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Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 by Arden Bucholz Pdf
The Prussian army invented modern war processes, and Helmuth von Moltke (1800 - 1891) was the first modern war planner. His accomplishment was to develop, bring to fruition and validate the war processes invented during his lifetime. In this book, Bucholz examines Moltke's work and the processes he utilised in each of the three wars of German unification: against Denmark (1864), Austria (1865) and France (1870-71). Moltke's achievements have become a legacy for modern military strategists. The procedures he developed have been used in all of the wars of the twentieth century - the Persian Gulf War of 1991 may be its most interesting example - beacuse they respond to the size, space, time and technology mandates of industrial mass warfare. This book describes and analyzes these developments in a unique way, by using organisational, knowledge and learning theory, by looking closely at Moltke's life as a professional soldier and by bringing little-known research in the field to a wider audience.
Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871 by Arden Bucholz Pdf
The Prussian army invented modern war processes, and Helmuth von Moltke (1800 - 1891) was the first modern war planner. His accomplishment was to develop, bring to fruition and validate the war processes invented during his lifetime. In this book, Bucholz examines Moltke's work and the processes he utilised in each of the three wars of German unification: against Denmark (1864), Austria (1865) and France (1870-71). Moltke's achievements have become a legacy for modern military strategists. The procedures he developed have been used in all of the wars of the twentieth century - the Persian Gulf War of 1991 may be its most interesting example - beacuse they respond to the size, space, time and technology mandates of industrial mass warfare. This book describes and analyzes these developments in a unique way, by using organisational, knowledge and learning theory, by looking closely at Moltke's life as a professional soldier and by bringing little-known research in the field to a wider audience.
"The Moltke Myth is author Terence Zuber's groundbreaking book on Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke, the chief of staff of the Prussian Army for thirty years. Often referred to as Moltke the Elder, he is portrayed today as the nearly-infallible victor of the Prussian wars in 1864 against Denmark, in 1866 against Austria, and in 1871 against France. Moltke the Elder is known as a brilliant, innovative planner and master of the battlefield. The Moltke Myth shows that this "common knowledge" is based solely on hero-worship and simplistic generalizations." "Zuber, a career infantry officer, subjects Moltke's plans and orders to a militarily professional analysis. He asserts a new premise that Moltke was a normal human being who made grave errors like systematically failing to use cavalry reconnaissance and never knowing the location of his enemy. Zuber presents the true story about how realistic peacetime training and tactical excellence in combat helped the Prussian army win battles. The Moltke Myth offers stimulating new perspectives on tactics and strategy in the Wars of German Unification."--BOOK JACKET.
Moltke’s Projects for the Campaign of 1866 Against Austria by Field Marshal Graf Helmuth von Moltke Pdf
Originally published in 1907, this is the translation by the British Army War Office of Field Marshal Moltke’s military papers relating to the war of 1866 (first published in their original German in 1896). “A NEW light was thrown upon the campaign of 1864 by the publication, in 1892, of Moltke’s military correspondence during that war—a volume which revealed, as nothing published before it had done, the brilliant abilities and resolute character of the Prussian general. That delightful volume was followed, in 1896, by the publication of a selection from Moltke’s military papers relating to the war of 1866...They are divided into four parts, collected under the headings of preparation, mobilization, and deployment, the actual operations, the truce and peace. The chief interest of these disclosures lies in the first part, for it is the arrangements for the first deployment and subsequent concentration of the Prussian Army that have formed the principal subject of controversy in regard to this campaign. Moreover, since the construction of railways, the great importance which always in every campaign has attached to the opening has been, if anything, increased. The opening is usually arranged with a deliberation impossible in the subsequent stages of the action. It is the part of the game which admits of the completest study beforehand, and it is the part in which for this campaign abundant evidence is now given. Moltke’s colleagues of the Staff have told us since his death that they were much impressed by his habitual effort to think things out, and that he used in this process to assist himself by putting his thoughts on paper and rewriting his analysis or his argument again and again until he found it satisfactory.”
