American And Canadian Counterinsurgency Strategies In Afghanistan
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American and Canadian Counterinsurgency Strategies in Afghanistan by Federmán Rodríguez Pdf
The book aims to explain the factors that brought about a high degree of similarity between American and Canadian foreign and security policies during the Afghanistan intervention. Specifically, it seeks to explain why, despite their different positions in the international distribution of power, the United States and Canada embraced similar counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies from 2005/2006 to 2011. During this time, the United States and Canada fought against insurgent groups, sought to maintain stabilized areas by mentoring Afghan forces, and invested in infrastructure and governance. These goals, which corresponded to the ‘clear,’ ‘hold,’ and ‘build’ COIN components, entailed sending troops and civilian officials to a war zone and committing financial resources.
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan by Seth G. Jones Pdf
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the U.S.-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The U.S. should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The U.S. military-along with U.S. civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.
Release of Canada's first ever National Security Policy (NSP) in 2004, followed by the International (Foreign) Policy Statement and Defence Policy Review in 2005, have publicly articulated Canada's principal security interests for the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) world. Nevertheless, the realities of Canada's present engagement in Afghanistan have highlighted a gap between stated national security and foreign policy goals on one hand, and the Canadian military, diplomatic and development effort in theater, in the other. National interests and values, articulated within the NSP and the International Policy Statement, are insufficient to frame the context for such a complex endeavor. Only a clearly defined strategy based upon rigorous analysis of ends, ways, and means and assessment of risk can enable informed national and political debate, provide the required guidance for campaign planning among government departments, and determine Canada's preferred stake in the wider international arena, including the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Recommendations are provided with respect to resolving Canada's strategy gap in both the immediate and longer term.
The author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City (winner of the 2007 Samuel Johnson Prize) now gives us the startling, behind-the-scenes story of the struggle between President Obama and the US military to remake Afghanistan.
Richard Lee Armitage,Samuel R. Berger,Daniel Seth Markey
Author : Richard Lee Armitage,Samuel R. Berger,Daniel Seth Markey Publisher : Council on Foreign Relations Page : 83 pages File Size : 41,5 Mb Release : 2010 Category : Afghan War, 2001- ISBN : 9780876094792
U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan by Richard Lee Armitage,Samuel R. Berger,Daniel Seth Markey Pdf
The Council on Foreign Relations sponsors Independent Task Forces to assess issues of current and critical importance to U.S. foreign policy and provide policymakers with concrete judgments and recommendations. Diverse in backgrounds and perspectives, Task Force members aim to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and non-partisan deliberations. Once launched, Task Forces are independent of CFR and solely responsible for the content of their reports. Task Force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse "the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation." Each Task Force member also has the option of putting forward an additional or a dissenting view. Members' affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not imply institutional endorsement. Task Force observers participate in discussions, but are not asked to join the consensus. --Book Jacket.
The Unexpected War by Janice Gross Stein,J. Eugene Lang Pdf
This book reveals tough realities about how public servants and politicians dither and avoid hard decisions in Ottawa and about how our senior public service needs a deep shake-up.
This groundbreaking study offers a major reinterpretation of American strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War. Gregory A. Daddis argues senior military leaders developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, one not confined to 'attrition' of enemy forces. This innovative work is a must for a genuine understanding of the Vietnam War.
