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Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency by James S. Corum Pdf
The author examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan Police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.
Author : James S. Corum Publisher : Strategic Studies Institute U. S. Army War College Page : 72 pages File Size : 40,9 Mb Release : 2006 Category : History ISBN : UOM:39015063282563
Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency by James S. Corum Pdf
The author examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan Police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.
Training Indigenous Forces in Counter-insurgency by James S. Corum Pdf
Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive, and nearly all major counterinsurgency campaigns of the last century have relied heavily on indigenous police and military forces. Indeed, there have been few counterinsurgency situations in which the indigenous security forces were not the primary forces employed on the government side in the conflict, at least in terms of numbers. Although the importance of training indigenous police and military forces is understood in counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, relatively little research has been conducted concerning how this mission should be carried out. Hopefully, this monograph will help fill some of the information gap on this vital subject. There are several major questions that need to be addressed: How can the supporting or governing power best organize the local police and military forces for counterinsurgency? What level of training do security forces need to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations? What is the role of the police in counterinsurgency? What is the role of home guards or irregular security organizations? What kinds of training programs produce effective police and military leaders? These are very relevant questions today as the U.S. military revises its counterinsurgency doctrine. Currently, U.S. forces are engaged in campaigns against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are providing advice and support to the Philippine and Colombian governments in their battles against insurgents. In all of these countries, the U.S. military is engaged in training and supporting the local police and military force for counterinsurgency operations. As the Global War on Terror continues, the U.S. military will certainly see many more missions to train and support indigenous security forces.
Finding the Right Indigenous Leader and Force for Counterinsurgency Operations by Naval Postgraduate Naval Postgraduate School Pdf
In recent decades, insurgents and other nonstate actors with their nontraditional styles of warfare have become significant threats to the U.S. and its allies. Failing to draw lessons from past conflicts has been a root cause of the misguided strategies implemented against insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Combating these insurgencies using a military-heavy strategy has proved to be a drain on both the U.S. economy as well as the military forces that have shared the burden of deployments since the onset of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As a result, the U.S. should consider alternative strategies for dealing with insurgents that are both more tactically sound and less taxing on the economy and military. Using special operations forces (SOF) to establish local indigenous security forces in under-governed areas is one means of accomplishing this goal. This thesis focuses on the importance of choosing the right indigenous leader and force for U.S. SOF to partner with to defeat insurgents through the establishment of security, governance, and development at the grassroots level. A step-by-step process is described in this thesis that will assist SOF units in choosing the best local indigenous force leader (LIFL) and training him and his force. Also discussed is the importance of maintaining that partnership until the LIFL and his force are capable of operating on their own, and lines of support and communication have been opened with higher levels of the host nation government.
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan by Seth G. Jones Pdf
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency by Stephen T. Hosmer,Rand Corporation Pdf
This report identifies potential initiatives for improving Army doctrine and capabilities for counterinsurgency and insurgency warfare. These include recommendations that the Army (1) build and maintain small cadres of counterinsurgency and insurgency experts; (2) create, along with the other services, a counterinsurgency institute to train U.S. and foreign nationals; and (3) ensure more appropriate and effective U.S. arms and equipment transfers to countries facing insurgent threats. The author also examines the reasons insurgency is likely to continue to be a frequent form of conflict; describes the threat of insurgency to important U.S. interests in the Third World; explores the potential for U.S. Army noncombat support to Third World countries fighting insurgency; describes the impediments to U.S. influence and assistance; outlines the potential situations that might lead to U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency combat; and discusses the Army's role in support of friendly insurgency.
Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency by Russell W. Glenn Pdf
This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations by Lieutenant William E. Rieper Pdf
The purpose of this monograph is to determine the ideal practices for militias and irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations. This study specifically addresses those groups organized by a legitimate sponsor such as the Host Nation or one of its partners and takes note to exclude criminal organizations that seek to terrorize the government or its population to gain concessions. As part of its study, this paper provides a basic outline of the goals of insurgent and counterinsurgent doctrine. It uses Mao Tse-tung as a source for universal insurgent goals and Revolutionary Insurgencies and David Galula for Nationalist Insurgencies (Galula refers to them as Bourgeois-Nationalist). Galula's differentiation is unique because it attempts to identify situations and expected insurgents actions for each type of insurgency though insurgencies may include characteristics of both models. This study also refers to US doctrine to provide an understanding of how the US expects to fight insurgencies. This monograph then establishes a baseline of criteria for militia tasks and considerations that it subsequently investigates using historical examples of three conflicts: The Malayan Emergency, The US in the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As in any military operation, commanders must balance a myriad of criteria that weigh on possible alternative solutions. In the employment of irregular forces, a leader must consider how using locally hired indigenous forces affect operations. He should be aware of how the roles of such unconventional forces affect the militias themselves, how the Host Nation or its defense forces react to them, and possible US government and popular reactions. While verifying that militias are effective in counterinsurgent operations for basic security and defense related tasks, providing intelligence, population control, and permit for conventional forces to direct actions against the insurgents, this paper revealed that irregulars have the potential for additional contributions. With training and supervision, surrogates can engage in short duration offensive operations. Militias also provide a means for the government to garner local support against the insurgency through inclusion. They can facilitate reconciliation with disaffected groups and provide a unifying force for these groups in politics. In the course of researching applicable doctrine, there is a noticeable gap in the use of irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations. The author attributes this gap to the residual effects of the Vietnam War and the criminal militia operating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which made US forces resistant to employing irregular forces. In the conclusion, the author calls for a revision of current US doctrine to expand the use of irregular forces in Counterinsurgency Operations. This calling is not so much based on the author's own opinion but reflects the reality that since most potential enemies, unable to match the combat power of the US, will continue to use asymmetric methods, including exploiting and operating among the local population. Irregular forces provide a feasible solution to this problem that can provide an advantage in future US operations.
Major Us Army Robert L Green,US Army, Robert L., Robert Green, , US Army
Author : Major Us Army Robert L Green,US Army, Robert L., Robert Green, , US Army Publisher : CreateSpace Page : 146 pages File Size : 52,8 Mb Release : 2013-12 Category : Electronic ISBN : 1494381214
Key Considerations for Irregular Security Forces in Counterinsurgency by Major Us Army Robert L Green,US Army, Robert L., Robert Green, , US Army Pdf
Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area. Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering, surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces are no silver bullet to achieving success. Counterinsurgency is a struggle for the support of the population against an active and thinking enemy and therefore, there are no hard and fast rules. Several counterinsurgency scholars and theorists do, however, agree on several key principles that can aid counterinsurgents in prosecuting their campaigns successfully. This paper seeks to add to the body of knowledge by examining the key aspects that counterinsurgents should take into account when considering raising an irregular security force.
Author : The U.S. Army Marine Corps Publisher : University of Chicago Press Page : 474 pages File Size : 52,7 Mb Release : 2008-09-15 Category : History ISBN : 9780226841526
Counterinsurgency Field Manual by The U.S. Army Marine Corps Pdf
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) by Bruce R. Pirnie,Edward O'Connell Pdf
Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.
Author : Anthony James Joes Publisher : University Press of Kentucky Page : 364 pages File Size : 49,8 Mb Release : 2006-08-18 Category : History ISBN : 081319170X
In Resisting Rebellion, Anthony James Joes explores insurgencies ranging across five continents and spanning more than two centuries. Analyzing examples from North and South America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, he identifies recurrent patterns and offers useful lessons for future policymakers. Insurgencies arise from many sources of discontent, including foreign occupation, fraudulent elections, and religious persecution, but they also stem from ethnic hostilities, the aspirations of would-be elites, and traditions of political violence. Because insurgency is as much a political phenomenon as a military one, effective counterinsurgency requires a thorough understanding of the insurgents' motives and sources of support. Clear political aims must guide military action if a counterinsurgency is to be successful and prepare a lasting reconciliation within a deeply fragmented society. The most successful counterinsurgency campaign undertaken by the United States was the one against Philippine insurgents following the Spanish-American War. But even more instructive than successful counterinsurgencies are the persistent patterns of errors revealed by Joes's comparative study. Instances include the indiscriminate destructiveness displayed by the Japanese in China and the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the torture of suspected Muslim terrorists by members of the French Army in Algeria. Joes's comprehensive twofold approach to counterinsurgency is easily applied to the U.S. The first element, developing the strategic basis for victory, emphasizes creating a peaceful path to the redress of legitimate grievances, committing sufficient troops to the counterinsurgent operation, and isolating the conflict area from outside aid. The second element aims at marginalizing the insurgents and includes fair conduct toward civilians and prisoners, systematic intelligence gathering, depriving insurgents of weapons and food, separating insurgent leaders from their followers, and offering amnesty to all but the most incorrigible. Providing valuable insights into a world of conflict, Resisting Rebellion is a thorough and readable exploration of successes and failures in counterinsurgency's long history and a strategy for the future.
Policing and Decolonisation by David Anderson,David Killingray Pdf
This study looks at the problems facing the imperial police forces during the acute political dislocations following decolonization in the British Empire, from Ireland to India and in the Asian and African colonies. This book examines the changing roles and experiences of the police forces involved.
One Hundred Victories is a portrait of how—after a decade of intensive combat operations—special operations forces have become the go-to force for US military endeavors worldwide. Linda Robinson follows the evolution of special ops in Afghanistan, their longest deployment since Vietnam. She has lived in mud-walled compounds in the mountains and deserts of insurgent-dominated regions, and uses those experiences to show the gritty reality of the challenges the SOF face and the constant danger in which they operate. She witnessed special operators befriending villagers to help them secure their homes, and fighting off insurgents in the most dangerous safe havens even as they navigated a constant series of conflicts, crises, and other “meteors” from conventional forces, the CIA, and the Pakistanis—not to mention weak links within their own ranks. They showed what a tiny band of warriors could do, and could not do, out on the wild frontiers of the next-generation wars. One Hundred Victories also includes the inside story of the dramatic November 2011 cross-border firefight with Pakistan, which sent the US commander into a fury and provoked an international crisis. It describes the murky world of armed factions operating along the world's longest disputed border, and the chaos and casualties that result when commanders with competing agendas cannot resolve their differences.