This detailed and comprehensive book offers the first modern biography of Helmuth Von Moltke, a major progenitor of the processes modern great powers use to engage in large-scale warfare. Drawing upon the author's own previously published works, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning and Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871, it also contains original research. The volume suggests that the General Staff was a pioneer of what became known in the twentieth century as 'operations research', establishing some of the framework for the modern economics of transportation. However, Moltke was much more than just a Prussian soldier and strategist. He was a best-selling author (travel writings, love letters), pioneer cartographer (Asia Minor, Rome, Silesia), dedicated lover and devoted husband, legislator, linguist, family leader, music lover, and spa devotee. Helmuth Von Moltke will appeal to students of military history and strategy, as well as historians of nineteenth century Germany.
Moltke: His Life and Character by Field Marshal Graf Helmuth von Moltke Pdf
Originally published in 1892, this is a memoir of German Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke (the Elder), chief of staff of the Prussian Army for 30 years, compiled from numerous personal journals, letters, and notes. It also draws on his father’s memoirs and one of Moltke’s tales, “The Two Friends.” Richly illustrated throughout with drawings by Moltke, portraits and facsimile letters. “THE nature of the subject of this volume rendered it impossible that the contents should appear as if cast in one mould. This circumstance might be regarded as a defect, but its justification will be found partly in the many-sided character of a long and eventful life, which showed a rich development and a mature perfection of every human faculty, and partly in the fact that for some periods of this life original authorities were lacking. The volume is therefore intended, as was inevitable, to produce its effect by the impression it makes as a whole. Our knowledge of the Field-Marshal must be supplemented from notes regarding his family and his own life, from journals of travels, and records of the many impulses, scientific and artistic, to which his travels gave rise; further, from an attempt in the region of Belles Lettres—the novel of “The Two Friends,” in which he, the man of eight-and-twenty, paints himself true to the life; finally, from the vigorous productions of his old age, with their strivings after the highest truth, which, under the title of “Consolatory Thoughts,” form the conclusion of the volume.”- Editor’s Note
Strategy; Its Theory and Application by Helmuth Graf von Moltke Pdf
These works provide many clues to the military thought of this renowned Chief of the Prussian General Staff as he sought to apply new weapons to tactics and to give new dimensions to strategy. The books are essential to an understanding of Prussian strategy in 1866 and 1870, and of German military doctrine on the eve of World War I.
The Wars of German Unification by Dennis Showalter Pdf
The Wars of German Unification is the definitive account of the three of the most decisive conflicts in the history of modern Europe. In this new edition, Dennis Showalter offers a thoroughly updated look at the wars and their context that will be invaluable for those interested in the military, social and political history of the period. Showalter explores how the Schleswig-Holstein conflict of 1864; the 'Six Weeks War' of 1866; and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 fundamentally altered the balance of power in 19th-century Europe. They marked the establishment of Prussian hegemony in central Europe, the creation of the Bismarckian Reich in 1871, the reduction of Habsburg influence and the collapse of Napoleon III's Second Empire. The Wars of German Unification offers a balanced and incisive account of the wars, their origins and their consequences, and firmly embeds these conflicts in their political, ideological and military contexts. This volume traces the transition from the 'cabinet wars' of the 19th century and shows how the conflicts that made up the wars of German unification provided the foundation for the birth of modern warfare.
The Franco-German War of 1870-71 (1892) by Helmuth Von Moltke,Clara Bell,Henry William Fischer Pdf
This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.
