Moral Hazard In Health Insurance

Moral Hazard In Health Insurance Book in PDF, ePub and Kindle version is available to download in english. Read online anytime anywhere directly from your device. Click on the download button below to get a free pdf file of Moral Hazard In Health Insurance book. This book definitely worth reading, it is an incredibly well-written.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : Amy Finkelstein
Publisher : Columbia University Press
Page : 161 pages
File Size : 47,8 Mb
Release : 2014-12-02
Category : Medical
ISBN : 9780231538688

Get Book

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by Amy Finkelstein Pdf

Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Amy Finkelstein,Kenneth Joseph Arrow,Jonathan Gruber,Joseph P. Newhouse,Joseph E. Stiglitz
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : Amy Finkelstein,Kenneth Joseph Arrow,Jonathan Gruber,Joseph P. Newhouse,Joseph E. Stiglitz
Publisher : Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture
Page : 146 pages
File Size : 50,8 Mb
Release : 2014
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0231163800

Get Book

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by Amy Finkelstein,Kenneth Joseph Arrow,Jonathan Gruber,Joseph P. Newhouse,Joseph E. Stiglitz Pdf

Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, the author presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this.

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance

Olesya Kazantseva
Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : Olesya Kazantseva
Publisher : GRIN Verlag
Page : 14 pages
File Size : 54,8 Mb
Release : 2014-07-18
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9783656699002

Get Book

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance by Olesya Kazantseva Pdf

Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.

The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance

John A. Nyman
The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : John A. Nyman
Publisher : Stanford University Press
Page : 228 pages
File Size : 44,8 Mb
Release : 2003
Category : Health & Fitness
ISBN : 0804744882

Get Book

The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance by John A. Nyman Pdf

Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard

Anonim
Health Insurance The Trade Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard Book PDF

Author : Anonim
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 67 pages
File Size : 42,9 Mb
Release : 1989
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:227785946

Get Book

Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard by Anonim Pdf

Choosing economically optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between risk reduction and the overuse of health care. The economic purpose of insurance is to reduce financial uncertainty or risk - the more health insurance lowers the risk, the greater will be the increase in social well-being. But increases in health insurance also increase the amount of medical care demand, because insurance lowers the out-of-pocket cost of health care - the larger the demand response of medical care to cost sharing, the greater the decrease in social well-being, due to the purchase of too much health care. This study examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of the cost sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, nonelderly (under age 65) population.

Moral Hazard

Juan Flores Zendejas,Norbert Gaillard,Rick J. Michalek
Moral Hazard Book PDF

Author : Juan Flores Zendejas,Norbert Gaillard,Rick J. Michalek
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 167 pages
File Size : 52,9 Mb
Release : 2021-12-30
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9781000515022

Get Book

Moral Hazard by Juan Flores Zendejas,Norbert Gaillard,Rick J. Michalek Pdf

Moral Hazard is a core concept in economics. In a nutshell, moral hazard reflects the reduced incentive to protect against risk where an entity is (or believes it will be) protected from its consequences, whether through an insurance arrangement or an implicit or explicit guarantee system. It is fundamentally driven by information asymmetry, arises in all sectors of the economy, including banking, medical insurance, financial insurance, and governmental support, undermines the stability of our economic systems and has burdened taxpayers in all developed countries, resulting in significant costs to the community. Despite the seriousness and pervasiveness of moral hazard, policymakers and scholars have failed to address this issue. This book fills this gap. It covers 200 years of moral hazard: from its origins in the 19th century to the bailouts announced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the ethics and other fundamental issues connected to moral hazard. Part II provides historical and empirical evidence on moral hazard in international finance. It examines in turn the role of the export credit industry, the international lender of last resort, and the IMF. Finally, Part III examines specific sectors such as automobile, banking, and the US industry at large. This is the first book to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of moral hazard and explain why addressing this issue has become crucial today. As such, it will attract interest from scholars across different fields, including economists, political scientists and lawyers.

