Terrorist Watchlist Checks And Air Passenger Prescreening
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Terrorist Watchlist Checks and Air Passenger Prescreening by William J. Krouse Pdf
Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: HSPD-6 and Terrorist Screening: NCTC and Terrorist Ident.; TSC and Terrorist Watch-Listing and Screening; (3) CBP and TSA and International Air Passenger Pre-screening: CBP and Advanced Passenger Info. System (APIS); APIS Pre-departure/Pre-arrival Final Rule; (4) TSA ¿No Fly¿ and ¿Automatic Selectee¿ Watchlists; Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS); CAPPS and Checked Baggage Screening; CAPPS and Passenger Screening at Airport Security Checkpoints; TSA Secure Flight Program; (5) Misidentifications: Disclosure Under FOIA and Privacy Act; DHS Redress Mechanisms; (6) Fair, Accurate, Secure, and Timely Redress Act of 2009; (7) Issues for Congress. Illustrations.
Terrorist Watchlist Checks and Air Passenger Prescreening by Anonim Pdf
Considerable controversy surrounds U.S. air passenger prescreening and terrorist watchlist checks. In the past, such controversy centered around diverted international flights and misidentified passengers. More recently, however, the foiled conspiracy to bomb airlines bound for the United States from the United Kingdom (UK) has raised questions about the adequacy of existing processes to prescreen air passengers against terrorist watchlists. Observers have noted that the suspected conspirators may have been able to board aircraft bound for the United States without having been screened against the consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB) maintained by the U.S. government prior to the flight's departure. Many of those observers have also noted that because the UK is a participant in the visa waiver program, British nationals are able to visit the United States temporarily for business or pleasure without acquiring a visa a U.S. consular post abroad -- a process during which they would be screened against the TSDB. Although all ticket purchasers are screened against aviation security watchlists (the "No Fly" and "Automatic Selectee" lists) at the point of purchase by air carriers, some international air passengers may not be screened against the larger, consolidated TSDB by U.S. border security officials prior to a flight's departure (wheels up) if they purchased their tickets just prior to the gates closing on a flight. In response to the recent plot, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has reportedly issued a temporary order requiring that passenger name records (PNRs) be provided preflight to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for transatlantic flights originating in the UK, as opposed to 15 minutes after the flight's departure as normally required under current law. In addition, CBP is seeking greater amounts of PNR data preflight from all air carriers and to retain that data for a greater length of time. U.S. authorities maintain that these measures are necessary to provide greater aviation and border security. Some Europeans, however, strongly oppose such data sharing and view U.S. demands for such data, without data privacy safeguards, as an infringement on their national and collective sovereignties. Complicating matters further, in July 2006, the European Court of Justice ruled that the existing agreement between the European Commission and CBP to exchange passenger name records was illegal. The Court ordered the cessation of this data exchange on September 30, 2006, in the absence of a new agreement that addresses the Court's objections with the existing agreement. If not resolved, this impasse could significantly affect travel from European Union countries to the United States. The continuing controversy surrounding U.S. air passenger prescreening processes and terrorist watchlist checks underscores that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their person or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watchlist hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation and border security. These agencies include DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and CBP, as well as the Terrorist Screening Center, which is administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Homeland Security by Bart Elias,William Krouse,Edward B. Rappaport,Resources, Science, and Industry Division,Domestic Social Policy Division Pdf
The adequacy of existing systems to screen air passengers against terrorist watch lists has been questioned, most notably by the 9/11 Commission. Yet, considerable controversy surrounds air passenger prescreening systems, such as the "No Fly" or "Automatic Selectee" lists, underscoring that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their persons or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watch list hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation security. Today, those agencies pricipally include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). In October 2004, TSA unveiled the Secure Flight program - the next generation domestic air passenger prescreening system. Secure Flight consists of four elements: (1) a streamlined rule for more intensive screening; (2) an identity authentication process; (3) a passenger name check against the consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB); and (4) an appeals process for passengers who may have been misidentified. The TSC has consolidated the "No Fly" and "Automatic Selectee" lists with the TSDB. Since CBP has assumed responsibility for prescreening passengers on inbound and outbound international flights, TSA will only prescreen domestic flights under Secure Flight. The Administration has propsed creating an Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) - under DHS's Border and Transportation Security Directorate - to oversee Secure Flight, among other screening, expedited inspection, and credentialing programs. Congress included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) requiring: (1) TSA to assume the airline passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an advanced passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the consolidated TSDB: (2) CBP to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to departure; and (3) DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons who are identified as security threats may challenge such determinations. Also, in the FY 2005 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334), Congress prohibited TSA from spending any appropriated funds on the deployment of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, or any successor system, until the Government Accountability Office reports that certain conditions have been met, including the establishment of an appeals process. Several issues may emerge for Congress. To what extent is the FBI-administered TSC supporting the air passenger screening activities of both the TSA and CBP? Has the quality and quantity of the records on the "No Fly" list been improved? Will the TSA and CBP be able to divide cleanly responsibility for screening air passengers on domestic and international flights, respectively? Will the proposed SCO be an effective mechanism to coordinate multiple border and transportation security screening programs? When will TSA be able to deploy an advanced air passenger screening system and assume the day-to-day administration of the "No Fly" lists from the airlines?