Since the early 1940s, the students of military operations in general, and from the United States in particular, have studied German military operations. While some of these studies have dealt with the wars of the imperial era, particularly the Wars of German Unification (1864- 71), much more study has centered on the wars waged by the Third Reich from 1939-45. From these studies, lessons have been extracted, and military doctrine has been influenced. Regrettably, however, as the German way of war has been studied, too often those studies have focused on the tactical or the operational levels of war. The exploits, the victories of German operational leaders such as Erwin Rommel, Heinz Guderian, and Eric von Manstein have been traditional favorites. And while the Germans have clearly influenced warfare on this level, even the casual observer should have noticed that the Germans fought two major wars in the 20th century and lost both of them, the second with disastrous consequences. Thus the question emerges, What was wrong with the oft-studied German way of war? A significant factor in their military failure can be laid at the top with both their civilian and military leadership. For while the Germans have excelled tactically and operationally, they have exhibited significant weaknesses in developing achievable goals for their nation and appropriate strategies for achieving these goals. In the time that stretched from the beginning of the 1860s until the end of World War II, Germany only had one brief period when it could bask in the glory of the European leadership it so desired. That brief period was from 1871 until 1889 when Otto von Bismarck was Chancellor. Following Bismarck (and Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke), the German record of setting achievable goals and developing and following logical strategies is poor. This Letort Paper is designed to explore these issues and provide an overview of the development of Germany as a nation and German military thought in the 19th century. It examines the origins of modern German military thinking and the concepts promoted by some of Germany's key military and political leadership. It emphasizes that, if a nation is unwilling or incapable of designing logical strategies, tactical and operational victories in the field will come to naught.
The Austro-Prussian War and Franco-Prussian War by Charles River Charles River Editors Pdf
*Includes pictures *Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading Locked in a balance of power since the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the world was dominated by the great European powers of Britain, France, Russia, and Austria, and at the Congress of Vienna itself, Prussia had been a minor concern. Though the Prussians had come through in time to assist the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo, they were nevertheless taken for granted at the conference, with the major powers instead preferring to deal with the more historically powerful Austrian Hapsburgs. In his scathing commentary on Prussian culture, When Blood is Their Argument, Ford Maddox Ford attempted to explain the sudden rise of Prussian political and economic status from 1849-1880, writing, "She [Prussia] had pushed herself from being a bad second in the comity of Germanism into a position of equality with, if not of predominance over, Austria, amongst the German peoples." Prussian leaders, especially Otto von Bismarck, the chancellor and advisor to Prussia's king, believed Prussia could be a united and respected power, but only without the traditional Austrian dominance. At the time, the Austrian empire was a collection of ethnically diverse peoples and had been dominated by a socio-political conservatism that sought to keep the empire ruled in Hapsburg tradition. After Prussia was victorious in the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck played a waiting game where the unification of Germany was concerned, as the joining of the southern states - initially resistant to Prussian rule, friendly with Austria, and bent on independence - would have to be overcome. What was needed was "a clear case of French aggression" toward either Prussia or the southern states. Not only would such a move by Emperor Napoleon III trigger the terms of the treaty between the German states, but it would keep the remaining world powers out of the conflict. The Franco-Prussian War started in August 1870, and a number of victories followed for the Prussians in battles in northeast France. By September, the strategic city of Metz was under siege, and forces fought a major battle at Sedan. Led by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Prussians forced the French to surrender at Metz, and then at Sedan. Emperor Napoleon III, commanding his country's forces at Sedan, was taken prisoner, humiliating France and its impetuous leader. The Prussians immediately marched on Paris, but the capital refused to submit, and a separate siege was mounted that ended up lasting 130 days. Obviously, French society was in tumult, but a Third Republic and Government of National Defence was pronounced in place of the French Empire. An uprising subsequently took place in the stricken city, dubbed the "Paris Commune," which sought to establish a radical alternative to the status quo and was itself put down by French troops. On January 18, 1871, King Wilhelm I was crowned Kaiser of the German Empire, and though the Franco-Prussian War was still taking place, this moment was essentially the point at which Germany was unified. The other German states had to agree to this profound constitutional change, but they acquiesced after the clear victory of the Prussian-led forces. German unification was the territorial expansion of Prussia by another name, but Berlin demonstrated it could protect the interests, or at least the safety, of German-speakers under their watch. Despite the campaigns of nationalists and liberals over the previous decades, it was ultimately a victory on the battlefield that united the German states. This was the real-world application of Bismarck's "Blood and Iron" concept. From this position of strength during war, Prussia achieved an unassailable position. During the relatively short wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, Bismarck roused nationalist sentiment, and in so doing, he achieved the long awaited goal of German unification.
