The Russian Military And The Georgia War Lessons And Implications
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The Russian Military and the Georgia War by Ariel Cohen,Robert E. Hamilton Pdf
In this monograph, the authors state that Russia planned the war against Georgia in August 2008 aiming for the annexation of Abkhazia, weakening the Saakashvili regime, and prevention of NATO enlargement. According to them, while Russia won the campaign, it also exposed its own military as badly needing reform. The war also demonstrated weaknesses of the NATO and the European Union security systems.
The Russian Military and the Georgia War by Ariel Cohen Pdf
In this monograph, the authors state that Russia planned the war against Georgia in August 2008 aiming for the annexation of Abkhazia, weakening the Saakashvili regime, and prevention of NATO enlargement. According to them, while Russia won the campaign, it also exposed its own military as badly needing reform. The war also demonstrated weaknesses of the NATO and the European Union security systems.
The Guns of August 2008 by Svante E. Cornell,S. Frederick Starr Pdf
In the summer of 2008, a conflict that appeared to have begun in the breakaway Georgian territory of South Ossetia rapidly escalated to become the most significant crisis in European security in a decade. The implications of the Russian-Georgian war will be understood differently depending on one's narrative of what transpired and perspective on the broader context. This book is designed to present the facts about the events of August 2008 along with comprehensive coverage of the background to those events. It brings together a wealth of expertise on the South Caucasus and Russian foreign policy, with contributions by Russian, Georgian, European, and American experts on the region.
The Russia-Georgia War by Alexandros Fox Boufesis Pdf
This essay as part of the Nimble Books series "The Decisive Battles of the 21st century" describes the battles carried out in August 2008 around South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after Georgia unleashed an attack upon them. The foreword is by a renowned professor of Geopolitics of the Hellenic Military Academy, Dr Constantinos Grivas. The Russians fought on the side of the breakaway Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in a war, which is also known as "The Five Day War." There is an extensive analysis on the diplomatic prelude occurring prior to the beginning of the hostilities, debating the causes that led Georgia to attack the breakaways and Russia to defend them. The prelude covers deep historical topics since the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rise of Gamsakhurdia, the nationalist Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, whose toppling by the Rose Revolution brought Mikhail Saakashvili to power. Military operations are described and analyzed thoroughly starting from the skirmishes between Georgians and Ossetians and culminating with the war's most decisive battle, the battle of Tskhinvali. The essay sheds light on the new Russian military doctrine and the reforms, which took place in the Russian Army, following the Five Day War, in all sectors including the Army, VDV troops, the Air Force and the Navy. Finally, an extensive analysis is carried out both in the framework of geoeconomics and that of international relations and geopolitics, around Russia's future diplomatic ties with the EU and the US, separately, including the recent events in the US and European Economies, which have led to the manifestation of a European power centralized around Germany. The battle of Tskhinvali may well have settled the fate of the Caucasus for the 21st century, and foreshadowed the campaigns in Crimea, Ukraine, and beyond.
Russia launched the war against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued strategic and geopolitical objectives, which included de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening or toppling the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement. This book examines the Georgian war along with the recent process of organizational change in the Russian ground forces. (Imprint: Nova)
Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008 by Jim Nichol Pdf
Contents: (1) Recent Developments; (2) Background; (3) Renewed Conflict in South Ossetia: Actions in Abkhazia and Western Georgia; Ceasefire; Occupation Operations; Russia¿s Partial Withdrawal; Russia Recognizes the Independence of the Regions; Follow-On Ceasefire Agreement; Status Conference Meetings in Geneva; (4) Implications for Georgia and Russia: Assessing the Causes of the Conflict; Casualties and Displaced Persons; (5) International Response; Stand-off on OSCE Monitoring; Other Developments in 2009; Internat. Humanitarian and Rebuilding Assistance; (6) U.S. Response: U.S. Reaction to Russia¿s Recognition Declaration; U.S.-Georgia Charter; U.S. Assistance; Georgia and NATO Membership Action Plan. Illus.
