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Author : P. Dixon
Publisher : Springer
Page : 264 pages
File Size : 45,5 Mb
Release : 2012-10-19
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781137284686
This timely and critical volume questions the effectiveness of Britain's 'hearts and minds' approach, challenging conventional counterinsurgency thinking by drawing on the expertise of regional and thematic specialists.
Author : P. Dixon
Publisher : Springer
Page : 456 pages
File Size : 42,7 Mb
Release : 2012-10-19
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781137284686
This timely and critical volume questions the effectiveness of Britain's 'hearts and minds' approach, challenging conventional counterinsurgency thinking by drawing on the expertise of regional and thematic specialists.
Author : Thomas R. Mockaitis
Publisher : Manchester University Press
Page : 204 pages
File Size : 55,9 Mb
Release : 1995
Category : Counterinsurgency
ISBN : 0719039193
This text covers the development of British counterinsurgency principles and practices since 1960. Through the study of conflicts in Borneo, South Arabia, Oman and Northern Ireland, the author explores how Britain's unique approach to internal conflict evolved and shows how the conflicts of this era can only be fully understood by stressing the links between colonial and post-colonial policy.
Author : Matthew Hughes
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 254 pages
File Size : 40,6 Mb
Release : 2016-04-08
Category : History
ISBN : 9781134920457
This edited collection examines the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency. It brings together and consolidates new scholarship on the counter-insurgency associated with the end of empire, foregrounding a dark and violent history of British imperial rule, one that stretched back to the nineteenth century and continued until the final collapse of the British Empire in the 1960s. The essays gathered in the collection cover the period from the late nineteenth century to the 1960s; they are both empirical and conceptual in tone. This edited collection pivots on the theme of the nature of the force used by Britain against colonial insurgents. It argues that the violence employed by British security forces in counter-insurgency to maintain imperial rule is best seen from a maximal perspective, contra traditional arguments that the British used minimum force to defeat colonial rebellions. Case studies are drawn from across the British Empire, covering a period of some hundred years, but they concentrate on the savage wars of decolonisation after 1945. The collection includes a historiographical essay and one on the ‘lost’ Hanslope archive by the scholar chosen by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to manage the release of the papers held. This book was published as a special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies.
Author : Robert Egnell,David H. Ucko
Publisher : Columbia University Press
Page : 249 pages
File Size : 49,8 Mb
Release : 2013-10-08
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780231535410
Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Author : Andrew Mumford
Publisher : Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College
Page : 40 pages
File Size : 51,7 Mb
Release : 2011
Category : History
ISBN : UOM:39015088037752
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.
Author : Andrew Mumford
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 218 pages
File Size : 45,7 Mb
Release : 2012
Category : History
ISBN : 9780415667456
This book examines the complex practice of counter-insurgency warfare through the prism of the British experiences of irregular war in the post-war era, from Malaya up to the current Iraq war.
Author : Daniel Whittingham,Stuart Mitchell
Publisher : Casemate
Page : 193 pages
File Size : 52,9 Mb
Release : 2021-06-30
Category : History
ISBN : 9781612009490
An overview of modern Western militaries’ response to armed rebellion, from Indochina to Northern Ireland to Iraq. Counterinsurgency—or efforts to defeat and confine a rebellion against a constituted authority—has become a buzzword in recent times, but the term is as old as society itself. This concise history covers the development of modern counterinsurgency over the last two hundred years, from the concept of “small wars” and colonial warfare to the ideas of early insurgents like Clausewitz and the theories of Lawrence of Arabia to the methods of twentieth-century insurgents including Mao and Che Guevara. It also examines a number of post-1945 insurgencies and how Western armies have tried to counter them, in particular the French in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the United States in Vietnam and the reaction to the American experience there. This is compared with the British approach in the years after World War II, particularly in Malaya, but also in Kenya and Northern Ireland. Against this backdrop, there is an investigation of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of COIN literature, and the subsequent backlash against that literature—and finally, a discussion of the future of COIN.
Author : David H. Ucko,Robert Egnell
Publisher : Columbia University Press
Page : 250 pages
File Size : 52,8 Mb
Release : 2013-10-15
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780231164269
The British military confronted significant challenges during the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Adhering to the principles and doctrines of previous campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these cities against Britain’s celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing the gap between the ambitions and resources, intent and commitment, that proved so disastrous to the operation. In its detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. It calls attention to the effectiveness of insurgent tactics and the danger of ungoverned spaces shielding hostile groups and underscores the need for the British military to acquire new skills for meeting irregular threats in future wars.
Author : Victoria Nolan
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing
Page : 319 pages
File Size : 49,5 Mb
Release : 2011-12-18
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780857720870
Offering a unique and original perspective on Britain's 'Small Wars' leadership culture - this title is an essential reading for serving soldiers and scholars of military studies. It is based on original archival research. It offers fascinating survey of counterinsurgency operations - with relevance for today's military and security. Between 1948 and 1960, the British army conducted three important counterinsurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. During that time, military leaders inspired the evolution of a distinct organisational culture, known as 'small wars culture', which affected learning, discipline and attitudes towards leadership and fellow soldiers. Using a synthesis of organisational theory and archival research, this book explores how military leaders embedded and transmitted this particular military organisational culture within the British army and provides an analysis of leaders' characteristics, their support networks and past experiences. This book will be of interest to counterinsurgency specialists, the British Army and military historians and sociologists, as well as to serving military forces.
Author : John Newsinger
Publisher : Springer
Page : 284 pages
File Size : 48,6 Mb
Release : 2016-04-30
Category : History
ISBN : 9781137316868
British Counterinsurgency challenges the British Army's claim to counterinsurgency expertise. It provides well-written, accessible and up-to-date accounts of the post-1945 campaigns in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, South Yemen, Dhofar, Northern Ireland and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Author : J. B. E. Hittle
Publisher : Potomac Books, Inc.
Page : 453 pages
File Size : 54,5 Mb
Release : 2011
Category : Biography & Autobiography
ISBN : 9781612341286
How the British Secret Service failed to neutralize Sinn Fein and the IRA
Author : Russell W. Glenn
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 330 pages
File Size : 44,8 Mb
Release : 2015-05-22
Category : History
ISBN : 9781317592761
This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
Author : Beatrice Heuser,Eitan Shamir
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 399 pages
File Size : 45,5 Mb
Release : 2017-01-05
Category : History
ISBN : 9781107135048
A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.
Author : John Nagl
Publisher : Bloomsbury Publishing USA
Page : 273 pages
File Size : 41,7 Mb
Release : 2002-10-30
Category : History
ISBN : 9780313077036
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