Homeland Security by Bart Elias,William Krouse,Edward B. Rappaport Pdf
The adequacy of existing systems to screen air passengers against terrorist watch lists has been questioned, most notably by the 9/11 Commission. Yet, considerable controversy surrounds air passenger prescreening systems, such as the "No Fly" or "Automatic Selectee" lists, underscoring that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their persons or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watch list hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation security. Today, those agencies pricipally include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). In October 2004, TSA unveiled the Secure Flight program - the next generation domestic air passenger prescreening system. Secure Flight consists of four elements: (1) a streamlined rule for more intensive screening; (2) an identity authentication process; (3) a passenger name check against the consolidated terrorist screening database (TSDB); and (4) an appeals process for passengers who may have been misidentified. The TSC has consolidated the "No Fly" and "Automatic Selectee" lists with the TSDB. Since CBP has assumed responsibility for prescreening passengers on inbound and outbound international flights, TSA will only prescreen domestic flights under Secure Flight. The Administration has propsed creating an Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) - under DHS's Border and Transportation Security Directorate - to oversee Secure Flight, among other screening, expedited inspection, and credentialing programs. Congress included provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) requiring: (1) TSA to assume the airline passenger prescreening function from U.S. air carriers after it establishes an advanced passenger prescreening system for domestic flights that utilizes the consolidated TSDB: (2) CBP to prescreen passengers on international flights against the TSDB prior to departure; and (3) DHS to establish appeals procedures by which persons who are identified as security threats may challenge such determinations. Also, in the FY 2005 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-334), Congress prohibited TSA from spending any appropriated funds on the deployment of CAPPS II, Secure Flight, or any successor system, until the Government Accountability Office reports that certain conditions have been met, including the establishment of an appeals process. Several issues may emerge for Congress. To what extent is the FBI-administered TSC supporting the air passenger screening activities of both the TSA and CBP? Has the quality and quantity of the records on the "No Fly" list been improved? Will the TSA and CBP be able to divide cleanly responsibility for screening air passengers on domestic and international flights, respectively? Will the proposed SCO be an effective mechanism to coordinate multiple border and transportation security screening programs? When will TSA be able to deploy an advanced air passenger screening system and assume the day-to-day administration of the "No Fly" lists from the airlines?
Air carriers remain a front-line defense against acts of terrorism that target the nation¿s civil aviation system. A key responsibility of air carriers is to check passengers¿ names against terrorist watch-list records to identify persons who should be prevented from boarding (the No Fly List) or who should undergo additional security scrutiny (the Selectee List). Eventually, the Transport. Security Admin. (TSA) is to assume this responsibility through its Secure Flight program. However, due to program delays, air carriers retain this role. This report examined: (1) the watch-list-matching requirements air carriers must follow that have been established by TSA; and (2) the extent to which TSA has assessed air carriers¿ compliance with these requirements. Illus.
GAO Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Certification of the Secure Flight Program by Stephen M. Lord Pdf
"The matching of airline passenger information against terrorist watchlist records (watchlist matching) is a frontline defense against acts of terrorism that target the nation's civil aviation system. In general, passengers identified as matches to the No-Fly list are prohibited from boarding commercial flights, while those matched to the Selectee list are required to undergo additional screening. Historically, airline passenger prescreening against watchlist records has been performed by commercial air carriers. As required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed an advanced passenger prescreening program--known as Secure Flight--to assume from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against terrorist watchlist records Since fiscal year 2004, TSA has received $358 million in appropriated funds for the development and implementation of Secure Flight, according to program officials. Also, since fiscal year 2004, GAO has been mandated to assess the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program We have reported on numerous challenges the program has faced, including those related to protecting passenger privacy, completing performance testing, fully defining and testing security requirements, and establishing reliable cost and schedule estimates, among other things. We have made recommendations to address these challenges, and TSA has generally agreed with them and has taken corrective actions"--Page 1-2.
