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An official in the Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and both Bush administrations, Peter W. Rodman draws on his firsthand knowledge of the Oval Office to explore the foreign-policy leadership of every president from Nixon to George W. Bush. This riveting and informative book about the inner workings of our government is rich with anecdotes and fly-on-the-wall portraits of presidents and their closest advisors. It is essential reading for historians, political junkies, and for anyone in charge of managing a large organization.
Presidents and Their Generals by Matthew Moten Pdf
Since 1945, as the U.S. has engaged in near-constant “wars of choice” with limited congressional oversight, the executive and armed services have shared primary responsibility for often ill-defined objectives, strategies, and benefits. Matthew Moten shows the significance of negotiations between presidents and the generals allied with them.
From the only national security advisor to have served under Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump, a riveting diplomat's memoir of America at war, and an exclusive insider's look at the way presidents make decisions under pressure. Since the attacks of 9/11, American presidents have exercised raw and unchecked executive power to make critical, fateful decisions for our nation. From Afghanistan to Iraq and Syria, enemies have been declared and Americans have fought and died based on presidential orders issued outside public view--and therefore with little scrutiny or accountability. But McGurk deploys his insight as a vital player in the executive decision-making process to pull back the curtain on these crucial moments in modern American history. From the Green Zone to the Situation Room, McGurk delivers an inside look at the last three presidents as they grapple with incomplete information and conflicting advice to make life-and-death decisions. Bush transformed his presidency over its last two years, becoming the most hands-on commander-in-chief since FDR. Obama demanded a rigorous process some saw as micromanagement, but others recognized as a key feature of what led to his election. Trump threw out the playbook. In page-turning prose, McGurk delivers hair-raising stories from his time as an American diplomat in Iraq and as a national security advisor in the White House, revealing how the vast differences in leadership and strategy among each president play out on the ground. McGurk uses his close-up view of three presidents' successes and failures to extract an urgent set of lessons about the best way to make the biggest decisions--the means, ways, and ends of policymaking. With implications from the White House to the Pentagon to boardrooms and organizations around the globe, Command lifts the mystique of wartime decision-making, illuminating the high-stakes choices made by a chosen few that profoundly affect us all.
The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show -- the politicians or the generals? In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen examines four great democratic war statesmen -- Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion -- to reveal the surprising answer: the politicians. Great states-men do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds -- backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist.Yet they faced similar challenges, not least the possibility that their conduct of the war could bring about their fall from power. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. Military men often dismiss politicians as meddlers, doves, or naifs. Yet military men make mistakes. The art of a great leader is to push his subordinates to achieve great things. The lessons of the book apply not just to President Bush and other world leaders in the war on terrorism, but to anyone who faces extreme adversity at the head of a free organization -- including leaders and managers throughout the corporate world. The lessons of Supreme Command will be immediately apparent to all managers and leaders, as well as students of history.
The U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) has proven to be the most lethal weapon in the president's arsenal. Shrouded in secrecy, the Command has done more to degrade the capacity of terrorists to attack the United States than any other single entity. And counter-terrorism is only one of its many missions. Because of such high profile missions as Operation Neptune's Spear, which resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, JSOC has attracted the public's attention. But Americans only know a fraction of the real story. In The Command, Ambinder and Grady provide readers with a concise and comprehensive recent history of the special missions units that comprise the most effective weapon against terrorism ever conceived. For the first time, they reveal JSOC's organizational chart and describe some of the secret technologies and methods that catalyze their intelligence and kinetic activities. They describe how JSOC migrated to the center of U.S. military operations, and how they fused intelligence and operations in such a way that proved crucial to beating back the Iraq insurgency. They also disclose previously unreported instances where JSOC's activities may have skirted the law, and question the ability of Congress to oversee units that, by design, must operate with minimum interference. With unprecedented access to senior commanders and team leaders, the authors also: Put the bin Laden raid in the larger context of a transformed secret organization at its operational best. Explore other secret missions ordered by the president (and the surprising countries in which JSOC operates). Trace the growth of JSOC's operational and support branches and chronicle the command's mastery of the Washington inter-agency bureaucracy. By Marc Ambinder, a contributing editor at the Atlantic, who has covered politics for CBS News and ABC News, and D.B. Grady, a correspondent for the Atlantic, and former U.S. Army paratrooper and a veteran of Afghanistan.
Author : United States. General Accounting Office Publisher : Unknown Page : 124 pages File Size : 40,9 Mb Release : 1979 Category : Command and control systems ISBN : STANFORD:36105127390990
The World Wide Military Command and Control System--major Changes Needed in Its Automated Data Processing Management and Direction by United States. General Accounting Office Pdf
In this magisterial examination of the Presidency over the course of the 20th Century, the author explores the history of the world's greatest elective office and the role each incumbent has played in changing the scope of its powers. Using individual presidential portraits of each of the presidents of the past century Graubard asks, and answers, a wide variety of crucial questions about each President. What intellectual, social and political assets did they bring to the White House, and how quickly did they deplete or mortgage that capital? How well did they cope with crises, foreign and domestic? How much attention did they pay to their election pledges after they were elected? How did they use the media, old and new? Above all, how did they conduct themselves in office and what legacy did they leave to their successors? Graubard provides original analysis in each case, and reaches many surprising conclusions.
