The Stability Concept Of Evolutionary Game Theory

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The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory

Ross Cressman
The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory Book PDF

Author : Ross Cressman
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 137 pages
File Size : 49,5 Mb
Release : 2013-03-09
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9783642499814

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The Stability Concept of Evolutionary Game Theory by Ross Cressman Pdf

These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central message may soon become obsolete as the theory matures. Although the restricted topics I have chosen for this text reflect my own research bias, I am confident they will remain the theoretical basis of ESS theory. Indeed, I feel the adult maturity of ESS theory is close at hand and I hope the text will play an important role in this achievement.

Evolutionary Game Theory

J. McKenzie Alexander
Evolutionary Game Theory Book PDF

Author : J. McKenzie Alexander
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 115 pages
File Size : 43,9 Mb
Release : 2023-03-31
Category : Science
ISBN : 9781009380584

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Evolutionary Game Theory by J. McKenzie Alexander Pdf

Evolutionary game theory originated in population biology from the realisation that frequency-dependent fitness introduced a strategic element into evolution. Since its development, evolutionary game theory has been adopted by many social scientists, and philosophers, to analyse interdependent decision problems played by boundedly rational individuals. Its study has led to theoretical innovations of great interest for the biological and social sciences. For example, theorists have developed a number of dynamical models which can be used to study how populations of interacting individuals change their behaviours over time. In this introduction, this Element covers the two main approaches to evolutionary game theory: the static analysis of evolutionary stability concepts, and the study of dynamical models, their convergence behaviour and rest points. This Element also explores the many fascinating, and complex, connections between the two approaches.

Evolutionary Game Theory

Jörgen W. Weibull
Evolutionary Game Theory Book PDF

Author : Jörgen W. Weibull
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 292 pages
File Size : 46,9 Mb
Release : 1997
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0262731215

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Evolutionary Game Theory by Jörgen W. Weibull Pdf

Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.

Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability

Immanuel M. Bomze,Benedikt M. Pötscher
Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability Book PDF

Author : Immanuel M. Bomze,Benedikt M. Pötscher
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 152 pages
File Size : 53,6 Mb
Release : 2013-12-19
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9783642456602

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Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability by Immanuel M. Bomze,Benedikt M. Pötscher Pdf

These Lecture Notes arose from discussions we had over a working paper written by the first author in fall 1987. We decided then to write a short paper about the basic structure of evolutionary stability and found ourselves ending up with a book manuscript. Parts of the material contained herein were presented in a seminar at the Department of Mathematics at the University of Vienna, as well as at a workshop on evolutionary game theory in Bielefeld. The final version of the manuscript has certainly benefitted from critical comments and suggestions by the participants of both the seminar and the workshop. Thanks are also due to S. Bomze-de Barba, R. Burger, G. Danninger, J. Hofbauer, R. Selten, K. Sigmund, G. Stiastny and F. Weising. The co-operation of W. Muller from Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, is gratefully acknowledged. Vienna, November 1988 Immanuel M. Bomze Benedikt M. Potscher III Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and multitype games 17 2. 6. Additional remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Evolutionary stability 25 3. 1. Definition of evolutionary stability 25 3. 2. Evolutionary stability and solution concepts in classical game theory 30 3. 3. Conditions for evolutionary stability based on the normal cone 31 3. 4.

Game Equilibrium Models I

Reinhard Selten
Game Equilibrium Models I Book PDF

Author : Reinhard Selten
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 338 pages
File Size : 53,5 Mb
Release : 2013-06-29
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9783662026748

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Game Equilibrium Models I by Reinhard Selten Pdf

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.

Evolution and the Theory of Games

John Maynard Smith
Evolution and the Theory of Games Book PDF

Author : John Maynard Smith
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 244 pages
File Size : 48,6 Mb
Release : 1982-10-21
Category : Science
ISBN : 0521288843

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Evolution and the Theory of Games by John Maynard Smith Pdf

This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.

Game-Theoretical Models in Biology

Mark Broom,Jan Rychtar
Game Theoretical Models in Biology Book PDF

Author : Mark Broom,Jan Rychtar
Publisher : CRC Press
Page : 516 pages
File Size : 47,8 Mb
Release : 2013-03-27
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9781439853221

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Game-Theoretical Models in Biology by Mark Broom,Jan Rychtar Pdf

Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use MATLAB® to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behavior, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modeling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modeling of these diverse biological phenomena.

Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds

Daniel Friedman,Barry Sinervo
Evolutionary Games in Natural Social and Virtual Worlds Book PDF

Author : Daniel Friedman,Barry Sinervo
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 320 pages
File Size : 50,6 Mb
Release : 2016-02-01
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780199981175

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Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds by Daniel Friedman,Barry Sinervo Pdf

Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks (either internet or highways) and the "price of anarchy"; environmental and trade policy analysis based on evolutionary games; the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. As an aid for instruction, a web site provides downloadable computational tools written in the R programming language, Matlab, Mathematica and Excel.

Game Equilibrium Models I

Reinhard Selten
Game Equilibrium Models I Book PDF

Author : Reinhard Selten
Publisher : Springer
Page : 330 pages
File Size : 40,7 Mb
Release : 2010-12-01
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 3642081088

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Game Equilibrium Models I by Reinhard Selten Pdf

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

Eric van Damme
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria Book PDF

Author : Eric van Damme
Publisher : Springer Science & Business Media
Page : 331 pages
File Size : 40,8 Mb
Release : 2012-12-06
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9783642969782

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Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria by Eric van Damme Pdf

The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.

Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection

Larry Samuelson
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection Book PDF

Author : Larry Samuelson
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 332 pages
File Size : 53,7 Mb
Release : 1997
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0262692198

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Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection by Larry Samuelson Pdf

The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.

Game-Theoretical Models in Biology

Mark Broom,Jan Rychtář
Game Theoretical Models in Biology Book PDF

Author : Mark Broom,Jan Rychtář
Publisher : CRC Press
Page : 623 pages
File Size : 49,7 Mb
Release : 2022-08-03
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9781000623680

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Game-Theoretical Models in Biology by Mark Broom,Jan Rychtář Pdf

Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology, Second Edition presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use Python to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behaviour, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modelling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modelling of these diverse biological phenomena. In this thoroughly revised new edition, the authors have added three new chapters on the evolution of structured populations, biological signalling games, and a topical new chapter on evolutionary models of cancer. There are also new sections on games with time constraints that convert simple games to potentially complex nonlinear ones; new models on extortion strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and on social dilemmas; and on evolutionary models of vaccination, a timely section given the current Covid pandemic. Features Presents a wide range of biological applications of game theory. Suitable for researchers and professionals in mathematical biology and the life sciences, and as a text for postgraduate courses in mathematical biology. Provides numerous examples, exercises, and Python code.

Evolutionary Game Dynamics

American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Evolutionary Game Dynamics Book PDF

Author : American Mathematical Society. Short Course
Publisher : American Mathematical Soc.
Page : 186 pages
File Size : 47,5 Mb
Release : 2011-10-27
Category : Mathematics
ISBN : 9780821853269

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Evolutionary Game Dynamics by American Mathematical Society. Short Course Pdf

This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.

Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games

Ross Cressman
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games Book PDF

Author : Ross Cressman
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 346 pages
File Size : 51,6 Mb
Release : 2003
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 0262033054

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Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games by Ross Cressman Pdf

Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

William H. Sandholm
Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics Book PDF

Author : William H. Sandholm
Publisher : MIT Press
Page : 618 pages
File Size : 41,5 Mb
Release : 2010-12-17
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780262195874

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Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics by William H. Sandholm Pdf

Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.