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Draws on hundreds of newly declassified documents to present an account of the Suez crisis that reveals the considerable danger it posed as well as the influence of Eisenhower's health problems and the 1956 election campaign.
In a bold reinterpretation of history, Ike's Gamble shows how the 1956 Suez Crisis taught President Eisenhower that Israel, not Egypt, would have to be America's ally in the region. In 1956 President Nasser of Egypt moved to take possession of the Suez Canal, bringing the Middle East to the brink of war. Distinguished Middle East expert Michael Doran shows how Nasser played the United States, invoking America's opposition to European colonialism to his own benefit. At the same time Nasser made weapons deals with the USSR and destabilized other Arab countries that the United States had been courting. In time, Eisenhower would realize that Nasser had duped him and that the Arab countries were too fractious to anchor America's interests in the Middle East. Affording deep insight into Eisenhower and his foreign policy, this fascinating and provocative history provides a rich new understanding of the tangled path by which the United States became the power broker in the Middle East. -- Back cover.
The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis by Diane B. Kunz Pdf
Diane Kunz describes here how the United States employed economic diplomacy to affect relations among states during the Suez Crisis of 1956-57. Using political and financial archival material from the United States and Great Britain, and drawing from pers
US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy by A. Hybel Pdf
The book has three objectives: to expose students to the ways different US presidents handled major foreign policy making problems; to test the explanatory value of alternative decision-making models; And to reintroduce students to a wide range of critical US foreign policy issues.
Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 by Cole Christian Kingseed Pdf
Historian Cole C. Kingseed reinforces the revisionist perspective on Dwight D. Eisenhower's presidency in this study of one of the major foreign policy challenges of Eisenhower's administration: the Suez crisis of 1956. Kingseed's principal focus is on the president - what he did and why and how he did it. Discussion of the Middle East situation forms the backdrop against which to analyze Eisenhower as chief executive. Forgoing late-twentieth-century hindsight, Kingseed evaluates Eisenhower's managerial performance according to what the president knew at the time. As much as possible, he relies on the president's own diary, his private letters and memoranda, his official correspondence, Department of State records, minutes of the National Security Council and cabinet meetings, presidential secretary Ann C. Whitman's diary and journals, written records and personal correspondence of staff secretary Andrew J. Goodpaster, and a wide array of oral histories. What Kingseed reveals about Eisenhower's command of the White House during the Suez crisis reflects his executive abilities generally: Eisenhower was at the center of events, organizing the security departments within the federal government in such a manner that it was only at the presidential level that all aspects of strategy and policy coalesced. In devising and implementing long-term policy, he utilized more formal bodies, such as the National Security Council, but for matters that required personal and immediate attention, he convened an ad hoc group of special advisers. A major premise of Kingseed's analysis is that the method in which a president organizes and supervises the decision-making apparatus has a profound impact on the attainment of political goals. That Eisenhower, in responding to the Suez crisis, achieved his policy objectives amid dissenting allies, contentious military chiefs, and political opposition in a presidential election year clearly demonstrates, according to Kingseed, the unique, flexible leadership style of an extraordinarily active - and effective - chief executive.
In July 1956 Egyptian President Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, causing immediate concern to Britain and France. They already opposed Nasser and were worried at the threat to maritime traffic in the Canal. This book traces the course of subsequent events. Together with Israel, Britain and France hatched a plot to occupy the Canal Zone and overthrow Nasser. Israel attacked Sinai, and Britain and France launched offensives throughout Egypt, but strategic failures overshasdowed tactical success. Finally, Britain, France and Israel bowed to international pressure and withdrew, leaving the Suez Canal, and Egypt, firmly in the hands of President Nasser.
The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957 by Peter G. Boyle Pdf
The personal correspondence between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Anthony Eden during the time they were simultaneously in office tells the dramatic story of a relationship that began with great promise but ended in division and estrangement. Many of the letters have only recently been declassified, making it possible for the first time to publish this unique historic collection in its entirety. Peter G. Boyle's introduction, annotations, and conclusion provide context for the letters--details about the personalities and careers of Eden and Eisenhower and major issues that influenced the Anglo-American relationship up to 1955, such as relations with the Soviet Union, nuclear concerns, colonialism, the Middle and Far East, economic issues, and intelligence matters. The letters themselves offer an intimate look into the special connection between Britain and the United States through the often eloquent words of their leaders. They offer particular insight into the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Eden's and Eisenhower's views greatly diverged over the use of force to resolve the situation. Their personal relationship cooled from that point on and ended with Eden's resignation in January 1957.
Although much has been written on the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the subsequent military action, this study provides fresh perspectives by reflecting the latest research from leading international authorities on the crisis. Drawing on recently released documents, including previously neglected aspects of Suez, and by reassessing its more familiar ones, the volume makes a key contribution to furthering research on, and understanding of, events in Egypt in 1956.
This is an analysis, based on newly available evidence, of the Suez crisis of 1956, its origins, and its consequences. The contributors are all leading authorities, and some, like Mordechai Bar-On, Robert Bowie and Adam Watson, were active participants in the events of the time.
Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States pledged to give increased economic and military aid to receptive Middle Eastern countries and to protect--with U.S. armed forces if necessary--the territorial integrity and political independence of these nations from the threat of "international Communism." Salim Yaqub demonstrates that although the United States officially aimed to protect the Middle East from Soviet encroachment, the Eisenhower Doctrine had the unspoken mission of containing the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom Eisenhower regarded as an unwitting agent of Soviet expansionism. By offering aid and protection, the Eisenhower administration hoped to convince a majority of Arab governments to side openly with the West in the Cold War, thus isolating Nasser and decreasing the likelihood that the Middle East would fall under Soviet domination. Employing a wide range of recently declassified Egyptian, British, and American archival sources, Yaqub offers a dynamic and comprehensive account of Eisenhower's efforts to counter Nasserism's appeal throughout the Arab Middle East. Challenging interpretations of U.S.-Arab relations that emphasize cultural antipathies and clashing values, Yaqub instead argues that the political dispute between the United States and the Nasserist movement occurred within a shared moral framework--a pattern that continues to characterize U.S.-Arab controversies today.
Whitehall and the Suez Crisis by Saul Kelly,Anthony Gorst Pdf
This review of the Suez Crisis incorporates 1956 releases from the Public Record under the Open Government Initiative, to reassess the role of officials and the process of policymaking, through the analysis of the activities and role of a range of
'This is proper history. It is illuminating to pick up this book with the twenty-first century's crises of Brexit and Iraq in mind.' Jeremy Bowen (BBC correspondent, and author of Six Days). Over sixteen extraordinary days in October and November 1956, the twin crises of Suez and Hungary pushed the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict and what many at the time were calling World War III. Blood and Sand is a revelatory new history of these dramatic events, for the first time setting both crises in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the treacherous power politics of imperialism and oil. Blood and Sandtells this story hour by hour, with a fascinating cast of characters including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anthony Eden, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, Christian Pineau, Imre Nagy and David Ben-Gurion. It is a tale of conspiracy and revolutions, spies and terrorists, kidnappings and assassination plots, the fall of the British Empire and the rise of American hegemony. Blood and Sand is essential to our understanding of the modern Middle East and resonates powerfully with the problems of oil control, religious fundamentalism and international unity that face the world today.