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Charles Nelson Spinks,John C. Durr,Stephen Peters,American University (Washington, D.C.). Center for Research in Social Systems
Author : Charles Nelson Spinks,John C. Durr,Stephen Peters,American University (Washington, D.C.). Center for Research in Social Systems Publisher : Unknown Page : 114 pages File Size : 51,7 Mb Release : 1969 Category : Land settlement ISBN : STANFORD:36105119675135
The North Vietnamese Regime by Charles Nelson Spinks,John C. Durr,Stephen Peters,American University (Washington, D.C.). Center for Research in Social Systems Pdf
The study is intended to give background material on certain problem areas in the existing social system of North Vietnam. Emphasis is placed on the historical development of the North Vietnam Workers' Party (formerly the Indochina Communist Party), its structural organization, tactics employed to seize political power in North Vietnam after the surrender of Japan in August 1945, and the resistance war it waged against France in the period 1946-54. Details are given on the formation of the various front organizations, particularly the Viet Minh and its successor, the Fatherland Front; the youth and women's organizations; and the trade unions; and on the methods employed by the North Vietnamese Communist leadership to mobilize the masses and use them to achieve their political, social, and economic objectives. Included are the discussions of the roles of the puppet Democratic and Socialist parties in furthering the aims of the Communists. Additionally, background information is given dealing with problems affecting the Roman Catholics, ethnic minorities, resettlement of the population, evacuation of urban centers, and the development of local industry. (Author).
Key Figures of the Vietnam War by Hope Lourie Killcoyne Pdf
From 1965 to 1973, the United States sent troops to South Vietnam to assist in its war against the Communist regime of North Vietnam. In the end, the North was victorious, and Vietnam was reunited under Communist rule. This resource provides an overview of Vietnam’s history, a chronicle of the war itself, and profiles of people who played instrumental roles in and leading up to this long and bitter conflict—political and military leaders from North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States, as well as some notable figures from the American antiwar movement.
*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading The Vietnam War could have been called a comedy of errors if the consequences weren't so deadly and tragic. In 1951, while war was raging in Korea, the United States began signing defense pacts with nations in the Pacific, intending to create alliances that would contain the spread of Communism. As the Korean War was winding down, America joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, pledging to defend several nations in the region from Communist aggression. One of those nations was South Vietnam. Before the Vietnam War, most Americans would have been hard pressed to locate Vietnam on a map. South Vietnamese President Diem's regime was extremely unpopular, and war broke out between Communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam around the end of the 1950s. Kennedy's administration tried to prop up the South Vietnamese with training and assistance, but the South Vietnamese military was feeble. A month before his death, Kennedy signed a presidential directive withdrawing 1,000 American personnel, and shortly after Kennedy's assassination, new President Lyndon B. Johnson reversed course, instead opting to expand American assistance to South Vietnam. Over the next few years, the American military commitment to South Vietnam grew dramatically, and the war effort became both deeper and more complex. The strategy included parallel efforts to strengthen the economic and political foundations of the South Vietnamese regime, to root out the Viet Cong guerrilla insurgency in the south, combat the more conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA) near the Demilitarized Zone between north and south, and bomb military and industrial targets in North Vietnam itself. In public, American military officials and members of the Johnson administration stressed their tactical successes and offered rosy predictions; speaking before the National Press Club in November 1967, General Westmoreland claimed, "I have never been more encouraged in the four years that I have been in Vietnam. We are making real progress...I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing." Ripe for the plucking by North Vietnam, the country of South Vietnam found itself in an unenviable position in 1974. American forces rapidly withdrew, leaving only a few advisers and other personnel in place of the large forces deployed in the Southeast Asian theater until recently. President Gerald Ford and his staff, completely outmatched at the negotiations during the American retreat, parleyed from a position of weakness. The North Vietnamese gave essentially no useful concessions since they had no reason to, and they secured an American withdrawal without needing to remove their own advance units from South Vietnamese territory in return. Naturally, these facts reflected themselves in the morale of the two sides. South Vietnamese morale collapsed to catastrophic levels and remained there, though the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) forces occasionally managed gallant, even heroic stands. The North Vietnamese, by contrast, felt confident of victory, from the highest to the lowest ranks. A mix of Marxist zeal and barely expressed but very real nationalism strengthened the resolve of the North Vietnamese's commanders and soldiers as well. A haunting fear remained among the North Vietnamese that the Americans would return, but each fresh success with no American response made this concern recede further into the background. As 1975 dawned, the NVA prepared for a final series of campaigns to conquer the territory of South Vietnam, leading to a chain of events that culminated with the fall of Saigon and some of the most infamous footage in 20th century America's history. The Fall of Saigon: The History of the Battle for South Vietnam's Capital and the End of the Vietnam War examines how the war ended.
