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The papers in this collection discuss the central questions about the connections between language, reality and human understanding. The complex relations between accounts of meaning and facts about ordinary speakers’ understanding of their language are examined so as to illuminate the philosophical character of the connections between language and reality. The collection as a whole is a thematically unified treatment of some of the most central questions within contemporary philosophy of language.
Author : Mark de Bretton Platts Publisher : Routledge/Thoemms Press Page : 350 pages File Size : 51,9 Mb Release : 1980 Category : Language and languages ISBN : 0710004060
Questions about truth and questions about reality are intimately connected. One can ask whether numbers exist by asking "Are there numbers?" But one can also ask what arguably amounts to the same question by asking "Is the sentence 'There are numbers' true?" Such semantic ascent implies that reality can be investigated by investigating our true sentences. This line of thought was dominant in twentieth century philosophy, but is now beginning to be called into question. In From Truth to Reality, Heather Dyke brings together some of the foremost metaphysicians to examine approaches to truth, reality, and the connections between the two. This collection features new and previously unpublished material by JC Beall, Mark Colyvan, Michael Devitt, John Heil, Frank Jackson, Fred Kroon, D. H. Mellor, Luca Moretti, Alan Musgrave, Robert Nola, J. J. C. Smart, Paul Snowdon, and Daniel Stoljar.
Essays on Truth and Reality (Classic Reprint) by F. H. Bradley Pdf
Excerpt from Essays on Truth and Reality I have been unwilling to include so many pages on Pragmatism. The subject certainly does not occupy a corresponding space in my mind. But the reader perhaps will recognize that, having been in a manner forced here to write in self-defence, I am no longer free merely to consult my own wishes. He will find, I trust, that the discussion, if too long, throws light on some points of interest; and in any case the remedy remains in his power. On the other hand, I should be sorry if the examination of 'Radical Empiricism' were left unread. It is a satisfaction to me, when approaching the end of my own career, to note (whatever school or tendency may from time to time be in fashion) the increasing devotion amongst us to metaphysical inquiry. There has been, I think, a rise in the general level of English philosophical thought such as fifty years ago might well have seemed incredible. I am the more resigned to add that the best which I can now myself expect to do is to collect some other scattered writings, as well as perhaps to republish those early volumes which I can no longer hope to re-write. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
THE present volume consists mainly of articles which have appeared in Mind. I have added a paper first printed in the Philosophical Review, and there are also some essays which have not before been published. With three exceptions the whole belongs to the last five or six years. The parts of this work have been called chapters mainly for convenience in reference, but also because most of them represent more or less the chapters of a book-which I once intended to write. The title indicates, I think, the principal subject and aim of the contents. I am not offering a formal treatise on the nature and criterion of knowledge, truth, and reality, and yet this main-problem recurs and in some form is perhaps present throughout. The imperfection and incompleteness, too evident to the reader, may, I hope, be forgiven if these pages serve to emphasize the need and possibly even to stimulate the pursuit of the above inquiry. There has seldom, I imagine, been a time when the general question as to the criterion was more pressing, or when the answer, attained or attempted, promised better results. But I have myself little to contribute here beyond that which I have urged in former years. For the inner connection which, I hope, unites the various parts of this volume, I would refer to the remarks appended to the closing chapter.
First published in 1909 (one year before his death), philosopher William James collected several essays into this volume, meant as a sequel to his book "Pragmatism." He wanted to clarify his definition of the truth, and respond to criticism of his previous book.
Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes by G. Forrai Pdf
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The purpose of the book is to develop internal realism, the metaphysical-episte mological doctrine initiated by Hilary Putnam (Reason, Truth and History, "Introduction", Many Faces). In doing so I shall rely - sometimes quite heavily - on the notion of conceptual scheme. I shall use the notion in a somewhat idiosyncratic way, which, however, has some affinities with the ways the notion has been used during its history. So I shall start by sketching the history of the notion. This will provide some background, and it will also give opportunity to raise some of the most important problems I will have to solve in the later chapters. The story starts with Kant. Kant thought that the world as we know it, the world of tables, chairs and hippopotami, is constituted in part by the human mind. His cen tral argument relied on an analysis of space and time, and presupposed his famous doctrine that knowledge cannot extend beyond all possible experience. It is a central property of experience - he claimed - that it is structured spatially and temporally. However, for various reasons, space and time cannot be features of the world, as it is independently of our experience. So he concluded that they must be the forms of human sensibility, i. e. necessary ingredients of the way things appear to our senses.
This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation which holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. According to Julian Dodd, facts are not complexes of worldly entities; they are, as Frege believed, true thoughts. The supposed truthmaker is nothing but the truthbearer. The author christens this response to correspondence theories the modest identity theory, which he goes on to distinguish from those identity theories propounded, at some time or other, by Russell, Moore, Bradley, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby. It is acknowledged that the modest identity theory provides neither a definition of truth nor an account of what truth consists in. The modest identity theory's role is, by contrast, that of diagnosing the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby preparing the ground for a proper deflation of the concept of truth: a deflation defended in the latter part of the book.
Reason, Truth, and Reality by Daniel Goldstick Pdf
Basing consideration upon a characterization of reason in its deductive, inductive, and ethical functioning, Goldstick asks what must hold good for reason so characterized to be a dependable guide to truth.
Facing Facts is a powerful, original examination of attempts to dislodge a cornerstone of modern philosophy: the idea that our thoughts and utterances are representations of slices of reality. Representations that are accurate are usually said to be true, to correspond to the facts - this is the foundation of correspondence theories of truth. A number of prominent philosophers have tried to undermine the idea that propositions, facts and correspondence can play any usefulrole in philosophy, and formal argumentshave been advanced to demonstrate that, under seemingly uncontroversial conditions, such entities collapse into an undifferentiated unity. The demise of individual facts is meant to herald the dawn of a new era inphilosophy, in which debates about scepticism, realism, subjectivity, representational and computational theories of mind, possible worlds, and divergent conceptual schemes that represent reality in different ways todifferent persons, periods, or cultures evaporate through lack of subject matter.By carefully untangling a host of intersecting metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and logical issues, and providing rich and original analyses of key aspects of the work of Frege, Russell, Gödel, andDavidson, Stephen Neale demonstrates that arguments for the collapse of facts are considerably more complex and interesting than either friend or foe ever imagined. A number of deep semantic facts emerge along with apowerful proof: while it is technically possible to avoid the collapse of facts, rescue the idea of representations of reality, and thereby face anew the problems raised by the sceptic or the relativist, doing so requiresmaking some tough semantic decisions about predicates and descriptions. It is simply impossible, Neale shows, to invoke representations, facts, states, or propositions without making hard choices - choices that may send manyphilosophers scurrying back to the drawing board. Facing Facts will be crucial to future work in metaphysics, the philosophy of language and mind, and logic, and will have profound implications far beyond.
On Truth and the Representation of Reality by Dan Nesher Pdf
In On Truth and the Representation of Reality, Dan Nesher develops a new theory of truth in the framework of pragmatist theory of representation. Using the pragmatist theory of perception for the basis of his epistemological explanation of our confrontation with external Reality and how it's represented, Nesher shows that in our perceptual operations we quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments. He explains how- through our proving the truth of our propositions and theories, we know that they correspond to Reality, and through our proving their falsity, we know that they don't correspond to it.
Author : Dennis Rasmussen Publisher : Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG Page : 132 pages File Size : 41,7 Mb Release : 2019-02-01 Category : Language Arts & Disciplines ISBN : 9783111342429
To celebrate the 270th anniversary of the De Gruyter publishing house, the company is providing permanent open access to 270 selected treasures from the De Gruyter Book Archive. Titles will be made available to anyone, anywhere at any time that might be interested. The DGBA project seeks to digitize the entire backlist of titles published since 1749 to ensure that future generations have digital access to the high-quality primary sources that De Gruyter has published over the centuries.
In this collection of original papers, leading international authorities turn their attention to one of the most important questions in theoretical philosophy: what is truth? To arrive at an answer, two further questions need to be addressed in this context: 1) Does truth possess any essence, any inner nature? and 2) If so, what does this nature consist of? The present discussion focuses on the antagonism between substantial or robust theories of truth, with correspondence theory taking the lead, and deflationist or minimalist views, which have been commanding an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Whereas substantial theories proceed from the premise that truth has an essence, and that therefore the objective is to discover this essence, the challenge presented by deflationism is to dispense with this very premise.
Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation by Frank Ankersmit Pdf
In this book, the noted intellectual historian Frank Ankersmit provides a systematic account of the problems of reference, truth, and meaning in historical writing. He works from the conviction that the historicist account of historical writing, associated primarily with Leopold von Ranke and Wilhelm von Humboldt, is essentially correct but that its original idealist and romanticist idiom needs to be translated into more modern terms. Rehabilitating historicism for the contemporary philosophy of history, he argues, "reveals the basic truths about the nature of the past itself, how we relate to it, and how we make sense of the past in historical writing." At the heart of Ankersmit's project is a sharp distinction between interpretation and representation. The historical text, he holds, is first and foremost a representation of some part of the past, not an interpretation. The book's central chapters address the concept of historical representation from the perspectives of reference, truth, and meaning. Ankersmit then goes on to discuss the possible role of experience in the history writing, which leads directly to a consideration of subjectivity and ethics in the historian's practice. Ankersmit concludes with a chapter on political history, which he maintains is the "basis and condition of all other variants of historical writing." Ankersmit's rehabilitation of historicism is a powerfully original and provocative contribution to the debate about the nature of historical writing.
The Revision Theory of Truth by Anil Gupta,Nuel D. Belnap Pdf
In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological contexts. The latter include, for instance, contexts that generate Liar Paradox. Their central claim is that truth is a circular concept. In support of this claim they provide a widely applicable theory (the "revision theory") of circular concepts. Under the revision theory, when truth is seen as circular both its ordinary features and its pathological features fall into a simple understandable pattern. The Revision Theory of Truth is unique in placing truth in the context of a general theory of definitions. This theory makes sense of arbitrary systems of mutually interdependent concepts, of which circular concepts, such as truth, are but a special case.
