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Author : C. V. Borst
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 261 pages
File Size : 53,6 Mb
Release : 1970
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:963382160
Author : Thomas W. Polger
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 340 pages
File Size : 51,6 Mb
Release : 2006-01-20
Category : Psychology
ISBN : 0262264161
In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain—that sensations are brain processes—and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties—a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the "great blooming buzzing confusion" of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory—Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism.
Author : Riccardo Manzotti
Publisher : John Benjamins Publishing Company
Page : 254 pages
File Size : 47,9 Mb
Release : 2017-10-19
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9789027265098
What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical but not neural. This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same?
Author : Clive Vernon Borst
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 261 pages
File Size : 48,8 Mb
Release : 1973
Category : Mind and body
ISBN : OCLC:234122836
Author : U. T. Place
Publisher : Oxford University Press on Demand
Page : 228 pages
File Size : 51,6 Mb
Release : 2004-04-08
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780195161373
This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighbouring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness.
Author : Anonim
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 128 pages
File Size : 52,7 Mb
Release : 1979
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:916254448
Author : Thomas W. Polger,Lawrence A. Shapiro
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 273 pages
File Size : 43,7 Mb
Release : 2016
Category : FAMILY & RELATIONSHIPS
ISBN : 9780198732891
Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro provide a full investigation of multiple realisation - the idea that minds can be realised in ways other than the human brain. They cast doubt on the hypothesis and give an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, and in chemistry, biology, and related fields.
Author : David Malet Armstrong
Publisher : London : Macmillan ; New York : St Martin's P.
Page : 272 pages
File Size : 48,9 Mb
Release : 1970
Category : Psychology
ISBN : STANFORD:36105000008958
Author : Clive Vernon Borst
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 128 pages
File Size : 51,9 Mb
Release : 1970
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:310620707
Author : Clive Vernon Borst
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 261 pages
File Size : 50,7 Mb
Release : 1970
Category : Identity (Philosophical concept)
ISBN : LCCN:lc70106388
Author : Paul Badham
Publisher : Springer
Page : 178 pages
File Size : 45,6 Mb
Release : 1976-06-18
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9781349030132
Author : David Malet Armstrong
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 261 pages
File Size : 50,5 Mb
Release : 1970
Category : Identity (Philosophical concept)
ISBN : OCLC:19252170
Author : Clive Vernon Borst
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 261 pages
File Size : 43,6 Mb
Release : 1970
Category : Brain
ISBN : OCLC:17519249
Author : Richard Swinburne
Publisher : Oxford University Press (UK)
Page : 252 pages
File Size : 48,8 Mb
Release : 2013-01-17
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780199662579
Richard Swinburne presents a powerful new case for substance dualism and for libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental events (including conscious events) are distinct from physical events and interact with them, and claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that interaction does not take place. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, and claims that it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It ismetaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from eachother that it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each of us would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence, we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. It follows that we are morally responsible for our actions.
Author : M. R. Bennett,P. M. S. Hacker
Publisher : John Wiley & Sons
Page : 564 pages
File Size : 41,8 Mb
Release : 2022-03-14
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9781119530978
The second edition of the seminal work in the field—revised, updated, and extended In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories—including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research. Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume: Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness.