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Fiscal Decentralization and Budget Control by Laura von Daniels Pdf
How can governments control spending pressure from influential groups, often representing powerful regional interests? This book is concerned with institutional solutions that allow modern nation states to balance historically grown cultural, political and economic diversity. Laura von Daniels combines different literatures in economics and political science, and draws on interviews with former government leaders, and country experts from international organizations. She applies this research to topics such as fiscal institutions and budget balances, presenting a critical review of different institutional approaches to resolving fiscal imbalances and public indebtedness. Students and scholars of various disciplines, including politics, public and social policy, economics and business will find the discussions and detailed description of institutional reforms in emerging market nations to be of use to their research. It will also be of interest to practitioners working on fiscal decentralization and budget control.
Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Policy Performance by Moussé Sow,Mr.Ivohasina F Razafimahefa Pdf
This paper explores the impact of fiscal decentralization on fiscal policy performance in a large sample of advanced and developing economies. The findings suggest that a larger share of decentralized expenditure is associated with a stronger fiscal balance; however, fiscal decentralization can lead to more pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Thus, the design and pace of fiscal decentralization need to be tailored to the specificities of the economy. Countries that have already established strong accountablity and budget management capacity at the local level can benefit from fiscal decentralization. In contrast, in economies prone to large volatility from internal and external shocks, the central government may need to retain a sufficient share of expenditure and revenue to conduct counter-cyclical policies. Finally, the pace of expenditure and revenue decentralization should be aligned.
Ukraine by International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept. Pdf
This Technical Assistance paper on Ukraine reviews the results of the 2015 fiscal decentralization reform and the amendments to the Budget Code for implementation of certain Public Financial Management reforms. Several design issues are slowing the process of voluntary amalgamation of territorial communities and will lead to a proliferation of small units, with low potential for financial self-sufficiency. Achieving both an overall balance and a vertical fiscal balance, whereby own revenues cover basic expenditure responsibilities and dependence on State grants and subventions is minimized, would require a combination of changes to the revenue-sharing arrangements and expenditure assignments. There is no structured arrangement for ensuring a collaborative and coordinated approach in pursuing broad fiscal objectives and ensuring fiscal sustainability at all levels of government. The authorities should take steps to ensure an active and open dialogue between the different levels on the conduct of fiscal policy.
Making Fiscal Decentralization Work by Ms.Annalisa Fedelino Pdf
The question of what makes fiscal decentralization work is faced by many policymakers around the world. This book draws on both the relevant literature and policy and technical advice provided by the IMF to a wide range of member countries, and discusses the key factors that help make decentralization sustainable, efficient, and equitable from a macroeconomic perspective. It focuses on institutional reforms (in the revenue and expenditure assignments to different levels of government, the design of intergovernmental transfers, and public financial management systems) that are suited to different countries circumstances, and their appropriate sequencing.
Mali by International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept. Pdf
This Technical Assistance Report discusses key recommendations for implementing fiscal decentralization in Mali. It proposes to set an optimal administrative organization of the territory, which should aim at building consistent and sustainable local governments that are best suited to address specific local needs. In this context, the regions deemed to be best suited to handle funds are envisaged to be decentralized and with large-scale development actions. The local government revenue should be optimized through local taxation, and an efficient system of transfers from the central government should be introduced. The report also proposes establishing good financial governance in Mali.
The impact of fiscal decentralization and the soft budget constraint on the local government debt by David Onditi Pdf
Essay from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: A, University of Nairobi (School of Business), course: PhD Economics, language: English, abstract: The author aims to study the impacts of fiscal decentralization and soft budget constraint on the scale of local government debts. Moreover, the effect of soft budget constraint on the scale of local government debt under the different extent of fiscal decentralization will be discussed. Due to the linkage between economic growth and the fiscal decentralization, the expansion in the local government debt is closely related to the fiscal decentralization and the soft budget constraint (SBC) – the expectation that the local governments would be bailed out by the central government if they face debt challenges. Based on the literature fiscal decentralization is linked to local government debts as literature indicates that fiscal decentralization leads to the decentralization of the expenditure without the revenue collection powers. The Chinese local governments have increased expenditure budgets on public services but the powers of taxation are centralized. To bridge the revenue gaps, the local governments take up debts that are sunk into infrastructure and other low revenue generating investments. Soft budget constraints are thus a product of fiscal decentralization as they are based on the principal – agent relationship between the politicians and the voters, central government and local government and the local governments and the SOEs within the local jurisdictions.
Fiscal Decentralization and Public Subnational Financial Management in Peru by Ehtisham Ahmad,Mercedes Garcia-Escribano Pdf
There is increasing interest in fiscal decentralization in Peru as a mechanism to generate more involved decision-making at the subnational level. This is tempered with a continuing emphasis on overall fiscal stability. However, considerable work needs to be undertaken to define more clearly expenditure responsibilities and financing mechanisms that increase local accountability. In addition, a more transparent fiscal transfer system is needed, together with clarity in expenditure management at all levels of government. The paper suggests that a substantial work agenda is needed to extend the decentralization process with greater transparency.
Local budgeting serves important functions that include setting priorities, planning, financial control over inputs, management of operations and accountability to citizens. These objectives give rise to technical and policy issues that require open discussion and debate. The format of the budget document can facilitate this debate. This book provides a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of local budgeting needed to develop sound fiscal administration at the local level. Topics covered include fiscal administration, forecasting, fiscal discipline, fiscal transparency, integrity of revenue administration, budget formats, and processes including performance budgeting, and capital budgeting.
Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations by E. David Wildasin Pdf
November 1997 A local government's ability to extract a bailout from a central government depends on how big it is. Larger localities may rationally expect bailouts-and thus operate under softer budget constraints. Effective fiscal decentralization requires an institutional structure that minimizes these adverse incentives. Subnational governments are assuming greater fiscal responsibility in many developing and transition countries. There is concern, however, that fiscal decentralization may weaken fiscal discipline-that local authorities may undertake commitments or incur debt obligations that subsequently result in massive central government support, in the form of extraordinary transfers, or bailouts. (Recent experience in major U.S. cities shows that these problems are not restricted to developing countries.) Such bailouts could in turn cause national fiscal imbalances, excessive borrowing, and macroeconomic instability. Some analysts recommend that central authorities maintain strict control over the fiscal behavior of lower-level governments, but others argue that such controls could undercut the goals of fiscal decentralization, including autonomy. Wildasin shows that central authorities may have strong incentives to prop up the finances of local governments when the public services provided locally benefit the rest of society. The prospect of such interventions may in turn create incentives for localities to underprovide services that produce substantial spillover benefits, using local resources instead for purposes that may benefit local constituencies but not nonresidents. When central fiscal interventions are big enough, and when a loss of local control over the use of fiscal resources is not too costly to local residents, local decisionmakers will act to induce central government bailouts, resulting in inefficient outcomes for the system as a whole. This is not to say that fiscal decentralization produces perverse incentives or requires central government control over local fiscal policies. But incentives for bailouts can be especially strong when local governments are considered too big to fail-for example, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, DC (in the United States) and São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (in Brazil). In such cases, the repercussions from major breakdowns in the provision of services-or in debt servicing-can be too costly for central governments to ignore. Problems of fiscal discipline may result not because there is too much fiscal decentralization, says Wildasin, but because there is too little. It may make sense to carry out more thorough decentralization-for example, devolving fiscal authorities to smaller jurisdictions or special-purpose functional units, or subdividing large subnational jurisdictions into many smaller units. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand fiscal decentralization.
Fiscal Decentralization and Local Finance in Developing Countries by Roy Bahl,Richard M. Bird Pdf
This book draws on experiences in developing countries to bridge the gap between the conventional textbook treatment of fiscal decentralization and the actual practice of subnational government finance. The extensive literature about the theory and practice is surveyed and longstanding problems and new questions are addressed. It focuses on the key choices that must be made in decentralizing, on how economic and political factors shape the choices that countries make, and on how, by paying more attention to the need for a more comprehensive approach and the critical connections between different components of decentralization reform, everyone involved might get more for their money.
Republic of Mozambique by International Monetary,International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept. Pdf
The report contributes to efforts on strengthening expenditure control and cash flow management, and ensuring effective fiscal coordination and reporting in the context of the planned fiscal decentralization.
Author : Anwar Shah Publisher : World Bank Publications Page : 60 pages File Size : 48,7 Mb Release : 2005 Category : Federal government ISBN : UCSD:31822034991687
Fiscal Decentralization and Fiscal Performance by Anwar Shah Pdf
Fiscal rules binding on all levels can help sustain political commitment in countries having coalitions or fragmented regimes in power. Coordinating institutions help in the use of moral suasion to encourage a coordinated response. Industrial countries' experiences also show that unilaterally imposed federal controls and constraints on subnational governments typically do not work. Instead, societal norms based on fiscal conservatism such as the Swiss referenda and political activism of the electorate play important roles. Ultimately capital markets and bond-rating agencies provide more effective discipline on fiscal policy. In this context, it is important not to backstop state and local debt and not to allow ownership of the banks by any level of government. Transparency of the budgetary process and institutions, accountability to the electorate, and general availability of comparative data encourages fiscal discipline.
Decentralization in Regional Fiscal Systems in Russia by Lev M. Freinkman,Plamen Yossifov Pdf
Abstract: April 1999 - Considering the positive impact decentralization has had on regional economic performance and expenditure structure, Russia's federal government should: Decisively protect local self-governance and budget autonomy; Make intergovernmental fiscal relations more transparent; Develop universal models of interactions between regional and municipal governments; Impose stricter limits on total debt and budget deficits of subnational governments. To shed light on decentralization in Russia, Freinkman and Yossifov examine intergovernmental fiscal relations within regions. To analyze trends, they review channels of fiscal allocation within regions-tax sharing and local transfer schemes. To evaluate the potential impact of various fiscal decentralization patterns on regional economic performance (including growth and the budget deficit), they study data on the structure of 89 Russian consolidated regional budgets for 1992-96. They find that local governments' relative share of Russia's consolidated budget, although substantive (roughly a quarter of the total budget), did not expand after 1994. The federal government's relative role in financing public goods and services declined as the relative role of local governments increased substantially. Local governments collected more revenues in 1996 (6.4 percent of GDP) and spent more than regional governments. They also substantially increased social financing (including health, education, and social protection). Russia made no progress toward a more transparent system for tax assignments. The average level of expenditure decentralization is similar for ethnically Russian regions and national republics and okrugs but revenue arrangements differ greatly. True decentralization has taken place in oblasts and krais, where local authorities are provided with a bigger share of subnational tax revenues. A redistribution model applies in republics and autonomous okrugs, where greater local outlays have been financed through larger transfers from regional governments. Regions near each other tend to have similar budget arrangements-the result of intensive interactions between neighbors and probably supported by the activities of regional associations. The size of a region's territory does not influence decentralization outcomes. Fiscal decentralization seems positively related to the share of education spending in regional budgets. And regions with more decentralized finances tend to experience less economic decline. But budget control is weaker in more decentralized regions. Instability and lack of transparency in intergovernmental fiscal relations provide subnational governments little incentive for responsible fiscal policy. Further decentralization without greater transparency could bring greater debt and deficits. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the unit to study fiscal decentralization in transition economies. Lev Freinkman may be contacted at [email protected].