GAO Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Certification of the Secure Flight Program Cost and Schedule Estimates by United States. Government Accountability Office Pdf
The matching of airline passenger information against terrorist watchlist records (watchlist matching) is a frontline defense against acts of terrorism that target the nation's civil aviation system. In general, passengers identified as matches to the No-Fly list are prohibited from boarding commercial flights, while those matched to the Selectee list are required to undergo additional screening. Historically, airline passenger prescreening against watchlist records has been performed by commercial air carriers. As required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed an advanced passenger prescreening program, known as Secure Flight, to assume from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against terrorist watchlist records. Since fiscal year 2004, TSA has received $358 million in appropriated funds for the development and implementation of Secure Flight, according to program officials. TSA has generally achieved the statutory condition related to the appropriateness of Secure Flight's life-cycle cost and schedule estimates, and thus has generally achieved all 10 statutory conditions related to the development and implementation of the program. Although the program's cost and schedule estimates do not fully meet all related best practices, TSA has demonstrated that it completed all key activities and our overall assessment found that the agency had substantially satisfied best practices for developing the cost and schedule estimates.
Terrorism Issues and Developments by Janine A. Levy Pdf
Terrorism seems to have developed as a world-wide virus causing harm and destruction where ever it turns up and turning up at unexpected places as no doubt all viruses are intended to do. The attackers seek weaknesses in the target countries and the target countries seek defences and deterrents against the attackers. This new book highlights some of the anti-terrorist actions underway.
The Intersection of Law and War by Kristen Boon,Douglas Lovelace Pdf
Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a series that provides primary source documents and expert commentary on various topics in the worldwide effort to combat terrorism. Among the documents collected are transcripts of Congressional testimony, reports by such federal government bodies as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), United Nations Security Council resolutions, reports and investigations by the United Nations Secretary-General and other dedicated UN bodies, and case law from the U.S. and around the globe covering issues related to terrorism. Most volumes carry a single theme, and inside each volume the documents appear within topic-based categories. The series also includes a subject index and other indices that guide the user through this complex area of the law. Volume 126, The Intersection of Law and War, takes a fresh look at the ways in which law and war intersect in this modern age of multifaceted and multidimensional warfare. Professor Douglas Lovelace, Jr. has organized Congressional Research Service reports and United Nations studies to discuss how U.S. law and international law bear on contemporary national security issues such as: terrorism in the context of the war powers debate; the use of drones for targeted killings; maintaining and closing the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay; and illegal border crossing into the United States.
Report on Legislative and Oversight Activities of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security by United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Homeland Security Pdf
Intelligence for an Age of Terror by Gregory F. Treverton Pdf
During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was concerned primarily with states; non-state actors like terrorists were secondary. Now the priorities are reversed and the challenge is enormous. States had an address, and they were hierarchical and bureaucratic. They thus came with some 'story'. Terrorists do not. States were 'over there', but terrorists are there and here. They thus put pressure on intelligence at home, not just abroad. The strength of this book is that it underscores the extent of the change and ranges broadly across data collection and analysis, foreign and domestic, as well as presenting the issues of value that arise as new targets require collecting more information at home.
National Security Law by Stephen Dycus,William C. Banks,Peter Raven Hansen,Stephen I. Vladeck Pdf
For the last 30 years, National Security Law has helped create and shape an entire new field of law. It has been adopted for classroom use at most American law schools, all of the military academies, and many non-law graduate programs. The Seventh Edition of this leading casebook provides an up-to-date, user-friendly survey of this extremely dynamic field. Relying heavily on original materials and provocative notes and questions, this book encourages students to play the roles of national security professionals, politicians, judges, and ordinary citizens. And by showing the development of doctrine in historical context, it urges them to see their responsibility as lawyers to help keep us safe and free. Like earlier editions, the new book deals with basic separation-of-powers principles, the interaction of U.S. and international law, the use of military force, intelligence, detention, criminal prosecution, homeland security, and national security information — more than enough to provide teachers with a rich menu of readings for classes. New to the Seventh Edition: Latest developments on U.S. military involvement in Syria and Iran President Trump’s Border Wall and appropriations power Carpenter v. U.S. and recent FISA developments and FISC decisions Trump travel ban “Defending forward” in cyberspace New chapter on nuclear war Professors and students will benefit from: Carefully curated and edited original materials Extensive notes and questions to fill in the blanks Read-ins and chapter summaries to provide perspective Frequent references to historical and political context
