Phenomenal Intentionality

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Phenomenal Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel
Phenomenal Intentionality Book PDF

Author : Uriah Kriegel
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 272 pages
File Size : 52,9 Mb
Release : 2013-01-09
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780199720521

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Phenomenal Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel Pdf

Since the late 1970's, the main research program for understanding intentionality -- the mind's ability to direct itself onto the world -- has been based on the attempt naturalize intentionality, in the sense of making it intelligible how intentionality can occur in a perfectly natural, indeed entirely physical, world. Some philosophers, however, have remained skeptical of this entire approach. In particular, some have argued that phenomenal consciousness - - the subjective feel of conscious experience -- has an essential role to play in the theory of intentionality, a role missing in the naturalization program. Thus a number of authors have recently brought to the fore the notion of phenomenal intentionality, as well as a cluster of nearby notions. There is a vague sense that their work is interrelated, complementary, and mutually reinforcing, in a way that suggests a germinal research program. With twelve new essays by philosophers at the forefront of the field, this volume is designed to launch this research program in a more self-conscious way, by exploring some of the fundamental claims and themes of relevance to this program.

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Angela A. Mendelovici
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality Book PDF

Author : Angela A. Mendelovici
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 297 pages
File Size : 55,8 Mb
Release : 2018
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780190863807

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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela A. Mendelovici Pdf

Intentionality is the mind's ability to be "of," "about," or "directed" at things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might "say" that grass is green or that Santa Claus is jolly, and a visual experience might be "of" a blue cup. While the existence of the phenomenon of intentionality is manifestly obvious, how exactly the mind gets to be "directed" at things, which may not even exist, is deeply mysterious and controversial. It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms of tracking relations, information, functional roles, and similar notions. This book breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According to the theory advanced by Mendelovici, the phenomenal intentionality theory, there is a central kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and any other kind of intentionality derives from it. The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts, broad and object-involving contents, and nonconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a radically internalistic picture of the mind, on which all phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly singled out by us.

Phenomenal Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel
Phenomenal Intentionality Book PDF

Author : Uriah Kriegel
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 271 pages
File Size : 47,8 Mb
Release : 2013-03-07
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780199764297

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Phenomenal Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel Pdf

Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.

Phenomenal Presence

Fabian Dorsch,Fiona Macpherson
Phenomenal Presence Book PDF

Author : Fabian Dorsch,Fiona Macpherson
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 304 pages
File Size : 43,8 Mb
Release : 2018-05-24
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780191644450

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Phenomenal Presence by Fabian Dorsch,Fiona Macpherson Pdf

Many different features of the world figure consciously in our perceptual experiences, in the sense that they make a subjective difference to those experiences. These features are thought to range from colours and shapes, to volumes and backsides, from natural or artefactual kinds, to reasons for perceptual belief, and from the existence and externality of objects, to the relationality and wakeful-ness of our perceptual awareness of them. Phenomenal Presence explores the different ways in which features like these may be phenomenally present in perceptual experience. In particular, it focuses on features that are rarely discussed, and the perceptual presence of which is more controversial or less obvious because they are out of view or otherwise easily overlooked; for example, they are given in a non-sensory manner, or they are categorical in the sense that they feature in all perceptual experiences (such as their justificatory power, their wakefulness, or the externality of their objects). The book divides into four parts, each dealing with a different kind of phenomenal presence. The first addresses the nature of the presence of perceptual constancies and variations, while the second investigates the determinacy and ubiquity of the presence of spatial properties in perception. The third part deals with the presence of hidden or occluded aspects of objects, while part four discusses the presence of categorical aspects of perceptual experience. The contributions provide a thorough examination of which features are phenomenally present in perception, and what it is for them to figure in experience in this way.

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality

Angela Mendelovici
The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality Book PDF

Author : Angela Mendelovici
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 288 pages
File Size : 54,8 Mb
Release : 2018-05-04
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780190863814

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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela Mendelovici Pdf

Intentionality is the mind's ability to be "of," "about," or "directed" at things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might "say" that grass is green or that Santa Claus is jolly, and a visual experience might be "of" a blue cup. While the existence of the phenomenon of intentionality is manifestly obvious, how exactly the mind gets to be "directed" at things, which may not even exist, is deeply mysterious and controversial. It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms of tracking relations, information, functional roles, and similar notions. This book breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal consciousness, the felt, subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According to the theory advanced by Mendelovici, the phenomenal intentionality theory, there is a central kind of intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and any other kind of intentionality derives from it. The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts, broad and object-involving contents, and nonconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a radically internalistic picture of the mind, on which all phenomenally represented contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some sense represent are expressly singled out by us.

The Sources of Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel
The Sources of Intentionality Book PDF

Author : Uriah Kriegel
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 286 pages
File Size : 46,8 Mb
Release : 2014-05
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780199380312

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The Sources of Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel Pdf

What do thoughts, hopes, paintings, words, desires, photographs, traffic signs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not. An approach to this issue prevalent in the philosophy of the past half-century seeks to explain the power of directedness in terms of certain items' ability to reliably track things in their environment. A very different approach, with a venerable history and enjoying a recent resurgence, seeks to explain the power of directedness rather in terms of an intrinsic ability of conscious experience to direct itself. This book attempts a synthesis of both approaches, developing an account of the sources of such directedness that grounds it both in reliable tracking and in conscious experience.

