombs have led some analysts to question whether the violence has been transformed into something new, requiring a different set of policy responses. This book provides background on drug trafficking in Mexico, identifies the major drug trafficking organizations, and analyzes prospects for curbing violence in the future.
Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean by Anonim Pdf
This report is one of several studies conducted by UNODC on organized crime threats around the world. These studies describe what is known about the mechanics of contraband trafficking - the what, who, how, and how much of illicit flows - and discuss their potential impact on governance and development. Their primary role is diagnostic, but they also explore the implications of these findings for policy. Publisher's note.
Votes, Drugs, and Violence by Guillermo Trejo,Sandra Ley Pdf
When widespread state-criminal collusion persists in transitions from autocracy to democracy, electoral competition becomes a catalyst of large-scale criminal violence.
Mexico Is Not Colombia by Christopher Paul,Colin P. Clarke,Chad C. Serena Pdf
Although there is no perfectly analogous case to Mexico s current security situation, policymakers stand to benefit from historical lessons and efforts correlated with improvement in countries facing challenges related to violence and corruption."
Drug Cartel and Gang Violence in Mexico and Central America by Robert O. Kirkland Pdf
"Gives readers an overview of the issues associated with drugs, cartels, and gangs in Mexico and Central America. The readings are based on years of field research and interviews with regional leaders and local actors. The book examines the history and growth of Mexican drug cartels and the central role corruption plays in facilitating drug trafficking while simultaneously debilitating the Mexican state's efforts to confront them. The rise of Mexican community-based crime fighting is also discussed, as well as the changing role of Central American gangs, particularly in their relationship with Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. This edition includes new readings that feature current data and statistics on Mexican drug cartels and Central American gang violence, as well as an evaluation of Mexico's response to events in Jalisco from 2015-2018. Highly accessible, yet replete with valuable information and insight ... is ideal for courses in criminal justice, homeland security, and Latin American studies." -- Page 4 of cover.
Now in its sixth year, the conflict in Mexico is a mosaic of several wars occurring at once: cartels battle one another, cartels suffer violence within their own organizations, cartels fight against the Mexican state, cartels and gangs wage war against the Mexican people, and gangs combat gangs. The war has killed more than 60,000 people since President Felipe Calderón began cracking down on the cartels in December 2006. The targets of the violence have been wide ranging--from police officers to journalists, from clinics to discos. Governments on either side of the U.S.- Mexican border have been unable to control the violence. The war has spilled over into American cities and affects domestic policy issues ranging from immigration to gun control, making the border the nexus of national security and public safety concerns. Drawing on fieldwork along the border and interviews with officials at the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Department of Defense, U.S. Border Patrol, and Mexican military officers, Paul Rexton Kan argues that policy responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent stoking more cartel violence, to cut the incentives to smuggle drugs into the United States, and to stop the erosion of Mexican governmental capacity.
There has been a recent increase in the level of drug trafficking-related violence within and between the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. This violence has generated concern among U.S. policy makers that the violence in Mexico might spill over into the U.S. Currently, U.S. federal officials deny that the recent increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has resulted in a spillover into the U.S., but they acknowledge that the prospect is a serious concern. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) The Southwest Border Region and the Illicit Drug Trade Between the U.S. and Mexico; (3) Relationship Between Illicit Drug Markets and Violence; (4) What is Spillover Violence?: (5) Challenges in Evaluating and Responding to Spillover Violence.
The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations by Christopher Paul,Agnes Gereben Schaefer,Colin P. Clarke Pdf
A RAND team conducted a Delphi expert elicitation exercise, the results of which offer an assessment of the contemporary security situation in Mexico through the lens of existing RAND research on urban instability and unrest, historical insurgencies, and defense-sector reform. Assessment scorecards from these projects were used to obtain input from the expert panel and to guide the resulting discussion.