*Includes pictures *Includes a bibliography for further reading "The last thing I wanted to do was to be a wartime President." - Lyndon B. Johnson The Vietnam War could have been called a comedy of errors if the consequences weren't so deadly and tragic. In 1951, while war was raging in Korea, the United States began signing defense pacts with nations in the Pacific, intending to create alliances that would contain the spread of Communism. As the Korean War was winding down, America joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, pledging to defend several nations in the region from Communist aggression. One of those nations was South Vietnam. Before the Vietnam War, most Americans would have been hard pressed to locate Vietnam on a map. South Vietnamese President Diệm's regime was extremely unpopular, and war broke out between Communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam around the end of the 1950s. Kennedy's administration tried to prop up the South Vietnamese with training and assistance, but the South Vietnamese military was feeble. A month before his death, Kennedy signed a presidential directive withdrawing 1,000 American personnel, and shortly after Kennedy's assassination, new President Lyndon B. Johnson reversed course, instead opting to expand American assistance to South Vietnam. In 1964, the USS Maddox was an intelligence-gathering naval ship stationed off the coast of North Vietnam for the purpose of gathering information about the ongoing conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The borders between the two sides were in dispute, and the United States was less up to date on changes in these borders than the two belligerents. In the process, the USS Maddox accidentally crossed over into North Vietnamese shores, and when the ship was sighted by North Vietnamese naval units, they attacked the Maddox on August 2, 1964. Though no Americans were hurt, naval crews were on heightened alert as the Maddox retreated to South Vietnam, where it was met by the USS Turner Joy. Two days later, the Maddox and Turner Joy, both with crews already on edge as a result of the events of August 2, were certain they were being followed by hostile North Vietnamese boats, and both fired at targets popping up on their radar. The fighting on August 2, can be verified through a variety of sources and an accounting of materials expended. However, the mystery of the Gulf of Tonkin begins with what the Maddox's Captain John J. Herrick believed was a second attack that spanned August 4 and into the following morning. He reported to officials that there was such an attack despite lack of visual confirmation. The Ticonderoga passed along the report of an August 4 attack, with some visual evidence gathered by sailors and officers. After this second encounter, Johnson gave a speech over radio to the American people shortly before midnight on August 4th. He told of attacks on the high seas, suggesting the events occurred in international waters, and he vowed the nation would be prepared for its own defense and the defense of the South Vietnamese. On the strength of Herrick's report, on August 5, as part of the retaliatory action, Johnson ordered aerial attacks against the coastline's patrol bases and oil storage facilities. These represented the first purely American attacks against North Vietnam, named Operation Pierce Arrow. Lieutenant Everett Alvarez, an American pilot from the USS Constellation, was shot down and became the first American aviator to be captured. Fellow pilot Richard Sather received the unfortunate distinction of becoming the first American aviator to be killed in Vietnam. It would be years before the government revealed that the second encounter was no encounter at all. The government never figured out what the Maddox and Turner Joy were firing at the night of August 4, but there was no indication that it involved the North Vietnamese.
United States. Department of State. Office of Media Services
Author : United States. Department of State. Office of Media Services Publisher : Unknown Page : 142 pages File Size : 48,8 Mb Release : 1965 Category : Vietnam ISBN : UOM:39015001846982
Why the North Won the Vietnam War by M. Gilbert Pdf
In this new collection of essays on the Vietnam War, eminent scholars of the Second Indo-china conflict consider several key factors that led to the defeat of the United States and its allies. The book adopts a candid and critical look at the United State's stance and policies in Vietnam, and refuses to condemn, excuse, or apologize for America's actions in the conflict. Rather, the contributors think widely and creatively about the varied reasons that may have accounted for the United State's failure to defeat the North Vietnamese Army, such as the role played by economics in America's defeat. Other fresh perspectives on the topic include American intelligence failure in Vietnam, the international dimensions of America's defeat in Vietnam, and the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. None of the essays have been previously published, and all have been specifically commissioned for the book by its editor, Marc Jason Gilbert.
Based on extensive research in the Russian archives, this book examines the Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict between the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and late 1963, when the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of John F. Kennedy radically transformed the conflict. The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.
Offering a controversial perspective on America's most painful war, the author proposes that Vietnam should have been fought, but with different tactics.
Author : Mervyn Edwin Roberts III Publisher : University Press of Kansas Page : 428 pages File Size : 45,5 Mb Release : 2018-02-28 Category : History ISBN : 9780700625833
The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968 by Mervyn Edwin Roberts III Pdf
The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, for the first time fully explores the most sustained, intensive use of psychological operations (PSYOP) in American history. In PSYOP, US military personnel use a variety of tactics—mostly audio and visual messages—to influence individuals and groups to behave in ways that favor US objectives. Informed by the author’s firsthand experience of such operations elsewhere, this account of the battle for “hearts and minds” in Vietnam offers rare insight into the art and science of propaganda as a military tool in the twentieth century. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, focuses on the creation, capabilities, and performance of the forces that conducted PSYOP in Vietnam, including the Joint US Public Affairs Office and the 4th PSYOP Group. In his comprehensive account, Mervyn Edwin Roberts III covers psychological operations across the entire theater, by all involved US agencies. His book reveals the complex interplay of these activities within the wider context of Vietnam and the Cold War propaganda battle being fought by the United States at the same time. Because PSYOP never occurs in a vacuum, Roberts considers the shifting influence of alternative sources of information—especially from the governments of North and South Vietnam, but also from Australia, Korea, and the Philippines. The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968, also addresses the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965 and, finally, shows how the course of the war itself forced changes to this doctrine. The scope of the book allows for a unique measurement of the effectiveness of psychological operations over time.
