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Author : United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Strategic Forces Subcommittee
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 164 pages
File Size : 55,5 Mb
Release : 2015
Category : Ballistic missiles
ISBN : STANFORD:36105050688584
Author : Congressional Research Service
Publisher : Independently Published
Page : 54 pages
File Size : 48,9 Mb
Release : 2019-02-02
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1795679514
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile-9M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation. The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017-the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed-the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia's noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. NOTE: This study concluded just before the formal announcement of United States withdrawal pronounced on February 1, 2019, but predicted the withdrawal announcement.
Author : Congressional Service
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 48 pages
File Size : 46,9 Mb
Release : 2018-10-10
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1727821718
Summary: Russian deployment of the 9M729 missile violates the INF Treaty. The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." The 2017 and 2018 compliance reports describe the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, including, in 2018, the Russian designator for the missile-9M729. Press reports also indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile. The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017-the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed-the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.
Author : Amy F. Woolf
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 40 pages
File Size : 51,6 Mb
Release : 2016-11-11
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1540348164
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a groundlaunched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." The compliance reports do not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. The United States has raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. It could call a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns, so that both sides could raise their concerns and explain their programs. It could begin studies and research into new INF-range systems, which is permitted by the treaty, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities-including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities-to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.
Author : Amy F. Woolf
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 40 pages
File Size : 41,8 Mb
Release : 2017-02-04
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1542931495
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a "dual-track" decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. The U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that "the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles." In the 2016 report, it noted that "the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty." The compliance reports do not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. The Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. In October 2016, it called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new INF-range systems, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces. The United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities-including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities-to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. The Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.
Author : Steven Pifer
Publisher : Brookings Institution Press
Page : 384 pages
File Size : 40,9 Mb
Release : 2017-07-11
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780815730620
An insider’s account of the complex relations between the United States and post-Soviet Ukraine The Eagle and the Trident provides the first comprehensive account of the development of U.S. diplomatic relations with an independent Ukraine, covering the years 1992 through 2004 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States devoted greater attention to Ukraine than any other post-Soviet state (except Russia) after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Steven Pifer, a career Foreign Service officer, worked on U.S.-Ukraine relations at the State Department and the White House during that period and also served as ambassador to Ukraine. With this volume he has written the definitive narrative of the ups and downs in the relationship between Washington and newly independent Ukraine. The relationship between the two countries moved from heady days in the mid- 1990s, when they declared a strategic partnership, to troubled times after 2002. During the period covered by the book, the United States generally succeeded in its major goals in Ukraine, notably the safe transfer of nearly 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons left there after the Soviet collapse. Washington also provided robust support for Ukraine’s effort to develop into a modern, democratic, market-oriented state. But these efforts aimed at reforming the state proved only modestly successful, leaving a nation that was not resilient enough to stand up to Russian aggression in Crimea in 2014. The author reflects on what worked and what did not work in the various U.S. approaches toward Ukraine. He also offers a practitioner’s recommendations for current U.S. policies in the context of ongoing uncertainty about the political stability of Ukraine and Russia’s long-term intentions toward its smaller but important neighbor.
Author : United States. Congress,Committee on Armed Services
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 162 pages
File Size : 53,6 Mb
Release : 2017-09-18
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1976520053
Russian violations of the INF Treaty : after detection, what? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session, hearing held July 17, 2014.
Author : United States. Congress,United States House of Representatives,Committee on Armed Services
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 108 pages
File Size : 54,7 Mb
Release : 2017-11-16
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1979766312
Consequences and context for Russia's violations of the INF treaty : joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services meeting jointly with Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, first session, hearing held March 30, 2017.
Author : United States. Congress,United States House of Representatives,Committee on Armed Services
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 162 pages
File Size : 53,7 Mb
Release : 2017-12-06
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1981440127
Russian violations of the INF Treaty : after detection, what? : hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, second session, hearing held July 17, 2014.
Author : Committee on Foreign Relations United St,Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate
Publisher : Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Page : 62 pages
File Size : 51,6 Mb
Release : 2018-03-27
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1986097005
Together, [the United States and Russia] have conquered the Nazis, prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the 1990s, and worked against terrorists in the years after 9/11. Yet, for most of modern history, Americans and Russians have found themselves at cross-purposes. Throughout the Cold War, we trained to obliterate each other. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, many politicians argued that the difficult days of confrontation were behind us. Leaders like Gorbachev and Yeltsin worked to place Russia on a path towards democracy and peaceful engagement with the rest of the world. Reagan asked for the walls to be torn down, George W. Bush had Putin come to his home in Texas, and Obama sought to reset the relationship in a way that prioritized communication and cooperation. Scholars will long argue over exactly when the U.S./Russia relationship again became confrontational, but looking back, the Russia-Georgia war in August of 2008 seems to mark the beginning of a new age. Since that summer, a so-called resurgent Russia has pushed back on the institutions and allies of the West. Russia has invaded Georgia and Ukraine, striking them in ways designed to prevent their integration into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. Russia has acted contrary to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Incidents at Sea Agreement. Russia has altered the human rights landscape within its own country, decreasing democracy and begging questions about the future of governance, not just in Moscow, but across the Federation. Moreover, Russia has joined the civil war in Syria and begun militarizing the Arctic.