Author : The U.S. Army Marine Corps Publisher : University of Chicago Press Page : 474 pages File Size : 50,5 Mb Release : 2008-09-15 Category : History ISBN : 9780226841526
Counterinsurgency Field Manual by The U.S. Army Marine Corps Pdf
When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
The Combined Action Platoons by Michael Peterson Pdf
This is the first comprehensive history for the academic reader of the Combined Action Program (CAP) in Vietnam. Created as a response by the U.S. Marines to what was known as the other war in Vietnam, the CAP Program was comprised of platoons each combining a fourteen man marine rifle squad, a navy corpsman, and a platoon of South Vietnamese militia. These CAP units were unique to the war. Their function was to capture and hold rather than to search and destroy. While the main forces of the Army and Marines all too often waged war on the Vietnamese hamlets, the CAP marines waged war from the hamlets. Their intent was to keep the hamlet intact. The uniqueness of the CAP Program justifies this study not only from an historical and political perspective but also sociologically. The CAP Marines were among the few Americans who lived with the Vietnamese in their own setting for long periods of time, developing community projects and civic action programs. The 1980s has brought about a resurgence of valuable research, the declassification of official documentation, and most important, an emotional distance from the trauma of defeat. The author takes full advantage of these conditions to present a thorough and comprehensive history and civic program analysis. Many critics of the Vietnam War now agree that the tactics of the Combined Action Program were among the most promising of the war. The CAP Marines fought a deadly and personal war with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army. In this volume, the author achieves his twofold objective. He not only provides a valuable historical account of the Program, but also analyzes the civic action and community development projects undertaken by the CAP Marines. His study is done with an eye to the future as U.S. counterinsurgency has again found expression in other Third World conflicts.
Author : Craig Whitlock,The Washington Post Publisher : Simon and Schuster Page : 384 pages File Size : 44,7 Mb Release : 2022-08-30 Category : History ISBN : 9781982159016
The Afghanistan Papers by Craig Whitlock,The Washington Post Pdf
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.
The war in Afghanistan has been a major policy commitment and central undertaking of the Canadian state since 2001: Canada has been a leading force in the war, and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on aid and reconstruction. After a decade of conflict, however, there is considerable debate about the efficacy of the mission, as well as calls to reassess Canada's role in the conflict. An authoritative and strongly analytical work, Empire's Ally provides a much-needed critical investigation into one of the most polarizing events of our time. This collection draws on new primary evidence including government documents, think tank and NGO reports, international media files, and interviews in Afghanistan to provide context for Canadian foreign policy, to offer critical perspectives on the war itself, and to link the conflict to broader issues of political economy, international relations, and Canada's role on the world stage. Spanning academic and public debates, Empire's Ally opens a new line of argument on why the mission has entered a stage of crisis.
The "War Stories" columnist for Slate presents the inside story of a small group of soldier-scholars who have significantly changed the ways the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars, drawing on interviews with top contributors to reveal the origins of revolutionary ideas and how they have overcome formidable internal resistance.
Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (U.S.),Special Inspector General for Afghanista
Author : Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (U.S.),Special Inspector General for Afghanista Publisher : U.S. Independent Agencies and Commissions Page : 277 pages File Size : 51,9 Mb Release : 2017-08 Category : History ISBN : 0160948312
Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan by Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction (U.S.),Special Inspector General for Afghanista Pdf
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
This report examines how the U.S. government -- primarily the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, Treasury, and Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) -- understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, how the U.S. response to corruption evolved, and the effectiveness of that response. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and makes recommendations for both legislative and executive branch action. This analysis reveals that corruption substantially undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan from the very beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. It concludes that failure to effectively address the problem means that U.S. reconstruction programs, at best, will continue to be subverted by systemic corruption and, at worst, will fail. Figures and tables.. This is a print on demand report.
Coalition Challenges in Afghanistan by Gale A. Mattox,Stephen M. Grenier Pdf
This book examines the experiences of a range of countries in the conflict in Afghanistan, with particular focus on the demands of operating within a diverse coalition of states. After laying out the challenges of the Afghan conflict in terms of objectives, strategy, and mission, case studies of 15 coalition members—each written by a country expert—discuss each country's motivation for joining the coalition and explore the impact of more than 10 years of combat on each country's military, domestic government, and populace. The book dissects the changes in the coalition over the decade, driven by both external factors—such as the Bonn Conferences of 2001 and 2011, the contiguous Iraq War, and politics and economics at home—and internal factors such as command structures, interoperability, emerging technologies, the surge, the introduction of counterinsurgency doctrine, Green on Blue attacks, escalating civilian casualties, and the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGOs. In their conclusion, the editors review the commonality and uniqueness evident in the country cases, lay out the lessons learned by NATO, and assess the potential for their application in future alliance warfare in the new global order.
