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Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm by John Andreas Olsen Pdf
In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the second of August 1990, a small group of air power advocates in the Pentagon proposed a strategic air campaign - "Operation Desert Storm" designed to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait by a sustained effort against the major sources of Iraqi national power. John Andreas Olsen provides a coherent and comprehensive examination of the origins, evolution and implementation of this campaign. His findings derive from official military and political documentation, interviews with United States Air Force officers who were closely involved with the planning of the campaign and Iraqis with detailed knowledge and experience of the inner workings of the Iraqi regime.
Examines the U.S.Air Force strategic bombing campaign of Iraq & Iraqi armed forces occupying Kuwait from January 17th through February 28th, 1991 . Describes the aircraft & weapons, changes in technology & the reexamination & reapplication of traditional strategic bombing theory by USAF planning officers. Provides a chronological review of the campaign with an analysis of the results. Photos, maps, graphs & tables. Includes suggested readings.
Author : Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,Richard H. Shultz Publisher : DIANE Publishing Page : 387 pages File Size : 40,7 Mb Release : 1992 Category : Air power ISBN : 9781428992818
The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff,Richard H. Shultz Pdf
This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.
An incisive account of the Persian Gulf War, Storm Over Iraq shows how the success of Operation Desert Storm was the product of two decades of profound changes in the American approach to defense, military doctrine, and combat operations. The first detailed analysis of why the Gulf War could be fought the way it was, the book examines the planning and preparation for war. Richard P. Hallion argues that the ascendancy of precision air power in warfare—which fulfilled the promise that air power had held for more than seventy-five years—reflects the revolutionary adaptation of a war strategy that targets things rather than people, allowing one to control an opposing nation without destroying it.
Author : Richard G. Davis Publisher : Department of the Air Force Page : 398 pages File Size : 43,5 Mb Release : 2002 Category : History ISBN : UIUC:30112059871092
Advise and Dissent is the personal odyssey of James Abourezk, from his coming of age as the son of Lebanese immigrants in South Dakota, through his hardscrabble days as a farmhand, bartender, bouncer, and cook, to his entrance into and voluntary exit from the U.S. Senate. His is a quintessentially American story that entertains as it challenges the thinking of our nation. Abourezk refused to compromise his beliefs. He championed Native American self-determination and demanded the creation of a Palestinian state. He challenged the flow of special interest money through political action committees and tried to overthrow the structure that keeps small farmers in an economic stranglehold. His memoir takes the reader on a remarkable and wise tour through the corridors of power. At a time of waning public confidence in government, he makes us realize the importance of participatory democracy.
"The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower... Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications…but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war." Colin Powell Colin Powell, My American Journey Since its original publication The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system-which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.
Air Power and Desert Storm by Richard B. Clark Pdf
Includes Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Air Power; The Air Force Mission; The big Lesson from Desert Storm Air Base Attacks; The New AFM 1-1; O Clubs; and Close Air Support. Black and white photos.
The US-led coalition response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a highly successful application of modern military forces, especially air power. Both the buildup and the combat operations provide significant food for thought for military analysis and a considerable source of insight for future commanders. As with any military conflict, this war should not be viewed as a model for the next war, but rather as another contribution to the body of experience and knowledge that shapes the insights and perspectives of military professionals.Some observers have contended that the performance of the coalition air forces in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm heralds the arrival of a new generation of warfare, sometimes labeled hyperwar. Others commenting on the experience note the merge of capabilities - technology focused by tactics and strategic planning - with the long-standing promise of air power theory. This study focuses on the latter perspective and the close relationship between the core elements of air power theory and the conduct of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm.Lt. Col. Jerome V. Martin wrote this study as a primer on air power and a broad survey of the Gulf conflict for the cadets at the US Air Force Academy. His summary of the essence of air power theory and its illustrated use against Iraq should help Air Force officers and others interested in air power to better understand the potential of modern aviation in a crisis situation and combat.Robert M. Johnston, Colonel, United States Air ForceDirector, Airpower Research Institute
Heart of the Storm by Richard T. Reynolds,, Richard TReynolds , USAF Pdf
Airmen all over the world felt relief and exhilaration as the war in the Gulf reached its dramatic conclusion on 28 February 1991. Many nonairmen, of course, experienced those emotions as well-but for a variety of different reasons. Airmen, long uneasy about the lingering inconclusiveness of past applications of their form of military power, now had what they believed to be an example of air power decisiveness so indisputably successful as to close the case forever. Within the United States Air Force, among those who thought about the uses of air power, there were two basic groups of airmen. The first-smaller and less influential-held to the views of early air pioneers in their belief that air power was best applied in a comprehensive, unitary way to achieve strategic results. The second-much more dominant-had come to think of air power in its tactical applications as a supportive element of a larger surface (land or maritime) campaign. Thinking in terms of strategic air campaigns, members of the first group found their inclinations reinforced by Col John Warden's book, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, published in 1988. Over the years, the second group increasingly concentrated on refining specific mission capabilities (close air support, interdiction, air refueling, etc.) that could be offered to a joint force commander for his allocation decisions. Members of this group rarely thought in terms of comprehensive air campaigns to achieve strategic objectives and indeed generally equated the term strategic to Strategic Air Command's long-range bomber force in delivery of nuclear weapons. Both groups found agreement in their love of the airplane and their search for acceptance as equal partners with their older sister services. In that regard, airmen everywhere stepped forward in late February to receive the congratulations they felt were so richly deserved. Put aside, for the moment at least, was the fact that a hot and often bitter debate had taken place within the Air Force on the eve of Operation Desert Storm over the very issue of the strategic air campaign and the question of whether air power would be used in that form. Here was a story to be told, a piece of history to be recorded. Just how that story would be told was, to my mind, by no means clear. In the end, of course, the Gulf War did in fact include a strategic air campaign, and the very least that one could say about it was that by so thoroughly destroying the Iraqis' capability to conduct warfare, it permitted a relatively blood- less war-concluding ground operation by coalition army forces. The most that one could say about the air campaign was that it-in and of itself-won the war. At Air University (AU), where I was serving at the time as commander, direct involvement in Desert Shield/Storm was about as limited as in any part of the Air Force. We had done some early macroanalyses of air campaign options in the Air Force Wargaming Center; we had excused some students from their studies at Air Command and Staff College to act as observers in various headquarters involved in the war; and-like all commands-we had sent support personnel to augment CENTAF forces in the desert. Otherwise, we were as detached as it was possible to be-that is to say, vitally interested but wholly without responsibility. Our responsibility would begin when the guns fell silent. Within that overall context and in the heady moment of selfcongratulation by airmen, two thoughts occurred to me: (1) the story of the Air Force's development of an air campaign would rapidly become hazy as human memories began to fail-either willfully or through natural erosion-and (2) air power's effect on the outcome of the war would become increasingly controversial as non-Air Force institutions realized that their own resources would likely diminish if airmen's conclusions were accepted.
