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This is the original manual for “small wars,” now known variously as guerrilla warfare, asymmetric combat, and low-intensity conflict. It was first published in 1896 as an analysis and how-to guide for the British Army as it fought to expand the boundaries of the British Empire. Its author, Major General Sir Charles Edward Callwell, collects and distills combat experience from a vast range of British, French, and Russian imperial campaigns and rebellions. Callwell then draws several universal small-war combat lessons that are still true today, including the need for “boldness and vigor” to keep irregular forces off-balance, the vital role of intelligence, the importance of seizing and holding important terrain (most often the high ground), and the final war-winning requirement to “seize what the enemy prizes most.” He also shows that technological superiority alone is not enough, and that logistics and supply can lock an army in place instead of freeing it. Some of the Afghanistan battlefields described in the book are still being fought over today, with much the same disparity in forces, over a century later – it is impossible to miss the lessons of history in this classic work.
The Foundations of the Science of War by Maj-Gen. J. F. C. Fuller Pdf
The Foundations of the Science of War by Col. J. F. C. Fuller, first published in 1925, aims, as the title suggests and in the author’s own words, to provide “a foundation of the science of war, or, at least, of a science of war.” Col. Fuller spent over 15 years planning this foundation, and it was his endeavour that it would allow military students to examine it “not only for its own worth, but in order to think of war scientifically, for until we do so we shall never become true artists of war.” Likewise, Col. Fuller hoped the book may be of use to all other interested readers, “not only in studying war, but in studying any of the activities of life.” “In this book I am attempting something new—at least, new since the days of Henry Lloyd and Robert Jackson; for, as far as I am aware, these are my only two fellow-countrymen who have attempted to reduce war to a science. In a small way I am trying to do for war what Copernicus did for astronomy, Newton for physics, and Darwin for natural history. My book, I believe, is the first in which a writer has attempted to apply the method of science to the study of war; for Lloyd, Jackson, Clausewitz, Jomini, and Foch did not do this. In a few years’ time I hope that it will be superseded by many a better work, so that we all may begin to understand the nature of war, and thereby discover, not only how to prepare for war, but how to restrict its ravages; how to harness it, and possibly, also, how to transmute the destructive ferocity of the ape into the creative gentleness of the angel.”—Col. J. F. C. Fuller
The wars since 9/11, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, have generated frustration and an increasing sense of failure in the West. Much of the blame has been attributed to poor strategy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, public enquiries and defence think tanks have detected a lack of consistent direction, of effective communication, and of governmental coordination. In this important book, Sir Hew Strachan, one of the world's leading military historians, reveals how these failures resulted from a fundamental misreading and misapplication of strategy itself. He argues that the wars since 2001 have not in reality been as 'new' as has been widely assumed and that we need to adopt a more historical approach to contemporary strategy in order to identify what is really changing in how we wage war. If war is to fulfil the aims of policy, then we need first to understand war.
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
Given the enormous destructive capacity of precision weapons in the modern era and the inherent vulnerabilities of modern society to high technology attack, this book is more relevant today than when it was first written in the midst of the nuclear age, in 1953. Remaining one of the finest texts ever written on the history of warfare and weapons acquisition, this is a thorough and reliable work that should be a standard reference for acquisition managers and decision-makers, providing a guide to informed decision-making that reflects the experience and lessons of the past. Bibliographical notes. Index.
Originally setting out to write the very book that he would have wanted to own as a young infantryman, the author penned On Tactics as a remedy for navigating the chaotic and inchoate realm of tactical theory. Challenging centuries-old conventional wisdom regarding the principles of war, tactics, and the roles of strategy, doctrine, experiential learning, and military history, Friedman's work offers a striking synthesis of thinking on tactics as well as strategy. Part One of the book establishes a tactical system meant to replace the Principles of War checklist. First, the contextual role of tactics with regards to strategy and war will be established. This will necessarily lean on major strategic theories in order to illuminate the role of tactics. This section will be formed around the Physical, Mental, and Moral planes of battlefield interaction used by theorists such as J.F.C Fuller and John Boyd. Each plane will then be examined in turn, and many of the classic Principles of War will be discussed along with some new ones. It will present some standard methods that tacticians can use to gain an advantage on the battlefield using historical examples that illustrate each concept. These "tactical tenets" include maneuver, mass, firepower, tempo, surprise, deception, confusion, shock, and the role of the moral aspects of combat. Finally, Part One will circle back around by discussing the role of tactical victory- once achieved- in contributed to a strategy. Part One is short by design. It is intended to be both compelling and easily mastered for junior non-commissioned officers and company grade officers, while still rich enough to be interesting to both specialist and non-specialist academics. It is a book meant not just for bookshelves but also for ruck sacks and cargo pockets. Part Two builds on Part One by exploring concepts with which the tactician must be familiar with such as the culminating point of victory, mission tactics and decentralized command and control, offensive and defensive operations, and the initiative. Part Three will conclude the book examining implications of the presented tactical systems to a variety of other issues in strategic studies.
This historiography demonstrates how theorists have rationalized killing the innocent in war. It shows how moral arguments about killing the innocent respond to material conditions, and it explains how we have arrived at the post-World War II convention.
Military air power : the CADRE digest of air power opinions and thoughts by Anonim Pdf
This book is about what Airmen have in common - our heritage, capacity, and future potential. It also illustrates that while we're on the leading edge, we're also part of the sweep of military history. Understanding the way that our predecessors handled their challenges can equip us to better serve our nation. The number one aim of this book is to supply Airmen with useful thoughts that might help them meet their known responsibilities and the unknown challenges their service will bring. We can learn from both the failures and the successes of soldiers, sailors, marines, and Airmen; the ancient past; and yesterday's headlines. This book is a revision of one published in 1990. Just as in the 1990 edition, the quotations are arranged by subject matter to present multiple views of each topic.
Known as the War to End all Wars and the Great War, World War I introduced new forms of mass destruction and modern technological warfare. When the Bolsheviks pulled Russia out of the war in late 1917, the Germans turned their offensive efforts to the Western Front in an attempt to win the war in 1918. But as fresh American troops entered Europe, the strategic scales tipped against Germany. Much of how World War I played out turned on the plans and decisions of the senior-most German and Allied commanders. The Generals' War explores the military strategies of those generals during the last year of the Great War. These six very different men included Germany's Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff; France's Marshals Ferdinand Foch and Philippe Pétain; Great Britain's Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig; and the United States' General John Pershing. Although history remembers none of them as great captains, these six officers determined for better or worse how World War I was fought on the battlefields of the Western Front between November 1917 and November 1918. The Generals' War is a landmark exploration of the generalship that shaped the very framework of modern warfare as we know it today and provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis on the senior commanders of the Great War.
Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction by Michael Howard Pdf
Karl von Clausewitz's study On War was described by the American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie as 'not simply the greatest, but the only great book about war'. It is hard to disagree. Even though he wrote his only major work at a time when the range of firearms was fifty yards, much of what he had to say remains relevant today. Michael Howard explains Clausewitz's ideas in terms both of his experiences as a professional soldier in the Napoleonic Wars, and of the intellectual background of his time. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.