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Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Distinction Between Strategic and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NNW); (3) U.S. and Soviet NNW: (a) U.S. NNW During the Cold War; (b) Soviet NNW During the Cold War; (c) 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives; (d) U.S. NNW after the Cold War; (e) Russian NNW after the Cold War; (f) Changing the Focus of the Debate; (4) Issues for Congress: (a) Issues: Safety and Security of Russian NNW; The Role of NNW in Russia¿s National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of NNW in NATO Policy and Alliance Strategy; The Relationship Between NNW and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy; (b) Policy Options: Status Quo; Reduce Reliance on Nuclear Weapons; Cooperative Responses.
During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed thousands of 'nonstrategic' nuclear weapons that were intended to be used in support of troops in the field during a conflict. These included nuclear mines; artillery; short, medium, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range 'strategic' nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations. At the end of the 1980s, before the demise of the Soviet Union, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now retains approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with a few hundred deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 2,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration indicated that nuclear weapons remained essential to U.S. national security interests, but it did quietly redeploy and remove some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. In addition, Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy to discourage such acquisition. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons, possibly by negotiating an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. Others have suggested that any potential new U.S.-Russian arms control treaty count both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This might encourage reductions or the elimination of these weapons. The 111th Congress may review some of these proposals.
Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia's greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. Both the Trump Administration and Congress may address these questions during a new review of the U.S. nuclear posture. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range 'strategic' nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 760 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed and removed some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that NATO should consider expanding its deployments in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Some believe the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination.
"NATO has been a "nuclear" alliance since its inception. Nuclear weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military planning as well as being central to the Alliance's deterrence strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States. Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the Cold War, the problem itself -- that is, the question of what to do with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of a World War III against a military alliance that no longer exists -- is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO's identity, purpose, and corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a "nuclear alliance," but it is increasingly hard to define what that means."--Publisher's website.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO by Douglas T. Stuart Pdf
is understudied, both inside and outside of government. Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they have not received the attention that is commensurate to their importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status. Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May 2012.
Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex by Stephen P. Lambert Pdf
As politicians and policy makers trumpet the successes of strategic reductions and the achievements of the START agreements, Russia has increasingly focused on a rhetorical and doctrinal campaign to enhance the credibility of nuclear war fighting threats by legitimizing theater or tactical nuclear systems. The Russian Federation is convinced that its security rests upon these weapons, and it has therefore attempted to shield both the personnel and the hardware from the effects of the military rollback. The notion that the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons could speedily draw down their arsenals to under 2000 warheads, as a START 3 regime suggests, is misguided. This ignores the thousands of so called tactical nuclear weapons possessed by both states. The very real threats associated with Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal should impel those with genuine concerns to redirect their efforts toward the lower end of nuclear weapons spectrum. The arms control proposal presented in this paper incorporates a regime calling for the elimination of air delivered tactical nuclear weapons that may prove to be a useful model for reinvigorating the stalled process of nuclear arms reductions.
Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons by Jeffrey A. Larsen,Kurt J. Klingenberger Pdf
The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), a serious military and political concern for more than a generation, seemed to vanish from the scene in the early post-Cold War years. But tactical nuclear weapons never really went away. This book addresses many of the fundamental issues surrounding NSNW. It is the result of a conference on NSNW held Nov. 2-3, 2000. Some 75 experts in arms control, nuclear weapons, and national security strategy from both sides of the political spectrum attended the conference, which was hosted by the Nat. Security Policy Div., Nuclear and Counter-proliferation Directorate, HQ U.S. Air Force (AF/XONP). Chapters: defining the NSNW problem; contending objectives; obstacles; and possible solutions.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO by U. S. Army,Strategic Studies Institute,Director of National Intelligence,Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),U. S. Government Pdf
This important report from the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute provides the complete history of tactical nuclear weapons starting with the early days of the Cold War, along with unique up-to-date insights into the future of tactical nukes in Europe and Asia. The role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international security, primarily because it is so often disconcerting to remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an American journalist wryly noted that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was "a subject that drives the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart" - a dismissive quip which would have remained true right up until the moment World War III broke out. The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared to the momentous issues that the East and West have tackled since the end of the Cold War, the scattering of hundreds (or in the Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe seems to be almost an afterthought, a detail left behind that should be easy to tidy up. Such complacency is unwise. Tactical nuclear weapons (or NSNWs, "non-strategic nuclear weapons") still exist because NATO and Russia have not fully resolved their fears about how a nuclear war might arise, or how it might be fought. They represent, as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, "the longest deadlock" in the history of arms control. Washington and Moscow, despite the challenges to the "reset" of their relations, point to reductions in strategic arms as a great achievement, but strategic agreements also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are lower than at any point in history, but they are based on leaving each side a reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each. Inflicting this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a step no sane national leader would take. Preface * Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: An Introductory Reminiscence * PART I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS * 1. The Historical Context * 2. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination * 3. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Policymaking: The Asian Experience * PART II. RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS * 4. Russian Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 5. Russian Doctrine on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Contexts, Prisms, and Connections * 6. Aspects of the Current Russian Perspective on Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 7. Influences on Russian Policy and Possibilities for Reduction in Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons * 8. Russian Perspectives on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons * PART III. EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES * 9. Introduction of European Policies and Opinions Relating to Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 10. The Role and Place of Tactical Nuclear Weapons - A NATO Perspective * 11. European and German Perspectives * 12. European Perspectives * 13. Europe, NATO's Tactical Nuclear Conundrum, and Public Debate: Be Careful What You Wish For * PART IV. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES * 14. American Perspectives on Tactical Nuclear Weapons * 15. The Role of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: An American Perspective * 16. NATO's Nuclear Debate: The Broader Strategic Context * 17. Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review: Prospects for Change * PART V. ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION * 18. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: Arms Control as an Option * 19. Arms Control Options for Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons * 20. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO: A Conventional Arms Control Perspective * 21. Arms Control after START * 22. The Conventional and Nuclear Nexus in Europe * PART VI. CONCLUSION * 23. Summing Up and Issues for the Future
Tactical Nuclear Weapons by A. Shevtsov,United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Pdf
This study is concerned with the present and future role of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as seen from the perspective of Ukraine. It concludes that nuclear disarmament is at a crossroads and a decision has to be taken whether the aim is total disarmament or minimum deterrence on the part of a minimum number of countries. Despite numerous problems there is an opportunity for increased denuclearisation in Europe within the framework of START-3. It might be based on US giving up its "hedge" capabilities and Russia giving up its surplus arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.
The Bush Administration conducted a review of US nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. Although the review sought to adjust US nuclear posture to address changes in the international security environment at the start of the new century, it continued many of the policies and programs that had been a part of the US nuclear posture during the previous decades and during the Cold War. This book provides an overview of the US nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity. During the Cold War, the United States sought to deter the Soviet Union and its allies from attacking the United States and its allies by convincing the Soviet Union that any level of conflict could escalate into a nuclear exchange and, in that exchange, the United States would plan to destroy the full range of valued targets in the Soviet Union. Other nations were included in US nuclear war plans due to their alliances with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the United States maintained a substantial nuclear arsenal to deter potential threats from Russia. It would not forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in conflicts with other nations, armed with chemical or biological weapons, and formed contingency plans for such conflicts. The Bush Administration has emphasised that the United States and Russia are no longer enemies and that the United States will no longer plan or size its nuclear force to deter a 'Russian threat'. Instead, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal with the capabilities needed to counter capabilities of any potential adversary, focusing on 'how we will fight' rather than 'who we will fight'. Furthermore, US nuclear weapons will combine with missile defences, conventional weapons, and a responsive infrastructure in seeking to assure US allies, dissuade US adversaries, deter conflict, and defeat adversaries if conflict should occur. Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy, how to make the US nuclear deterrent 'credible', the relationship between the US nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
A New Nuclear Century by Stephen J. Cimbala,James Scouras Pdf
Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved. They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia—one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Euro-Atlantic Security by Paolo Foradori Pdf
This book offers a comprehensive examination of the important security issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have returned to the top of the international political agenda. The issue assumes particular importance in regard to NATO, given that some 150–200 US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are still present in five countries belonging to the Alliance (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). The past few years have seen animated debate in the United States and Europe on the role of such weapons in the current scenario of international security, and whether they can be further reduced or completely removed from Europe. Bringing together leading scholars and analysts of TNW with country-specific competences, this volume improves our understanding of this debate by providing in-depth analysis of the presence, role, perceived value and destiny of TNWs in Europe. The book addresses the issue in a systematic manner, taking into account the perspectives of all main actors directly or indirectly involved in the debate. This approach provides new and important insights that can inform both theoretical and policy work on a very critical and timely international issue, especially during the ongoing review of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. This book will be of much interest to students of European politics, European security, nuclear proliferation, and IR in general.
This book presents several essays analyzing Russia's extensive nuclear agenda and the issues connected with it. It deals with strategy, doctrine, European, Eurasian, and East Asian security agendas, as well as the central U.S.-Russia nuclear and arms control equations. This work brings together American, European, and Russian analysts to discuss Russia's defense and conventional forces reforms and their impact on nuclear forces, doctrine, strategy, and the critical issues of Russian security policies toward the United States, Europe, and China. It also deals directly with the present and future roles of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy and strategy.