Author : Alfred H. Moses
Publisher : Brookings Institution Press
Page : 438 pages
File Size : 55,5 Mb
Release : 2018-07-17
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780815732730
An insider's account of Romania's emergence from communism control In the 1970s American attorney Alfred H. Moses was approached on the streets of Bucharest by young Jews seeking help to emigrate to Israel. This became the author's mission until the communist regime fell in 1989. Before that Moses had met periodically with Romania's communist dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, to persuade him to allow increased Jewish emigration. This experience deepened Moses's interest in Romania—an interest that culminated in his serving as U.S. ambassador to the country from 1994 to 1997 during the Clinton administration. The ambassador's time of service in Romania came just a few years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. During this period Romania faced economic paralysis and was still buried in the rubble of communism. Over the next three years Moses helped nurture Romania's nascent democratic institutions, promoted privatization of Romania's economy, and shepherded Romania on the path toward full integration with Western institutions. Through frequent press conferences, speeches, and writings in the Romanian and Western press and in his meetings with Romanian officials at the highest level, he stated in plain language the steps Romania needed to take before it could be accepted in the West as a free and democratic country. Bucharest Diary: An American Ambassador's Journey is filled with firsthand stories, including colorful anecdotes, of the diplomacy, both public and private, that helped Romania recover from four decades of communist rule and, eventually, become a member of both NATO and the European Union. Romania still struggles today with the consequences of its history, but it has reached many of its post-communist goals, which Ambassador Moses championed at a crucial time. This book will be of special interest to readers of history and public affairs—in particular those interested in Jewish life under communist rule in Eastern Europe and how the United States and its Western partners helped rebuild an important country devastated by communism.
Author : Russian Academy of Sciences,National Academy of Sciences,Policy and Global Affairs,Committee on International Security and Arms Control,Joint Committee on Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability
Publisher : National Academies Press
Page : 127 pages
File Size : 47,8 Mb
Release : 2019-12-13
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN : 9780309468916
As ballistic missile technology proliferates, and as ballistic missile defenses are deployed by both the Russian Federation and the United States, it is increasingly important for these two countries to seek ways to reap the benefits of systems that can protect their own national security interests against limited missile attacks from third countries without undermining the strategic balance that the two governments maintain to ensure stability. Regional Ballistic Missile Defense in the Context of Strategic Stability examines both the technical implications of planned missile defense deployments for Russian and U.S. strategic deterrents and the benefits and disadvantages of a range of options for cooperation on missile defense.
Author : William James Perry,Brent Scowcroft,Charles D. Ferguson
Publisher : Council on Foreign Relations
Page : 149 pages
File Size : 52,8 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : History
ISBN : 9780876094204
The report notes that in the near term nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental element of U.S. national security. For this reason it emphasizes the importance of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent nuclear force and makes recommendations on this front. The report also offers measures to advance important goals such as preventing nuclear terrorism and bolstering the nuclear nonproliferation regime--Foreword.
Author : Alexey Malashenko
Publisher : Brookings Institution Press
Page : 310 pages
File Size : 44,5 Mb
Release : 2013-12-10
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780870034138
Russian influence in Central Asia is waning. Since attaining independence, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have forged their own paths—building relationships with outside powers and throwing off the last vestiges of Soviet domination. But in many ways, Moscow still sees Central Asia through the lens of the Soviet Union, and it struggles to redefine Russian relations with the region. In The Fight for Influence, Alexey Malashenko offers a comprehensive analysis of Russian policies and prospects in Central Asia. It is clear that Russian policy in the formerly Soviet-controlled region is entering uncharted territory. But does Moscow understand the fundamental shifts under way? Malashenko argues that it is time for Russia to rethink its approach to Central Asia. Contents 1. Wasted Opportunities 2. Regional Instruments of Influence 3. Russia and Islam in Central Asia: Problems of Migration 4. Kazakhstan and Its Neighborhood 5. Kyrgyzstan—The Exception 6. Tajikistan: Authoritarian, Fragile, and Facing Difficult Challenges 7. Turkmenistan: No Longer Exotic, But Still Authoritarian 8. Uzbekistan: Is There a Potential for Change? Conclusion Who Challenges Russia in Central Asia?
Author : Anonim
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 366 pages
File Size : 50,9 Mb
Release : 2001
Category : Ballistic missiles
ISBN : WISC:89072787104
"Featuring new evidence on: the end of the Cold War, 1989; the fall of the Wall; Sino-Soviet relations, 1958-59; Soviet missile deployments, 1959; the Iran Crisis, 1944-46; Tito and Khrushchev, 1954.