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Punctuated Equilibrium by Stephen Jay GOULD,Stephen Jay Gould Pdf
In 1972 Stephen Jay Gould took the scientific world by storm with his paper on punctuated equilibrium. Challenging a core assumption of Darwin's theory of evolution, it launched the controversial idea that the majority of species originates in geological moments (punctuations) and persists in stasis. Now, thirty-five years later, Punctuated Equilibrium offers his only book-length testament on a theory he fiercely promoted, repeatedly refined, and tirelessly defended.
Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection by Larry Samuelson Pdf
The author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. Evolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory by Stephen Jay Gould Pdf
The world’s most revered and eloquent interpreter of evolutionary ideas offers here a work of explanatory force unprecedented in our time—a landmark publication, both for its historical sweep and for its scientific vision. With characteristic attention to detail, Stephen Jay Gould first describes the content and discusses the history and origins of the three core commitments of classical Darwinism: that natural selection works on organisms, not genes or species; that it is almost exclusively the mechanism of adaptive evolutionary change; and that these changes are incremental, not drastic. Next, he examines the three critiques that currently challenge this classic Darwinian edifice: that selection operates on multiple levels, from the gene to the group; that evolution proceeds by a variety of mechanisms, not just natural selection; and that causes operating at broader scales, including catastrophes, have figured prominently in the course of evolution. Then, in a stunning tour de force that will likely stimulate discussion and debate for decades, Gould proposes his own system for integrating these classical commitments and contemporary critiques into a new structure of evolutionary thought. In 2001 the Library of Congress named Stephen Jay Gould one of America’s eighty-three Living Legends—people who embody the “quintessentially American ideal of individual creativity, conviction, dedication, and exuberance.” Each of these qualities finds full expression in this peerless work, the likes of which the scientific world has not seen—and may not see again—for well over a century.
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
This work, based upon the two Manchester Special Lectures given by the author in 1989-90, and focusing on the central economic issues of co-ordination and change, treats these as problems of equilibrium in the case of co-ordination and as problems of evolution in the case of change.
There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.
Pillars of Evolution by Douglas W. Morris,Per Lundberg Pdf
Pillars of Evolution provides a fresh and provocative perspective on adaptive evolution. Readers new to the study of evolution will find a refreshing new insight that establishes evolutionary biology as a rigorous and predictive science, whilst practicing biologists will discover a provocative book that challenges traditional approaches. The book begins by leading readers through the mechanics of heredity, reproduction, movement, survival, and development. With that framework in place, it then explores the numerous ways that traits emerge from the interactions between genetics, development, and the environment. The key message is that adaptive changes in traits (and their underlying allelic frequencies) evolve through the traits' functions and their connection with fitness. The complex mappings from genes-to-traits-to-fitness are characterized in the structure of evolution. A single "structure matrix" describes why individuals vary in the values of adaptive traits, their ability to perform the function of those traits, and in the fitness they accrue. Fitness depends on how organisms interact with and perceive their environment in time and space. These relationships are made explicit in spatial, temporal, and organizational scale that also sets the stage for the crucially important role that ecology always plays in evolution. The ecological hallmarks of density- and frequency-dependent interactions allow the authors to explore new and exciting insights into evolution's dynamics. The theories and principles are then brought together in a final synthesis on adaptation. The book's unique approach unites genetic, development, and environmental influences into a single comprehensive treatment of the eco-evolutionary process.
Part one of this work outlines the general theory of the fundamental dynamics that shape the world around us. Part two goes on to review the evolution of matter in the universe, the evolution of life in the biosphere and the evolution of society in the human world.
Principles of Biology by Lisa Bartee,Walter Shiner,Catherine Creech Pdf
The Principles of Biology sequence (BI 211, 212 and 213) introduces biology as a scientific discipline for students planning to major in biology and other science disciplines. Laboratories and classroom activities introduce techniques used to study biological processes and provide opportunities for students to develop their ability to conduct research.
Author : Richard R. Nelson Publisher : Harvard University Press Page : 456 pages File Size : 55,6 Mb Release : 1985-10-15 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : 0674041437
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change by Richard R. Nelson Pdf
This book contains the most sustained and serious attack on mainstream, neoclassical economics in more than forty years. Nelson and Winter focus their critique on the basic question of how firms and industries change overtime. They marshal significant objections to the fundamental neoclassical assumptions of profit maximization and market equilibrium, which they find ineffective in the analysis of technological innovation and the dynamics of competition among firms. To replace these assumptions, they borrow from biology the concept of natural selection to construct a precise and detailed evolutionary theory of business behavior. They grant that films are motivated by profit and engage in search for ways of improving profits, but they do not consider them to be profit maximizing. Likewise, they emphasize the tendency for the more profitable firms to drive the less profitable ones out of business, but they do not focus their analysis on hypothetical states of industry equilibrium. The results of their new paradigm and analytical framework are impressive. Not only have they been able to develop more coherent and powerful models of competitive firm dynamics under conditions of growth and technological change, but their approach is compatible with findings in psychology and other social sciences. Finally, their work has important implications for welfare economics and for government policy toward industry.
Alfred Marshall has traditionally been listed alongside pioneering 'neoclassical' economists. In this volume Neil Hart challenges this view, illuminating the ambiguities within Marshall's work, and exploring his reconciliation of two modes of thinking, equilibrium economics and evolutionary economics.
Societal revolutions and punctuated equilibrium. A comparison with the evolutionary theory by Cornelia Jürgens Pdf
Seminar paper from the year 2020 in the subject History - World History - Basics, grade: 9, VU University Amsterdam , language: English, abstract: Since revolutions usually describe big changes in a society that happen within a relatively short amount of time, it is most interesting to look into the connections between societal revolutions and the evolutional theory of punctuated equilibrium. A look from "above" could lead to a new understanding of both concepts or new ways to handle them. The focus of this text will be the concept of revolutions and how to deal with them, with punctuated equilibrium being the point of comparison. Revolutions are a societal phenomenon that has been an important factor to societal change for centuries. Few would deny the connection between the French revolution and the spread of democracy in Europe, for example. Today, there are several places and situations in the world that might break out into revolution soon, for example the Hong Kong protests, the recurring strikes in France or simply the fact that many people are unsatisfied with their leaders and their previous actions all across the world, which clearly shows the relevance of revolutions even today.