Russia's War in Georgia by Svante E. Cornell,Johanna Popjanevski,Niklas Nilsson Pdf
In August 2008, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia that sent shock waves reverberating--first across the post-Soviet space, but then also into the rest of Europe and the world, as the magnitude of the invasion and its implications became clear. This invasion took the world by surprise. But what should have been surprising about it was perhaps the extent of Russia's willingness to employ crude military force against a neighboring state, not that it happened. Indeed, Russia had for several years pursued increasingly aggressive and interventionist policies in Georgia, and had employed an array of instruments that included military means, albeit at a smaller scale. In the several months that preceded the invasion, Moscow's increasingly blatant provocations against Georgia led to a growing fear in the analytic community that it was seeking a military confrontation. Yet western reactions to this aggressive behavior remained declaratory and cautious in nature, and failed to attach cost to Russia for its behavior. After invading Georgia on August 8, Russia did score some initial successes in portraying the invasion as a response to a Georgian decision to militarily enter Tskhinvali, the capital of Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia. Yet a growing body of evidence rapidly emerged, implying that Russia's invasion was premeditated, not reactive--or in the words of a leading Russian military analyst, planned, not spontaneous. Indeed, as the chronology included in this paper shows, Russia had been meticulously preparing an invasion of Georgia through the substantial massing and preparation of forces in the country's immediate vicinity. Scholars will debate whether Russian tanks were already advancing inside Georgian territory when Georgian forces launched their attack on Tskhinvali; yet there seems little doubt that they were at least on the move toward the border. And the scope of the Russian attack leave little doubt: it immediately broadened from the conflict zone of South Ossetia, to include the opening of a second front in Abkhazia and systematic attacks on military and economic infrastructure across Georgia's territory. Within days, tens of thousands of Russian troops and hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles roamed Georgian roads. Russia's subsequent decisions to ignore the terms of a cease-fire agreement it signed, and to recognize the independence of the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, all complete the picture of long-hatched plan. The purpose was not merely related to South Ossetia or even Abkhazia: it served to punish Georgia and expose the inability of the west to prevent Russia from moving aggressively to restore its primacy over the former Soviet Union's territory, irrespective of the wishes of the governments and populations of the sovereign countries on that area. It is indeed the predetermined nature of this war that makes its implications so far-reaching. It constituted Moscow's first military aggression against a neighboring state since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1978; and it took place, this time, against a member state of European institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and to that a country on track to integration with NATO. As such, political leaders and analyst soon understood that it formed the largest crisis to date in Russia's relationship with the West; some have even come to realize that the Georgian war of 2008 may be the most significant challenge to European Security since the Cold War's end. It is therefore of particular importance to document, already at this stage, how this war started and draw some preliminary conclusions regarding what it means for Georgia, the post-Soviet space, and Europe and the United States. The following pages propose to do so by providing a chronology of events before, during, and immediately after the war; as well as to propose some initial conclusions that could be drawn from this chronology, as well as regarding its implications.--Introduction, p. [3]-4.
Russia launched the war against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued strategic and geopolitical objectives, which included de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening or toppling the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement. This book examines the Georgian war along with the recent process of organizational change in the Russian ground forces.
Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces by Rod Thornton Pdf
"This monograph considers the recent history of organizational change in the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV). In particular, it looks at how the VDV has changed since the end of Russia's conflict with Georgia in 2008. The VDV, a force much admired in Russian media and society has, in fact, escaped fairly lightly during the comprehensive reform of the Russian Army more generally over the last few years. In large part this has been down to the personality of the current head of the VDV, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov. Close to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Shamanov -- a "maverick"--Has used his political connections to help ward off many of the cuts and reforms that have impacted the rest of the Army. He has managed to keep the basic structure of the VDV intact, while also dealing with a number of problematic issues related to manning, equipment, and training regimes within his organization. This monograph goes on to point out the level of professionalism in the VDV that was demonstrated during the Georgian war. It also though, highlights the fact that, while some battalions within the VDV will be very effective and well trained, other battalions will not. Thus it is difficult to judge precisely how battle-ready the VDV's divisions now are. Ultimately, this monograph seeks to establish just what sort of Russian airborne forces U.S. or NATO troops may one day have to either work alongside or, indeed, face in some sort of confrontation."--Page vii.
Russia's invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and NATO and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow s relations with the West. This volume places the conflict in the context of Russia's broader objectives, its internal weaknesses, the limitations of EU and NATO policies, and America s security priorities. First, the Georgian conflict underscored Moscow's determination to reclaim an extensive zone of dominance corresponding with the former Soviet territories. Second, it displayed a shrewd calculation by the Kremlin about the fractured and ineffective Western response, and Moscow continues to test the Obama administration's rapprochement in pursuing its expansionist ambitions. Third, the 2008 conflict had a lasting impact on the Central-East European and post-Soviet states most exposed to pressures from Moscow. While the former demanded more tangible security guarantees from NATO, the latter either sought accommodation with Russia or intensified their protective strategies. Additionally, beneath the veneer of success, the conduct of the war, the economic recession, escalating separatist sentiments, and faltering attempts by Moscow to make the country more globally competitive revealed Russia's long-term weaknesses in the midst of its attempted neo-imperial restoration. The study concludes with succinct recommendations on how the transatlantic alliance can more effectively handle Russian ambitions and prepare itself to deter or manage future crises
The Russian Armed Forces in Transition by Roger N. McDermott,Bertil Nygren,Carolina Vendil Pallin Pdf
Although the role of the military in Russia has changed significantly since Soviet times, it continues to exert great influence on Russian politics, economy and society. This book presents a comprehensive overview of current developments related to Russia’s military sector. It considers recent military reforms, personnel issues, the defence industry and procurement, the defence economy, changes in civil-military relations, and the continuing huge economic significance of Russia’s military-industrial complex. It explores difficulties currently faced by the Russian military, including problems of recruitment and leadership; analyses Russian security policy - including in relation to Europe and more widely; and discusses the lessons learned by the Russian military as a result of the recent war in Georgia. The book argues that reform attempts have often been thwarted by bureaucracy, economy, strategy, manpower, weapon systems and leadership. The book concludes by assessing likely future developments.