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective

Anke Höhmann
Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance An Empirical Perspective Book PDF

Author : Anke Höhmann
Publisher : GRIN Verlag
Page : 26 pages
File Size : 40,7 Mb
Release : 2017-06-12
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9783668462632

Get Book

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective by Anke Höhmann Pdf

Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: In the discussion about cost increase for German health care, the existence of a moral hazard problem is often mentioned. A bigger part of the costs are ascribed to the insured persons ́ behavior or lifestyle. The insured person is led to an increased demand of medical services than without an insurance. But also doctors or pharmacists may be evidenced „unethical“ behavior on the part of supply-induced demand. Is it really an unethical or rather a rational behavior? Which experiences have been made with a higher self-participation of the insured people? In which context stay health care services and price elasticity? And how can you reduce the problem of moral hazard? These are just a few questions which will be examined in this paper. The first chapter begins with health insurance in general and explains the benefits and the risks of being insured. The second chapter gives a generally valid definition of moral hazard as well as in terms of health insurance in particular. The third chapter shows the empirical perspective from the point of view of insured people and doctors. Thereby, it will enlarge on the RAND experiment and the price elasticity in the German market. The fourth chapter gives a few solutions for moral hazard effects, whereby solutions for insured people and for alternative financing are here in the focus. The last chapter will give a conclusion to the discussed topic.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Liran Einav,Amy Finkelstein
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : Liran Einav,Amy Finkelstein
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 52,7 Mb
Release : 2017
Category : Risk-taking (Psychology)
ISBN : OCLC:1027043585

Get Book

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance by Liran Einav,Amy Finkelstein Pdf

We describe research on the impact of health insurance on healthcare spending ("moral hazard"), and use this context to illustrate the value of and important complementarities between different empirical approaches. One common approach is to emphasize a credible research design; we review results from two randomized experiments, as well as some quasi-experimental studies. This work has produced compelling evidence that moral hazard in health insurance exists - that is, individuals, on average, consume less healthcare when they are required to pay more for it out of pocket - as well as qualitative evidence about its nature. These studies alone, however, provide little guidance for forecasting healthcare spending under contracts not directly observed in the data. Therefore, a second and complementary approach is to develop an economic model that can be used out of sample. We note that modeling choices can be consequential: different economic models may fit the reduced form but deliver different counterfactual predictions. An additional role of the more descriptive analyses is therefore to provide guidance regarding model choice.

Care Without Coverage

Institute of Medicine,Board on Health Care Services,Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance
Care Without Coverage Book PDF

Author : Institute of Medicine,Board on Health Care Services,Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance
Publisher : National Academies Press
Page : 213 pages
File Size : 47,9 Mb
Release : 2002-06-20
Category : Medical
ISBN : 9780309083430

Get Book

Care Without Coverage by Institute of Medicine,Board on Health Care Services,Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance Pdf

Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.

How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market

Paolo Belli
How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market Book PDF

Author : Paolo Belli
Publisher : World Bank Publications
Page : 38 pages
File Size : 55,6 Mb
Release : 2001
Category : Adverse selection (Insurance)
ISBN : 8210379456XXX

Get Book

How Adverse Selection Affects the Health Insurance Market by Paolo Belli Pdf

There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.

Health Insurance

Willard G. Manning,M. Susan Marquis,Health Sciences Program (Rand Corporation)
Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : Willard G. Manning,M. Susan Marquis,Health Sciences Program (Rand Corporation)
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 639 pages
File Size : 53,7 Mb
Release : 1997
Category : Health insurance
ISBN : OCLC:79927365

Get Book

Health Insurance by Willard G. Manning,M. Susan Marquis,Health Sciences Program (Rand Corporation) Pdf

Choosing optimal health insurance coverage involves a trade-off between the gain from risk reduction and the deadweight loss from moral hazard. This paper examines this trade-off empirically by estimating both the demand for health insurance and the demand for health services. It relies on data from a randomized controlled trial of cost-sharing's effects on the use of health services and on the health status for a general, non-elderly population.

