The Army Command Post And Defense Reshaping 1987 1997
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The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping 1987 - 1997 by United States Army,Mark D Sherry Pdf
The U.S. Army underwent a decade of significant transformation between 1987 and 1997 that affected strategy, force requirements, structure, and basing requirements. The end of the Cold War provided the initial impetus for defense reshaping and drove the pace and depth of change. Reductions in forces and installations, and deferred procurement of the next generation of military equipment overlapped with efforts to adapt the Army to a new global security environment.
Author : Center of Military History United States Publisher : CreateSpace Page : 240 pages File Size : 48,9 Mb Release : 2014-12-13 Category : Electronic ISBN : 1505513588
The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping 1987-1997 by Center of Military History United States Pdf
The U.S. Army underwent a decade of significant transformation between 1987 and 1997 that affected strategy, force requirements, structure, and basing requirements. The end of the Cold War provided the initial impetus for defense reshaping and drove the pace and depth of change. Reductions in forces and installations, and deferred procurement of the next generation of military equipment overlapped with efforts to adapt the Army to a new global security environment.
The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987-1997 by Mark D. Sherry Pdf
The end of the Cold War initiated major changes in the global security environment that the United States could not ignore. These changes affected security requirements, forces, and missions that had guided the country since the end of World War II. Another "New Look" was needed, one that recognized the uncertainty inherent in the absence of a single rival power. Domestic pressures for a "peace dividend" provided additional impetus for a comprehensive restructuring of the nation's defenses. Army leaders responded almost immediately, agreeing that a more flexible, more technology-capable ground force was needed, one able to react to a much broader variety of threats and contingencies. But deciding how that goal could be best realized would prove illusive. Dr. Mark Sherry's The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping, 1987-1997, examines this tumultuous period in depth. The author relates how the efforts of Army leaders to develop options for change were soon overtaken by actions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Army size, structure, and missions. Strengthened by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reorganization act, the Joint Chiefs led the way, exerting an unprecedented degree of power in reshaping Defense Department policies and postures. Sherry first considers the Army's studies and recommendations before tackling the higher level initiatives that followed, culminating in the Bottom-up Review and finally the first Quadrennial Defense Review. These Defense Department studies quickly overshadowed all Army reshaping efforts and seized the initiative for defense transformation. One result was the reduction by 1997 of the Army's active duty strength by over one-third with few substantive changes in its missions or structure. Another was the greatly reduced size and authority of the Army Staff and Secretariat, undermining their ability to define the size, shape, and nature of the ground forces that they were expected to provide to the combatant commanders. Ten years later, these measures remain controversial. Whether the Army's ground forces are large enough and properly structured to address the full range of strategic requirements is still a question mark. So, too, is the size and shape of its generating base-its schools, installations, and administrative commands-and the Pentagon-based "Army Command Post" that oversees the entire effort. This work is thus not intended to end what is likely to be a continuing debate over national strategy and how best to implement it, especially from the viewpoint of land forces and the senior service. Instead, The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping is meant to clarify that debate and better prepare those who are taking part in it and who in the end will determine the future of the Army, the soldiers, and their ability to accomplish the tasks they are assigned to fulfill.
The Army Command Post and Defense Reshaping 1987-1997 by Mark D. Sherry Pdf
The U.S. Army underwent a decade of significant transformation between 1987 and 1997 that affected strategy, force requirements, structure, and basing requirements. The end of the Cold War provided the initial impetus for defense reshaping and drove the pace and depth of change. Reductions in forces and installations, and deferred procurement of the next generation of military equipment overlapped with efforts to adapt the Army to a new global security environment.
Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the United States Army 1989-2005 by John Sloan Brown Pdf
This is the story of how the United States Army responded to the challenges of the end of the Cold War by transforming itself into the most capable ground force in the world today. It argues that from 1989 through 2005 the U.S. Army attempted, and largely achieved, a centrally directed and institutionally driven transformation relevant to ground warfare that exploited Information Age technology, adapted to post?Cold War strategic circumstances, and integrated into parallel Department of Defense efforts. The process not only modernized equipment, it also substantially altered doctrine, organization, training, administrative and logistical practices, and the service culture. Kevlar Legions further contends that the digitized expeditionary Army has withstood the test of combat, performing superbly with respect to deployment and high-end conventional combat and capably with respect to low-intensity conflict and the counterinsurgency challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present, Volume IV by M Wade Markel,Alexandra Evans,Miranda Priebe,Adam Givens,Jameson Karns,Gian Gentile Pdf
Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors of this four-volume series show that there is no such thing as a “traditional” U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. Volume IV traces how Total Force Policy has been implemented since 1970.
Adopting Mission Command by Donald Vandergriff Pdf
In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place.
As entrenched bureaucracies, military organizations might reasonably be expected to be especially resistant to reform and favor only limited, incremental adjustments. Yet, since 1945, the U.S. Army has rewritten its capstone doctrine manual, Operations, fourteen times. While some modifications have been incremental, collectively they reflect a significant evolution in how the Army approaches warfare—making the U.S. Army a crucial and unique case of a modern land power that is capable of change. So what accounts for this anomaly? What institutional processes have professional officers developed over time to escape bureaucracies' iron cage? Forging the Sword conducts a comparative historical process-tracing of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army. The findings suggest that there are unaccounted-for institutional facilitators of change within military organizations. Thus, it argues that change in military organizations requires "incubators," designated subunits established outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy, and "advocacy networks" championing new concepts. Incubators, ranging from special study groups to non-Title 10 war games and field exercises, provide a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new operational concepts. Advocacy networks then connect different constituents and inject them with concepts developed in incubators. This injection makes changes elites would have otherwise rejected a contagious narrative.
As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy’s naval strategy system from the post–World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s’maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred –ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year “strategy of means” where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force’s ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy’s ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post–Cold War era.
Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2013 by William Gardner Bell Pdf
From the Foreword: This volume provides short biographical sketches of the commanding generals and chiefs of staff who have led the United States Army. Their rise through the levels of leadership to the pinnacle of their profession reveals both striking parallels and equally fascinating contrasts. While their responsibilities have evolved over the years, the essential elements of leadership remain unchanged. The format of this volume combines biographical information along with the officially designated portraits of the commanding generals and chiefs of staff. It also includes brief accounts of the artists selected to paint the official portraits. As an aspect of the Army art program, these portraits add an interesting and revealing dimension to the biographer's words. This volume not only celebrates the legacy of dedication and patriotism left by these leaders, but also enhances our understanding of military leadership at the highest levels. All those interested in the profession of arms should become familiar with those who have led our Army.
The Rise of the Military Welfare State by Jennifer Mittelstadt Pdf
This study of US military benefits “offers a disturbing view of the armed forces as a high-value target in political clashes over public assistance” (The Nation). Since the end of the draft, the U.S. Army has prided itself on its patriotic volunteers who heed the call to “Be All That You Can Be.” But beneath the recruitment slogans, the army promised volunteers something more tangible: a social safety net including medical care, education, housing assistance, legal services, and other privileges that had long been reserved for career soldiers. The Rise of the Military Welfare State examines how the U.S. Army’s extension of benefits to enlisted men and women created a military welfare system of unprecedented size and scope. In the 1970s, widespread opposition to the draft led to the establishment of America’s all-volunteer army. For this to succeed, a new strategy was needed for attracting and retaining soldiers. The army solved the problem, Jennifer Mittelstadt shows, by promising to take care of its own. While the United States dismantled its civilian welfare system in the 1980s and 1990s, army benefits continued to expand. Mittelstadt also examines how critics of this expansion fought to roll back its signature achievements, even as a new era of war began.
