The Strategic Analysis Of Judicial Behavior

Author : Lee Epstein,Keren Weinshall
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 101 pages
File Size : 43,9 Mb
Release : 2021-06-17
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781009058735

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The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior by Lee Epstein,Keren Weinshall Pdf

The past decade has witnessed a worldwide explosion of work aimed at illuminating judicial-behavior: the choices judges make and the consequences of their choices. We focus on strategic accounts of judicial-behavior. As in other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role but strategic accounts are unique in one important respect: They draw attention to the interdependent - i.e., the strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather attend to the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public. We survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices. As far as these studies have traveled in illuminating judicial-behavior, many opportunities for forward movement remain. We flag four in the conclusion.

Author : Glendon A. Schubert
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 424 pages
File Size : 48,9 Mb
Release : 1960
Category : Judicial process
ISBN : STANFORD:36105044054729

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Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior by Glendon A. Schubert Pdf

Author : Robert M. Howard,Kirk A. Randazzo
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 518 pages
File Size : 40,9 Mb
Release : 2017-10-02
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781317430384

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Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior by Robert M. Howard,Kirk A. Randazzo Pdf

Interest in social science and empirical analyses of law, courts and specifically the politics of judges has never been higher or more salient. Consequently, there is a strong need for theoretical work on the research that focuses on courts, judges and the judicial process. The Routledge Handbook of Judicial Behavior provides the most up to date examination of scholarship across the entire spectrum of judicial politics and behavior, written by a combination of currently prominent scholars and the emergent next generation of researchers. Unlike almost all other volumes, this Handbook examines judicial behavior from both an American and Comparative perspective. Part 1 provides a broad overview of the dominant Theoretical and Methodological perspectives used to examine and understand judicial behavior, Part 2 offers an in-depth analysis of the various current scholarly areas examining the U.S. Supreme Court, Part 3 moves from the Supreme Court to examining other U.S. federal and state courts, and Part 4 presents a comprehensive overview of Comparative Judicial Politics and Transnational Courts. Each author in this volume provides perspectives on the most current methodological and substantive approaches in their respective areas, along with suggestions for future research. The chapters contained within will generate additional scholarly and public interest by focusing on topics most salient to the academic, legal and policy communities.

Author : Nancy L. Maveety
Publisher : University of Michigan Press
Page : 446 pages
File Size : 50,6 Mb
Release : 2009-11-16
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780472024209

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The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior by Nancy L. Maveety Pdf

In The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior, prominent political scientists critically examine the contributions to the field of public law of the pioneering scholars of judicial behavior: C. Hermann Pritchett, Glendon Schubert, S. Sidney Ulmer, Harold J. Spaeth, Joseph Tanenhaus, Beverly Blair Cook, Walter F. Murphy, J. Woodward Howard, David J. Danelski, David Rohde, Edward S. Corwin, Alpheus Thomas Mason, Robert G. McCloskey, Robert A. Dahl, and Martin Shapiro. Unlike past studies that have traced the emergence and growth of the field of judicial studies, The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior accounts for the emergence and exploration of three current theoretical approaches to the study of judicial behavior--attitudinal, strategic, and historical-institutionalist--and shows how the research of these foundational scholars has contributed to contemporary debates about how to conceptualize judges as policy makers. Chapters utilize correspondence of and interviews with some early scholars, and provide a format to connect the concerns and controversies of the first political scientists of law and courts to contemporary challenges and methodological debates among today's judicial scholars. The volume's purpose in looking back is to look forward: to contribute to an ecumenical research agenda on judicial decision making, and, ultimately, to the generation of a unified, general theory of judicial behavior. The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior will be of interest to graduate students in the law and courts field, political scientists interested in the philosophy of social science and the history of the discipline, legal practitioners and researchers, and political commentators interested in academic theorizing about public policy making. Nancy L. Maveety is Associate Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

