U S Army Counterinsurgency And Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942 1976 Paperbound
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U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine, 1942-1976 (Paperbound) by Anonim Pdf
Examines the nature of counterinsurgency and nation-building missions, the institutional obstacles inherent in dealing effectively with such operations, and the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. doctrine, including the problems that can occur when that doctrine morphs into dogma.
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine by Andrew James Birtle Pdf
CMH Pub 70-98-1. This study examines the nature of counterinsurgency and nation-building missions, the institutional obstacles inherent in dealing effectively with such operations, and the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. doctrine, including the problems that can occur when that doctrine morphs into dogma.
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976 by Andrew J. Birtle Pdf
Published by the United States' Center of Military History of the United States Army, this is a doctrine and history of counterinsurgency and contingency operations between 1942 and 1976.
Center of Military History United States,United States Army Center of Military History
Author : Center of Military History United States,United States Army Center of Military History Publisher : CreateSpace Page : 586 pages File Size : 43,6 Mb Release : 2015-02-27 Category : History ISBN : 1508650470
U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976 by Center of Military History United States,United States Army Center of Military History Pdf
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976, is the second installment in the two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. As the U.S. government wrestles with tough questions on how to bring peace and stability to countries torn by internal strife, Andrew J. Birtle provides context for these concerns by describing how the United States attempted to suppress insurgencies and build nations during the Cold War. Employing a range of primary and secondary sources, Birtle explains how the Army in the 1950s and 1960s developed a dual strategy that combined military measures with political and socioeconomic reforms. On the military side, he states, doctrine advocated aggressive offensive operations, elaborate intelligence networks, and extensive security measures to drive the guerrillas away from inhabited areas and to secure the population from rebel influence and intimidation. On the civil side, Birtle continues, doctrine called for the implementation of measures to restore the norms of social and economic life; to establish efficient and popular government; and to redress, when possible, the causes of unrest. Birtle uses case studies of counterinsurgency wars in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Latin America, and Vietnam to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the nation's approach to counterinsurgency. Although the United States' counterinsurgency record was mixed, Birtle shows that the precepts underpinning U.S. doctrine have remained surprisingly constant over the years. By furnishing an in-depth look at how the Army performed its counterinsurgency and nation-building responsibilities during a previous era of global instability, Birtle sheds some needed light on the work that must be done today and tomorrow.
Center of Military History United States,United States Army Center of Military History
Author : Center of Military History United States,United States Army Center of Military History Publisher : CreateSpace Page : 332 pages File Size : 42,9 Mb Release : 2015-02-27 Category : History ISBN : 1508650713
U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941 by Center of Military History United States,United States Army Center of Military History Pdf
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941, is the first of a two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. Focusing on the suppression of insurgent or other irregular forces during overseas constabulary and contingency operations from the Civil War years up to America's entry into World War II, Andrew J. Birtle has filled an important omission in military historiography by writing about the underlying theories, concepts, and methods employed in the conduct of myriad unconventional missions with soldiers serving as governors, constables, judges, diplomats, explorers, colonizers, educators, administrators, and engineers. Even though official, codified, written doctrine for counterguerrilla, pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II has long been viewed as nonexistent, Birtle uncovers through his meticulous research an evidentiary thread of continuity in the Army's performance and thus maintains that some of the central principles governing such operations were indeed incorporated into official Army doctrinal literature. The events discussed unquestionably occurred long ago, but many of the issues raised by Birtle have enduring relevance for today's Army. People, places, and events may change, yet the fundamental questions involved in suppressing insurrections, fighting irregulars, administering civilian populations, and conducting foreign intervention remain surprisingly constant in this unpredictable world of ethnic tensions and turmoil. By studying how soldiers dealt with these complex issues in the past, Birtle's well-written account offers valuable insights to guide current and future soldiers when called upon to conduct similar operations.
U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860 - 1941 by Andrew J. Birtle Pdf
Includes: Concepts & Doctrine, & Antebellum Antecedents; War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 (pacification, Francis Lieber); Constabulary Years, 1865-1898 (reconstruction, Indian warfare); Cuba & the Philippines, 1898-1902; Imperial Constabulary Years, 1900-1913 (Peking Relief Expedition, policing the Philippines, governing the Moros, 2nd Cuban intervention); Military interventions during the Wilson Administration, 1914-1920 (Vera Cruz, Mexican Expedition, Russia, Panama); Interwar Years, 1920-1941 (Panama, Germany, & China); & Development of Small Wars Doctrine in Retrospect. Bibliography. Maps & illustrations.
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research
Author : The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Publisher : Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Page : 29 pages File Size : 46,8 Mb Release : 2021-10-25 Category : Antiques & Collectibles ISBN : 9789948345169
Abu Dhabi Dialogue by The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Pdf
This book is published as part of the ECSSR’s goal that the 24th Annual Conference, its discussions and outcomes, contribute to raising awareness of a range of significant issues that constitute challenges and opportunities in the 21st century. These issues include; technology and the future of fossil fuel; prospects for development in the field of renewable energy; the future of electricity in the world’s energy mix; changes in warfare; the impact of technology on internal security; and, crisis management in light of technological advancement. The conference also tackled topics related to industrial strategy and sustainable competitiveness; place-based smart specialization and ecosystem-based strategies; business education; and, industrial strategy for sustainable prosperity. Other topics included new media and its impact on social values, national identity in light of global change and the future of the Arabic language.
This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
American Military History, Volume II by Anonim Pdf
From the Publisher: This latest edition of an official U.S. Government military history classic provides an authoritative historical survey of the organization and accomplishments of the United States Army. This scholarly yet readable book is designed to inculcate an awareness of our nation's military past and to demonstrate that the study of military history is an essential ingredient in leadership development. It is also an essential addition to any personal military history library.
From Domination to Consolidation by Us Army Command and General Staff Colleg,Dominik Josef Schellenberger Pdf
The current operational environment is characterized by the emergence of the information age and peer and near peer adversaries. The 2017 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations addresses those paradigm shifts by introducing the multi-domain extended battlefield and four Army strategic roles-shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.FM 3-0 officially implements consolidation of gains and the related consolidation area for the first time into US Army doctrine. The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. An analysis of the historical role the US Army played at the end of World War II for the transition in occupied Germany as well as of current doctrine and future-oriented concepts leads to eighteen suggested doctrinal changes concerning consolidation of gains across US Army operations, leadership, and mission command doctrine.Four of those suggested doctrinal changes are the introduction of a comprehensive multi-domain consolidation area, the emphasis of intent-guided procedural control, the codification of virtual and cognitive consolidation of gains, and the doctrinal recognition of the possible need for temporary military government.