Intentionality Deconstructed

Amir Horowitz
Intentionality Deconstructed Book PDF

Author : Amir Horowitz
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 214 pages
File Size : 42,5 Mb
Release : 2024-03-28
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780198896487

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Intentionality Deconstructed by Amir Horowitz Pdf

Intentionality Deconstructed argues for the view that no concrete entity - mental, linguistic, or any other - can possess intentional content. Nothing can be about anything. The concept of intentionality is flawed, and so content ascriptions cannot be "absolutely" true or false - they lack truth conditions. Nonetheless, content ascriptions have truth conditions and can be true (or possess a related epistemic merit) relative to practices of content ascription, so that different practices may imply different (not real but practice-dependent) intentional objects for the same token mental state. The suggested view does not deny the existence of those mental states standardly considered intentional, notably the so-called propositional attitudes; it affirms it. That is, support is provided for the existence of those states with the properties usually attributed to them, but absent intentional properties. Specifically, it is argued that the so-called propositional attitudes possess logico-syntactic properties, whose postulation plays an important role in addressing the challenge of reconciling intentional anti-realism with beliefs being true or having alternative epistemic merits, the argument from the predictive and explanatory success of content ascription for intentional realism, and the cognitive suicide objection to views that deny intentionality. As part of the rejection of this final objection, intentional anti-realism is presented as a radical view, which claims "Nothing can possess intentional content" but not that nothing can possess intentional content, and it is argued that this is a legitimate characteristic of radical philosophy. In spite of rejecting the "claim that" talk, intentional anti-realism gives clear sense to its dispute with its rivals as well as to its own superiority. Various arguments for intentional anti-realism are presented. One argument rejects all possible accounts of intentionality, namely primitivism, intrinsic reductionism - the prominent example of which is the phenomenal intentionality thesis - and extrinsic reductionism (that is, reductive naturalistic accounts). According to another argument, since intentional properties are shown to be dispensable for all possibly relevant purposes, and no sound arguments support the claim that they ever are instantiated, the application of Ockham's razor shows that no such properties ever are instantiated, and another step shows that neither can they be.

Intentionality as Constitution

Alberto Voltolini
Intentionality as Constitution Book PDF

Author : Alberto Voltolini
Publisher : Taylor & Francis
Page : 239 pages
File Size : 51,9 Mb
Release : 2024-06-28
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9781040088340

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Intentionality as Constitution by Alberto Voltolini Pdf

This book develops a novel theory of intentionality. It argues that intentionality is an internal essential relation of constitution between an intentional state and an object, or between such a state and a possible state of affairs as subsisting. The author’s main claim is that intentionality is a fundamentally modal property, hence a non (scientifically) natural property in that it does not supervene, either locally or globally, on its nonmodal physical basis. This is the property, primarily for an intentional mental state, to be constituted by the entities it is about. In the case of intentionality of reference, such constituents are objects, in the sense of individuals; in the case of intentionality of content, such constituents are possible states of affairs as subsisting. Constitution is meant in a mereologically literal sense: those constituents are essential parts of the relevant states. As a result, the theory claims not only that intentionality is relational but also that it is an internal, essential relation holding between an intentional state and its object or proposition-like content. Intentionality as Constitution will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and cognitive science.

Cognitive Phenomenology

Elijah Chudnoff
Cognitive Phenomenology Book PDF

Author : Elijah Chudnoff
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 194 pages
File Size : 40,5 Mb
Release : 2015-04-10
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9781317676850

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Cognitive Phenomenology by Elijah Chudnoff Pdf

Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and explore the prospects of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought and cognition. Does cognition have its own phenomenal character? Can introspection tell us either way? If consciousness flows in an unbroken ‘stream’ as William James argued, how might a punctuated sequence of thoughts fit into it? Elijah Chudnoff begins with a clarification of the nature of the debate about cognitive phenomenology and the network of concepts and theses that are involved in it. He then examines the following topics: introspection and knowledge of our own thoughts phenomenal contrast arguments the value of consciousness the temporal structure of experience the holistic character of experience and the interdependence of sensory and cognitive states the relationship between phenomenal character and mental representation. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessment of cognitive phenomenology, whether philosophy student or advanced researcher. It will also be valuable reading for those in related subjects such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and epistemology.

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness

Uriah Kriegel
The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Book PDF

Author : Uriah Kriegel
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 704 pages
File Size : 48,6 Mb
Release : 2020-07-10
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780191066597

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The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness by Uriah Kriegel Pdf

The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness provides the most comprehensive overview of current philosophical research on consciousness. Featuring contributions from some of the most prominent experts in the field, it explores the wide range of types of consciousness there may be, the many psychological phenomena with which consciousness interacts, and the various views concerning the ultimate relationship between consciousness and physical reality. It is an essential and authoritative resource for anyone working in philosophy of mind or interested in states of consciousness.

Does Perception Have Content?

Berit Brogaard
Does Perception Have Content Book PDF

Author : Berit Brogaard
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 352 pages
File Size : 40,6 Mb
Release : 2014-09-05
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780199395248

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Does Perception Have Content? by Berit Brogaard Pdf

Within the contemporary philosophical debates over the nature of perception, the question of whether perception has content in the first place recently has become a focus of discussion. The most common view is that it does, but a number of philosophers have questioned this claim. The issue immediately raises a number of related questions. What does it mean to say that perception has content? Does perception have more than one kind of content? Does perceptual content derive from the content of beliefs or judgments? Should perceptual content be understood in terms of accuracy conditions? Is naive realism compatible with holding that perception has content? This volume brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address these and other central questions in the philosophy of perception.

Cognitive Phenomenology

Tim Bayne,Michelle Montague
Cognitive Phenomenology Book PDF

Author : Tim Bayne,Michelle Montague
Publisher : Oxford University Press on Demand
Page : 387 pages
File Size : 47,8 Mb
Release : 2011-11-24
Category : Medical
ISBN : 9780199579938

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Cognitive Phenomenology by Tim Bayne,Michelle Montague Pdf

The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology, ' that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.

Sensations, Thoughts, Language

Arthur Sullivan
Sensations Thoughts Language Book PDF

Author : Arthur Sullivan
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 354 pages
File Size : 41,9 Mb
Release : 2019-09-30
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9781351017411

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Sensations, Thoughts, Language by Arthur Sullivan Pdf

Brian Loar (1939-2014) was an eminent and highly respected philosopher of mind and language. He was at the forefront of several different field-defining debates between the 1970s and the 2000s—from his earliest work on reducing semantics to psychology, through debates about reference, functionalism, externalism, and the nature of intentionality, to his most enduringly influential work on the explanatory gap between consciousness and neurons. Loar is widely credited with having developed the most comprehensive functionalist account of certain aspects of the mind, and his ‘phenomenal content strategy’ is arguably one of the most significant developments on the ancient mind/body problem. This volume of essays honours the entirety of Loar’s wide-ranging philosophical career. It features sixteen original essays from influential figures in the fields of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, including those who worked with and were taught by Loar. The essays are divided into three thematic sections covering Loar’s work in philosophy of language, especially the relations between semantics and psychology (1970s-80s), on content in the philosophy of mind (1980s-90s), and on the metaphysics of intentionality and consciousness (1990s and beyond). Taken together, this book is a fitting tribute to one of the leading minds of the latter-20th century, and a timely reflection on Loar’s enduring influence on the philosophy of mind and language.

Content, Consciousness, and Perception

Conor McHugh,Ezio Di Nucci
Content Consciousness and Perception Book PDF

Author : Conor McHugh,Ezio Di Nucci
Publisher : Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Page : 222 pages
File Size : 54,9 Mb
Release : 2009-01-14
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9781443804400

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Content, Consciousness, and Perception by Conor McHugh,Ezio Di Nucci Pdf

What sort of thing is the mind? And how can such a thing at the same time - belong to the natural world, - represent the world, - give rise to our subjective experience, - and ground human knowledge? Content, Consciousness and Perception is an edited collection, comprising eleven new contributions to the philosophy of mind, written by some of the most promising young philosophers in the UK and Ireland. The book is arranged into three parts. Part I, “Concepts and Mental Content”, which begins with an attack by Hans-Johann Glock on the representational theory of mind, addresses the nature of mental representation. Part II, “Consciousness and the Metaphysics of Mind”, concerns the prospects for a naturalistic metaphysics of the conscious mind. Finally, Part III, entitled “Perception”, pursues the project of giving a satisfactory philosophical account of perceptual experience. The book begins with an introductory essay by the editors, which provides an overview of the state of contemporary philosophy of mind, locating the articles to follow within that context. The individual chapters of Content, Consciousness and Perception are professional contributions to their respective areas, of interest to any philosopher of mind. The volume as a whole is ideal for non-specialists and students interested in getting to grips with the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of mind.

Ten Problems of Consciousness

Michael Tye
Ten Problems of Consciousness Book PDF

Author : Michael Tye
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 270 pages
File Size : 41,6 Mb
Release : 1997-01-22
Category : Psychology
ISBN : 0262700646

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Ten Problems of Consciousness by Michael Tye Pdf

Can neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and gray matter composing our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a new and enlightening theory about the phenomenal "what it feels like" aspect of consciousness. The test of any such theory, according to Tye, lies in how well it handles ten critical problems of consciousness. Tye argues that all experiences and all feelings represent things, and that their phenomenal aspects are to be understood in terms of what they represent. He develops this representational approach to consciousness in detail with great ingenuity and originality. In the book's first part Tye lays out the domain, the ten problems and an associated paradox, along with all the theories currently available and the difficulties they face. In part two, he develops his intentionalist approach to consciousness. Special summaries are provided in boxes and the ten problems are illustrated with cartoons. A Bradford Book Representation and Mind series