The Theory of Social Health Insurance

Peter Zweifel
The Theory of Social Health Insurance Book PDF

Author : Peter Zweifel
Publisher : Now Publishers Inc
Page : 104 pages
File Size : 50,5 Mb
Release : 2007
Category : Health insurance
ISBN : 9781601980168

Get Book

The Theory of Social Health Insurance by Peter Zweifel Pdf

The Theory of Social Health Insurance develops the theory of social health insurance also known as public health insurance. While a good deal is known about the demand and supply of private insurance, the theoretical basis of social health insurance is much more fragile. The Theory of Social Health Insurance examines questions including why does social health insurance exist and even dominate private health insurance in most developed countries? What are the objectives and constraints of social health insurance managers? What is the likely outcome or "performance" of social health insurance? The Theory of Social Health Insurance reviews the conventional theory of demand for insurance and health insurance, the supply of health insurance in general and social health insurance in particular, the properties of the optimal health insurance contract, and whether there are factors limiting the growth of social health insurance.

Exposed

Christopher T. Robertson
Exposed Book PDF

Author : Christopher T. Robertson
Publisher : Harvard University Press
Page : 257 pages
File Size : 53,6 Mb
Release : 2019-12-17
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780674243170

Get Book

Exposed by Christopher T. Robertson Pdf

A sharp exposé of the roots of the cost-exposure consensus in American health care that shows how the next wave of reform can secure real access and efficiency. The toxic battle over how to reshape American health care has overshadowed the underlying bipartisan agreement that health insurance coverage should be incomplete. Both Democrats and Republicans expect patients to bear a substantial portion of health care costs through deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. In theory this strategy empowers patients to make cost-benefit tradeoffs, encourages thrift and efficiency in a system rife with waste, and defends against the moral hazard that can arise from insurance. But in fact, as Christopher T. Robertson reveals, this cost-exposure consensus keeps people from valuable care, causes widespread anxiety, and drives many patients and their families into bankruptcy and foreclosure. Marshalling a decade of research, Exposed offers an alternative framework that takes us back to the core purpose of insurance: pooling resources to provide individuals access to care that would otherwise be unaffordable. Robertson shows how the cost-exposure consensus has changed the meaning and experience of health care and exchanged one form of moral hazard for another. He also provides avenues of reform. If cost exposure remains a primary strategy, physicians, hospitals, and other providers must be held legally responsible for communicating those costs to patients, and insurance companies should scale cost exposure to individuals’ ability to pay. New and more promising models are on the horizon, if only we would let go our misguided embrace of incomplete insurance.

Foundations of Insurance Economics

Georges Dionne,Scott E. Harrington
Foundations of Insurance Economics Book PDF

Author : Georges Dionne,Scott E. Harrington
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 748 pages
File Size : 41,5 Mb
Release : 1992
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780792392040

Get Book

Foundations of Insurance Economics by Georges Dionne,Scott E. Harrington Pdf

Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.

Risk, Information and Insurance

Henri Loubergé
Risk Information and Insurance Book PDF

Author : Henri Loubergé
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 275 pages
File Size : 51,5 Mb
Release : 2012-12-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9789400921832

Get Book

Risk, Information and Insurance by Henri Loubergé Pdf

Orio Giarini The "Geneva Association" (International Association for the Study of Risk and Insurance Economics) was founded in 1973. The main goal was to stimulate and organize objective research in the field of risk, uncertainty, and insurance, in a world in which such issues were clearly becoming of greater and greater relevance for all economic actors. This was a pioneer ing effort, especially as economic theory and the teaching of economics were still anchored to the key notion of general equilibrium under an assumption of certainty. Thus, we had to start our work almost from scratch. One of the first initiatives was to bring together in Geneva, in June of 1973, all the academics in Europe already involved in risk and insurance economics. We found eight from five different countries who never had met before. This seminar chaired by Raymond Barre, the first president of The Geneva Association, was the first of an annual series that became known as the seminar of "The European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists." Since then more than 100 economists from most European countries as well as participants from two other continents and in particular from the United States have taken part in this seminar.