Author : Lee Epstein,Stefanie A. Lindquist
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 625 pages
File Size : 41,5 Mb
Release : 2017
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780199579891

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The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior by Lee Epstein,Stefanie A. Lindquist Pdf

"[This book offers] an introduction and analysis of research regarding decision making by judges serving on federal and state courts in the U.S...[This handbook] describes and explains how the courts' political and social context, formal institutional structures, and informal norms affect judicial decision making. The Handbook also explores the impact of judges' personal attributes and preferences, as well as prevailing legal doctrine, influence, and shape case outcomes in state and federal courts. The volume also proposes avenues for future research in the various topics addressed throughout the book."--

Author : Thomas H. Hammond,Chris W. Bonneau,Reginald S. Sheehan
Publisher : Stanford University Press
Page : 330 pages
File Size : 52,6 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 0804751463

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Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court by Thomas H. Hammond,Chris W. Bonneau,Reginald S. Sheehan Pdf

This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.

Author : Lee Epstein,Stefanie A. Lindquist
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 592 pages
File Size : 41,8 Mb
Release : 2017-06-08
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780191505348

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The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior by Lee Epstein,Stefanie A. Lindquist Pdf

The Oxford Handbook of U.S. Judicial Behavior offers readers a comprehensive introduction and analysis of research regarding decision making by judges serving on federal and state courts in the U.S. Featuring contributions from leading scholars in the field, the Handbook describes and explains how the courts' political and social context, formal institutional structures, and informal norms affect judicial decision making. The Handbook also explores the impact of judges' personal attributes and preferences, as well as prevailing legal doctrine, influence, and shape case outcomes in state and federal courts. The volume also proposes avenues for future research in the various topics addressed throughout the book. Consultant Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics: George C. Edwards III.

Author : Lawrence Baum
Publisher : University of Michigan Press
Page : 230 pages
File Size : 49,9 Mb
Release : 2009-10-22
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780472022632

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The Puzzle of Judicial Behavior by Lawrence Baum Pdf

From local trial courts to the United States Supreme Court, judges' decisions affect the fates of individual litigants and the fate of the nation as a whole. Scholars have long discussed and debated explanations of judicial behavior. This book examines the major issues in the debates over how best to understand judicial behavior and assesses what we actually know about how judges decide cases. It concludes that we are far from understanding why judges choose the positions they take in court. Lawrence Baum considers three issues in examining judicial behavior. First, the author considers the balance between the judges' interest in the outcome of particular cases and their interest in other goals such as personal popularity and lighter workloads. Second, Baum considers the relative importance of good law and good policy as bases for judges' choices. Finally Baum looks at the extent to which judges act strategically, choosing their own positions after taking into account the positions that their fellow judges and other policy makers might adopt. Baum argues that the evidence on each of these issues is inconclusive and that there remains considerable room for debate about the sources of judges' decisions. Baum concludes that this lack of resolution is not the result of weaknesses in the scholarship but from the difficulty in explaining human behavior. He makes a plea for diversity in research. This book will be of interest to political scientists and scholars in law and courts as well as attorneys who are interested in understanding judges as decision makers and who want to understand what we can learn from scholarly research about judicial behavior. Lawrence Baum is Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.

Author : Lee Epstein,William M. Landes,Richard A. Posner
Publisher : Harvard University Press
Page : 491 pages
File Size : 47,9 Mb
Release : 2013-01-07
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780674070684

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The Behavior of Federal Judges by Lee Epstein,William M. Landes,Richard A. Posner Pdf

Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors' view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.