The Kremlin and the High Command by Dale R. Herspring Pdf
Throughout its existence, the Red Army was viewed as a formidable threat. By the end of the Cold War, however, it had become the weakest link in the Soviet Union's power structure. Always subordinate to the Communist Party, the military in 1991 suddenly found itself answering instead to the president of a democratic state. Dale Herspring closely examines how that relationship influenced the military's viability in the new Russian Federation. Herspring's book is the first to assess the relationship between the Russian military and the political leadership under Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin. He depicts an outmoded and demoralized military force still struggling to free itself from Cold War paradigms, while failing to confront not only debacles in Afghanistan and Chechnya but also a rise in crime and corruption within the ranks. He reveals how Gorbachev neglected the military to save Russia from internal collapse and Yeltsin reneged on continuing promises of support. And, while Putin claims a better understanding of the armed forces, he has severely tightened his control over the military while monitoring its struggle toward modernization. Herspring argues that presidential leadership-or a significant lack thereof-has been the key variable determining the kind of military Russia puts in the field. It has been up to the president to ensure that the high command makes a successful transition to the new polity-otherwise combat readiness will decline and generals and admirals could become politicized. By focusing on how the high command has reacted to each president's decisions and leadership style, Herspring shows that, in spite of the continued importance of the military's bureaucratic structure, personality factors have assumed a much more important role than in the past. The Kremlin and the High Command provides the most complete analysis to date of the Russian president's influence on the Russian officer corps, the soldiers they lead, and their army's combat readiness. Shedding light on the chaos that has plagued the USSR and Russia over the past 25 years, it also suggests how the often fraught relationship between the president and the high command must evolve if the Russian Federation is to evolve into a truly democratic nation.
Allied command structures in the new NATO by Anonim Pdf
After extremely promising efforts to strengthen NATO's military structure, progress has been slowed by demands to convert the AFSOUTH command at Naples from a U.S.-led to a European-led position. AFSOUTH consists of Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. The role of NATO's regional commanders has been enhanced significantly since the end of the Cold War. As NATO broadens it focus, adding crisis management operations to its core mission of collective defense, it is the theater commander who has been called upon to deal with conflict at the regional level. The United States has but one major subordinate commander in Europe, at AFSOUTH. Therefore, the proposal to make AFSOUTH a European-led command would weaken the Alliance by weakening the U.S. leadership role in regional affairs at a time when that command is becoming increasingly important. The AFSOUTH issue has become difficult to manage for at least three reasons. As a result, a high-level effort may be required to break the deadlock. Setting aside the AFSOUTH issue, there has been significant progress in the area of NATO adaptation - that is, in strengthening of ESDI in NATO. However, U.S. military strength remains crucial. The military assets and capabilities that the United States makes available to AFSOUTH warrant a U.S.-led command. U.S. leadership will be essential at least until there is evidence that European leadership would be backed by European capabilities and resources commensurate with the importance of the region. Given the recent and projected trends in European defense investments, it cannot be foreseen when adequate capabilities and commitment of resources would become a reality. A review of recent history in the Balkans, the Aegean area, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East indicates the indispensable nature of both U.S. diplomacy and U.S. military engagement in the key regions surrounding the AFSOUTH area of operation.
Nuclear Command and Control in NATO by S. Gregory Pdf
For more than forty years NATO premised its defence on credible nuclear deterrence. Underwriting this deterrence was NATO's strategy and the nuclear weapons and command and control systems intended to make the strategy an operational reality. This book examines NATO's attempts between 1952 and 1990 to achieve the political and military control of nuclear weapons operations in a multinational organisation. By using case-studies of US, British, French and NATO nuclear weapons operations and empirical evidence from Cold War crises it provides an analysis of NATO's experience and offers insights for the present day.
Although Theodore Roosevelt was not a wartime president, he took his role as commander in chief very seriously. In Command explores Roosevelt's efforts to modernize the American military before, during, and after his presidency (1901-9). Matthew Oyos examines the evolution of Roosevelt's ideas about military force in the age of industry and explores his drive to promote new institutions of command: technological innovations, militia reform, and international military missions. Oyos places these developments into broader themes of Progressive Era reform, civil-military tensions, and Roosevelt's ideas of national cultural vitality and civic duty. In Command focuses on Roosevelt's career-long commitment to transforming the military institutions of the United States. Roosevelt's promotion of innovative military technologies, his desire to inject the officer corps with fresh vigor, and his role in building new institutions for command changed the American military landscape. His attempt to modernize the military while struggling with the changing nature of warfare during his time resonates with and provides unique insight into the challenges presented by today's rapidly changing strategic environment.
The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993 by Ronald H. Cole Pdf
Faced with the need to establish unified command of U.S. military forces in peacetime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 created an organization directive, the "Outline Command Plan," which was the first in a series of documents known as the Unified Command Plans. This document covers the formulation of the plan, modifications and periodic revisions. A compilation of three separate histories which were originally classified. Extensive references. Appendices: membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, glossary of abbreviations, and world map.