The Franco-Prussian War by Charles River Charles River Editors Pdf
*Includes pictures *Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading After Prussia was victorious in the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck played a waiting game where the unification of Germany was concerned, as the joining of the southern states - initially resistant to Prussian rule, friendly with Austria, and bent on independence - would have to be overcome. What was needed was "a clear case of French aggression" toward either Prussia or the southern states. Not only would such a move by Emperor Napoleon III trigger the terms of the treaty between the German states, but it would keep the remaining world powers out of the conflict. The Franco-Prussian War started in August 1870, and a number of victories followed for the Prussians in battles in northeast France. By September, the strategic city of Metz was under siege, and forces fought a major battle at Sedan. Led by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Prussians forced the French to surrender at Metz, and then at Sedan. Emperor Napoleon III, commanding his country's forces at Sedan, was taken prisoner, humiliating France and its impetuous leader. The Prussians immediately marched on Paris, but the capital refused to submit, and a separate siege was mounted that ended up lasting 130 days. Obviously, French society was in tumult, but a Third Republic and Government of National Defence was pronounced in place of the French Empire. An uprising subsequently took place in the stricken city, dubbed the "Paris Commune," which sought to establish a radical alternative to the status quo and was itself put down by French troops. Prussian forces besieged Paris starting in September 1870, and although French units attempted to make inroads at battles in the north and east of the country, the Prussians were in comfortable control of the conflict. Food was becoming scarce, and an armistice was signed on January 26, 1871 with Paris on the brink of starvation. The Prussians lost 45,000 men during the conflict, while France suffered almost three times as many dead and wounded. The French government accepted the terms of its defeat with the Germans, which would prove a painful experience, and for their part, the Prussians could avenge the humiliation of the Napoleonic occupation and the treatment at the hands of the French conqueror 65 years earlier. On January 18, 1871, King Wilhelm I was crowned Kaiser of the German Empire, and though the Franco-Prussian War was still taking place, this moment was essentially the point at which Germany was unified. The other German states had to agree to this profound constitutional change, but they acquiesced after the clear victory of the Prussian-led forces. German unification was the territorial expansion of Prussia by another name, but Berlin demonstrated it could protect the interests, or at least the safety, of German-speakers under their watch. Despite the campaigns of nationalists and liberals over the previous decades, it was ultimately a victory on the battlefield that united the German states. This was the real-world application of Bismarck's "Blood and Iron" concept. From this position of strength during war, Prussia achieved an unassailable position. During the relatively short wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, Bismarck roused nationalist sentiment, and in so doing, he achieved the long awaited goal of German unification. Nevertheless, the manner in which Germany was united drew much criticism. Prussia was at the head of a militarized state led by an authoritarian regime. This version of a German Reich would move irrevocably toward the First World War, which started 43 years after the Empire's founding. For many, nationalism became a substitute for political participation in the unified Germany.
Author : Daniel J. Hughes ,Richard L. DiNardo Publisher : University Press of Kansas Page : 696 pages File Size : 49,7 Mb Release : 2018-03-26 Category : History ISBN : 9780700626007
Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 by Daniel J. Hughes ,Richard L. DiNardo Pdf
An in-depth, finely detailed portrait of the German Army from its greatest victory in 1871 to its final collapse in 1918, this volume offers the most comprehensive account ever given of one of the critical pillars of the German Empire—and a chief architect of the military and political realities of late nineteenth-century Europe. Written by two of the world’s leading authorities on the subject, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 examines the most essential components of the imperial German military system, with an emphasis on such foundational areas as theory, doctrine, institutional structures, training, and the officer corps. In the period between 1871 and 1918, rapid technological development demanded considerable adaptation and change in military doctrine and planning. Consequently, the authors focus on theory and practice leading up to World War I and upon the variety of adaptations that became necessary as the war progressed—with unique insights into military theorists from Clausewitz to Moltke the Elder, Moltke the Younger, Schlichting, and Schlieffen. Ranging over the entire history of the German Empire, Imperial Germany and War, 1871–1918 presents a picture of unprecedented scope and depth of one of the most widely studied, criticized, and imitated organizations in the modern world. The book will prove indispensable to an understanding of the Imperial German Army.