Author : Anonim
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 166 pages
File Size : 45,8 Mb
Release : 1983
Category : Judicial process
ISBN : STANFORD:36105043880629

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Judicial Behavior by Anonim Pdf

Author : Walter F. Murphy
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 258 pages
File Size : 52,6 Mb
Release : 2016-07-08
Category : Law
ISBN : 1610273567

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Elements of Judicial Strategy by Walter F. Murphy Pdf

Now in a readily available and modern republication edition, and adding a substantive, detailed 2016 Foreword by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, this classic of law and political science is presented to a new generation of thoughtful observers of the U.S. Supreme Court and how its justices create judicial decisions. As Epstein and Knight write, this book is "extraordinary. It's the rarest of rare: a breakthrough of the path-marking, even paradigm-shifting, variety...." Its publication offered a "huge conceptual breakthrough. Elements was the first to offer a strategic account" of judging, and its "framework forever changed the study of judicial behavior." It remains influential to current thought, extending even in its "global reach," and is an important part of modern social sciences and law. / / First outlining the sources and instruments - and limitations - of judicial power, the author then shows how policy-oriented justices might take advantage of their power positions to maximize their impact on the formation and execution of public policy. In this book Walter F. Murphy attempts to understand how, under the limitations which the American legal and political systems impose, Supreme Court justices can legitimately act to further their policy objectives. Murphy also considers ethical issues raised by the model of judicial decision-making he describes. Throughout, systematic analysis is supported by prodigious research and fascinating real-world examples over the years and in very different judicial administrations. / / Part of the Legal Legends Series from Quid Pro Books, this edition embeds the page numbers of the original print editions, for purposes of continuity, referencing, course assignment, and convenience to the reader. Its modern presentation and larger, legible type enhance its use for scholars, college students, and other readers. NOTE: only the new edition from QUID PRO BOOKS has the new presentation and introduction, even if this description appears under used copies of older printings."

Author : Lee Epstein,Jack Knight
Publisher : SAGE
Page : 224 pages
File Size : 42,8 Mb
Release : 1997-01-01
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781483304854

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The Choices Justices Make by Lee Epstein,Jack Knight Pdf

The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions. Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.

Author : Josephine De Jaegere
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 41,5 Mb
Release : 2019
Category : Courts
ISBN : 1780686943

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Judicial Review and Strategic Behaviour by Josephine De Jaegere Pdf

Focusing on the Constitutional Court of Belgium, the approach of this book is to combine normative ideas on how the Court should act with an empirical case law analysis. It explores the extent to which the Court performs as a deliberative institution, while operating within a consensual political system.

Author : Lawrence Baum
Publisher : Princeton University Press
Page : 246 pages
File Size : 40,6 Mb
Release : 2009-01-10
Category : Law
ISBN : 9781400827541

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Judges and Their Audiences by Lawrence Baum Pdf

What motivates judges as decision makers? Political scientist Lawrence Baum offers a new perspective on this crucial question, a perspective based on judges' interest in the approval of audiences important to them. The conventional scholarly wisdom holds that judges on higher courts seek only to make good law, good policy, or both. In these theories, judges are influenced by other people only in limited ways, in consequence of their legal and policy goals. In contrast, Baum argues that the influence of judges' audiences is pervasive. This influence derives from judges' interest in popularity and respect, a motivation central to most people. Judges care about the regard of audiences because they like that regard in itself, not just as a means to other ends. Judges and Their Audiences uses research in social psychology to make the case that audiences shape judges' choices in substantial ways. Drawing on a broad range of scholarship on judicial decision-making and an array of empirical evidence, the book then analyzes the potential and actual impact of several audiences, including the public, other branches of government, court colleagues, the legal profession, and judges' social peers. Engagingly written, this book provides a deeper understanding of key issues concerning judicial behavior on which scholars disagree, identifies aspects of judicial behavior that diverge from the assumptions of existing models, and shows how those models can be strengthened.

Author : James R. Rogers,Roy B. Flemming,Jon R. Bond
Publisher : University of Virginia Press
Page : 366 pages
File Size : 42,5 Mb
Release : 2006
Category : Law
ISBN : 0813925274

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Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court by James R. Rogers,Roy B. Flemming,Jon R. Bond Pdf

Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices' votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government. Contributors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum