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This paper examines the increased role of the private sector in developing and maintaining critical infrastructure. It identifies governments' quest to shift part of the burden of new infrastructure investments to the private sector for the economic development of firms and industry and the improvement of quality of life and, given the constraints on public budgets, to finance growing infrastructure needs. Adequate infrastructure services include power, telecommunications, transport, water supply and sanitation. The paper also emphasizes the private sector involvement in bringing increased efficiency to investment and management and operation.
Author : J. Luis Guasch Publisher : World Bank Publications Page : 212 pages File Size : 44,9 Mb Release : 2004-01-01 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : 0821357921
Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions by J. Luis Guasch Pdf
During the 1990s, infrastructure concessions were hailed as the solution to Latin America's endemic infrastructure deficit, by combining private sector efficiency with rent dissipation brought about by competition. This publication examines the design and implementation of over 1,000 examples of concession contracts, in order to identify the problems that have occurred in the process. It goes on to highlight lessons to be learned for the future, in order to realise the potential benefits of infrastructure reform and to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.
Road Infrastructure Concession Practice in Europe by Franck Bousquet,Alain Fayard Pdf
Europe has a wealth of experience with motorway concessions and the issues associated with concession contracts and other infrastructure funding systems, toll charges and other parts to remuneration, and risk sharing between concession authorities and concession companies.
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America by J. Luis Guasch,Jean-Jacques Laffont Pdf
"The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. "--World Bank web site.
Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues.
En la última década ha sido práctica común la privatización de empresas gestoras de infraestructura, en sectores como el del transporte, las telecomunicaciones, la energía y el agua. Muy a menudo se adjudican a empresas privadas franquicias monopolistas, mediante concesiones a largo plazo. En este trabajo se analizan aquellas cuestiones relacionadas con el diseño de estos contratos de concesión y su adjudicación a empresas privadas.
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America by J. Luis Guasch,St??phane Straub Pdf
The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism.
Law and Economics of Public Procurement Reforms by Gustavo Piga,Tunde Tatrai Pdf
Appropriate laws and regulations are essential tools to direct the action of procurers toward the public good and avoid corruption and misallocation of resources. Common laws and regulations across regions, nations and continents potentially allow for the further opening of markets and ventures to newcomers and new ideas to satisfy public demand. Law and Economics of Public Procurement Reforms collects the original contributions related to the new European Union Directives approved in 2014 by the EU Parliament. They are of both economists and lawyers, and have been presented in a manner that allows for exchanges of views and "real time" interaction. This book features, for each section, an introductory exchange between two experts of different disciplines, made up of a series of sequential interactions between an economist and a lawyer, which enriches the liveliness of the debate and improve the mutual understanding between the two professions. Four sections characterize this book: Supporting social considerations via public procurement; Green public procurement; Innovation through innovative partnerships; and Lots - The Economic and Legal Challenges of Centralized Procurement. These themes have current relevance of the new European Public Procurement Directives. Written by an impressive array of experts in their respected fields, this volume is of great importance to practitioners who work in the field of EU public procurement in the Member States of the EU, as well as academics and students who study public finance, public policy and regulation.
Concession Contract Renegotiations by Antonio Estache,Lucia Quesada Pdf
If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation.
Road Infrastructure Concession Practice in Europe by Franck Bousquet Pdf
September 2001 Europe has a wealth of experience with motorway concessions and the issues associated with concession contracts and other infrastructure funding systems, toll charges and other paths to remuneration, and risk sharing between concession authorities and concession companies. In a road infrastructure concession, a public authority grants specific rights to a private or semi-public company to construct, overhaul, maintain, and operate infrastructure for a given period. By contract, the public authority charges that company with making the investments needed to create the service at its own cost and to operate it at its own risk. The price paid to the company comes from the service's users, the public authority, or both. In 1999, out of roughly 51,000 kilometers of European motorways, about 17,000 kilometers (33 percent) were concessioned--16,400 kilometers by toll and 670 kilometers by shadow toll (design, build, finance, and operate arrangements). Of these, 73 percent are managed by the public sector and 27 percent by private companies. State-owned companies have been important in European motorway concessions. Systems vary among countries, for example, in how they share risks between the concession authority and the concession company. As the motorway network has grown denser, attributing commercial risk has become more difficult. Increasingly, public authorities must play a greater regulatory role. Already, bad experiences have made the private sector reluctant to bear the commercial risk. And the commercial risk is sometimes too great to be carried by the concession company alone. Commercial risk should be controlled by mechanisms incorporated in the contract, but control of the commercial risk must not eliminate incentives. In addition to safeguarding the community's interests, the public concession authority must increase citizen awareness about concession decisions, to ensure their social acceptability. Formulas for determining toll charges differ through Europe. So do criteria for selecting concession companies. In 1999, the main criteria used were these: * The amount of public subsidy required. * The credibility of the financial arrangements. * The project's technical quality. * The operating strategy and price policy. * The reputation of the concession company (whether it has a construction company among its shareholders, for example). The increasingly frequent use of private funding must be taken into account when defining the training required by personnel responsible for monitoring the concessions. This paper--a product of the Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, World Bank Institute--is part of a larger effort in the institute to promote best practice in the regulation of privatized infrastructure. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