In the annals of Vietnam War history, no figure has been more controversial than Ngo Dinh Diem. During the 1950s, U.S. leaders hailed Diem as “the miracle man of Southeast Asia” and funneled huge amounts of aid to his South Vietnamese government. But in 1963 Diem was ousted and assassinated in a coup endorsed by President John F. Kennedy. Diem’s alliance with Washington has long been seen as a Cold War relationship gone bad, undone either by American arrogance or by Diem’s stubbornness. In Misalliance, Edward Miller provides a convincing new explanation for Diem’s downfall and the larger tragedy of South Vietnam. For Diem and U.S. leaders, Miller argues, the alliance was more than just a joint effort to contain communism. It was also a means for each side to pursue its plans for nation building in South Vietnam. Miller’s definitive portrait of Diem—based on extensive research in Vietnamese, French, and American archives—demonstrates that the South Vietnamese leader was neither Washington’s pawn nor a tradition-bound mandarin. Rather, he was a shrewd and ruthless operator with his own vision for Vietnam’s modernization. In 1963, allied clashes over development and reform, combined with rising internal resistance to Diem’s nation building programs, fractured the alliance and changed the course of the Vietnam War. In depicting the rise and fall of the U.S.–Diem partnership, Misalliance shows how America’s fate in Vietnam was written not only on the battlefield but also in Washington’s dealings with its Vietnamese allies.
The TET Offensive by Charles River Charles River Editors Pdf
*Includes pictures *Includes accounts of the fighting written by generals, soldiers, and journalists *Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading *Includes a table of contents "We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds...we are mired in a stalemate that could only be ended by negotiation, not victory." - Walter Cronkite, February 27, 1968 Before the Vietnam War, most Americans would have been hard pressed to locate Vietnam on a map. South Vietnamese President Diem's regime was extremely unpopular, and war broke out between Communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam around the end of the 1950s. Kennedy's administration tried to prop up the South Vietnamese with training and assistance, but the South Vietnamese military was feeble. A month before his death, Kennedy signed a presidential directive withdrawing 1,000 American personnel, and shortly after Kennedy's assassination, new President Lyndon B. Johnson reversed course, instead opting to expand American assistance to South Vietnam. Over the next few years, the American military commitment to South Vietnam grew dramatically, and the war effort became both deeper and more complex. The strategy included parallel efforts to strengthen the economic and political foundations of the South Vietnamese regime, to root out the Viet Cong guerrilla insurgency in the south, combat the more conventional North Vietnamese Army (NVA) near the Demilitarized Zone between north and south, and bomb military and industrial targets in North Vietnam itself. In public, American military officials and members of the Johnson administration stressed their tactical successes and offered rosy predictions; speaking before the National Press Club in November 1967, General Westmoreland claimed, "I have never been more encouraged in the four years that I have been in Vietnam. We are making real progress...I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing." (New York Times, November 22, 1967). Early in 1968, a massive coordinated Viet Cong operation - the Tet Offensive - briefly paralyzed American and South Vietnamese forces across the country, threatening even the American embassy compound in Saigon. With this, the smiling mask slipped even further, inflaming the burgeoning antiwar movement. Although American soldiers didn't lose a battle strategically during the campaign, the Tet Offensive made President Johnson non-credible and historically unpopular, to the extent that he did not run for reelection in 1968. Nearly 50 years after the campaign, the Tet Offensive continues to inspire impassioned and occasionally bitter debate among historians, military officers, government officials, veterans, journalists, and the public at large. Was the large-scale Communist assault a strategic masterstroke that demolished American popular support for the war effort? Was it a catastrophic misstep that effectively broke the back of the Viet Cong guerrilla forces in South Vietnam? Did Tet expose the Johnson administration's optimistic pronouncements as a deliberate pattern of lies and obfuscations designed to mislead the American public about the true nature of the war? Or did anti-war elements in the news media betray their public trust by mischaracterizing a substantial American victory as a shocking and catastrophic defeat? In the words of the historian Richard Falk, the Tet Offensive "remains a mirror for restating opposed preconceptions and validating contending ideological biases." (Falk, 11). Perhaps the only proposition to win universal agreement is that the Tet Offensive represented a significant turning point. The conflict in Vietnam would continue for years after Tet, but it would never be the same.
