Foreign Relations Of The United States 1969 1976 Volume Xii Soviet Union January 1969 October 1970
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Author : United States. Department of State Publisher : Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian Page : 746 pages File Size : 42,9 Mb Release : 2007 Category : History ISBN : MINN:31951D02721199W
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XII: Soviet Union, January 1969-October 1970 by United States. Department of State Pdf
Using editorial notes to highlight key instances of U.S.-Soviet conflict or collaboration, this volume documents the first Nixon administration's global confrontation, competition, and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Author : United States. Department of State Publisher : Government Printing Office Page : 1168 pages File Size : 51,8 Mb Release : 2016 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : UCBK:C098385513
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972 by United States. Department of State Pdf
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. The series, which is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes published over the last two decades increasingly contain declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIV: Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972 by Anonim Pdf
Using editorial notes to highlight key instances of U.S.-Soviet conflict or collaboration, this volume documents the first Nixon administration's global confrontation, competition, and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
After being sworn in as president, Richard Nixon told the assembled crowd that “government will listen. ... Those who have been left out, we will try to bring in.” But that same day, he obliterated those pledges of greater citizen control of government by signing National Security Decision Memorandum 2, a document that made sweeping changes to the national security power structure. Nixon’s signature erased the influence that the departments of State and Defense, as well as the CIA, had over Vietnam and the course of the Cold War. The new structure put Nixon at the center, surrounded by loyal aides and a new national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, who coordinated policy through the National Security Council under Nixon’s command. Using years of research and revelations from newly released documents, USA Today reporter Ray Locker upends much of the conventional wisdom about the Nixon administration and its impact and shows how the creation of this secret, unprecedented, extra-constitutional government undermined U.S. policy and values. In doing so, Nixon sowed the seeds of his own destruction by creating a climate of secrecy, paranoia, and reprisal that still affects Washington today.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Pt. 1, Korea, 1969-1972 by Anonim Pdf
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. The series, which is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes published over the last two decades increasingly contain declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies.
The Nixon Administration and the Middle East Peace Process, 1969-1973 by Dr Boaz Vanetik,Professor Zaki Shalom Pdf
The Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in Israeli society and a national trauma whose wounds have yet to heal some four decades later. In the years following the war many studies addressed the internal and international political background prior to the war, attempting to determine causes and steps by political players and parties in Israel, Egypt and the United States. But to date there has been no comprehensive study based on archival materials and other primary sources. Classified documents from that period have recently become available and it is now possible to examine in depth a crucial period in Middle East history generally and Israeli history in particular. The authors provide a penetrating and insightful viewpoint on the question that lies at the heart of the Israeli polity and military: Was an opportunity missed to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War? The book provides surprising answers to long-standing issues: How did National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, succeed in torpedoing the efforts of the State Department to bring about an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1971?; Would that agreement have allowed Israel to hold on to most of the Sinai Peninsula for many years and at the same time avert the outbreak of the war; Did Golda Meir reject any diplomatic initiative that came up for discussion in the years preceding the war?; Was the White House's Middle East policy throughout 1973 a catalyst for war breaking out?
How did the United States move from position of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1960s to a period of arms control based on nuclear parity the doctrine of mutual assured destruction in 1972? Drawing on declassified records of conversations between three presidents and their most trusted advisors, this book provides a new and fascinating answer to this question. John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon struggled to reconcile their own personal convictions on the nuclear arms race with the very different views of the public and Congress. In doing so they engaged in a double game, hiding their true beliefs behind a facade of strategic language while grappling in private with the complex realities of the nuclear age. The book shows how Kennedy and Johnson consistently worried about the domestic political costs of their actions, pushing ahead with an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system for the United States for fear of the domestic political consequences of scrapping both the system and the doctrine of strategic superiority on which it was based. By contrast, the abrupt change in U.S. public and congressional opinion in 1969 forced Nixon to give up America's first ABM and the U. S. lead in offensive ballistic missiles through agreements with the Soviet Union, despite his conviction that the U.S. needed a nuclear edge over the USSR to maintain the security of the West. By placing this dynamic at the center of the story, the book provides a completely new overarching interpretation of this pivotal period in the development of U.S. nuclear policy.
Author : Richard A. Moss Publisher : University Press of Kentucky Page : 418 pages File Size : 43,5 Mb Release : 2017-01-17 Category : History ISBN : 9780813167886
Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow by Richard A. Moss Pdf
Most Americans consider détente -- the reduction of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union -- to be among the Nixon administration's most significant foreign policy successes. The diplomatic back channel that national security advisor Henry Kissinger established with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin became the most important method of achieving this thaw in the Cold War. Kissinger praised back channels for preventing leaks, streamlining communications, and circumventing what he perceived to be the US State Department's unresponsive and self-interested bureaucracy. Nixon and Kissinger's methods, however, were widely criticized by State Department officials left out of the loop and by an American press and public weary of executive branch prevarication and secrecy. Richard A. Moss's penetrating study documents and analyzes US-Soviet back channels from Nixon's inauguration through what has widely been heralded as the apex of détente, the May 1972 Moscow Summit. He traces the evolution of confidential-channel diplomacy and examines major flashpoints, including the 1970 crisis over Cienfuegos, Cuba, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), US dealings with China, deescalating tensions in Berlin, and the Vietnam War. Moss argues that while the back channels improved US-Soviet relations in the short term, the Nixon-Kissinger methods provided a poor foundation for lasting policy. Employing newly declassified documents, the complete record of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel -- jointly compiled, translated, annotated, and published by the US State Department and the Russian Foreign Ministry -- as well as the Nixon tapes, Moss reveals the behind-the-scenes deliberations of Nixon, his advisers, and their Soviet counterparts. Although much has been written about détente, this is the first scholarly study that comprehensively assesses the central role of confidential diplomacy in shaping America's foreign policy during this critical era.
CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title 2016 This book examines six summits spanning the beginning and the end of the Cold War. Using declassified documents from U.S., British, and other archives, Chris Tudda shows how the Cold War developed from an ideological struggle between capitalism and communism into a truly global struggle. From Potsdam in 1945, to Malta in 1989, the nuclear superpowers met to determine how to end World War II, manage the arms race, and ultimately, end the Cold War. Meanwhile, the newly independent nations of the "Third World," including the People's Republic of China, became active and respected members of the international community determined to manage their own fates independent of the superpowers. The six summits - Potsdam (1945), Bandung (1955), Glassboro (1967), Beijing (1972), Vienna (1972), and Malta (1989) - are here examined together in a single volume for the first time. An introductory essay provides a historiographical analysis of Cold War summitry, while the conclusion ties the summits together and demonstrates how the history of the Cold War can be understood not only by examining the meetings between the superpowers, but also by analyzing how the developing nations became agents of change and thus affected international relations.
Golda Meir's Foreign Decision-Making Process by Michal Kremer Asaf Pdf
This book focuses on the analysis of Golda Meir’s foreign decision making processes during her tenure as Prime Minister (1970-1973), offering three unique case studies. It exposes the political-diplomatic aspects of foreign policy, using interviews and analysis of hundreds of formerly secret documents from various national archives. Furthermore, it proposes a new, innovative form of analysis, termed the Holistic Combined Spiral Model (HCSM), based on exploring foreign decision making processes through the four leading existing theoretical approaches, namely rational, emotional, bureaucratic and irrational factors. The study explores the fields of leadership, government and foreign decision making through a holistic perspective in two integrated dimensions: first, the decision making process during periods of crisis, such as the Yom Kippur War, and, second, external influences, such as the relationships with the American government and between the superpowers. Furthermore, after revealing and analysing the factors and components of the foreign decision making process, this book appreciates the complexity of these processes, which, during the dynamic and changing times in which we live, world leaders have to master.
When General Alexander M. Haig Jr. returned to the White House on May 3, 1973, he found the Nixon administration in worse shape than he had imagined. President Richard Nixon, reelected in an overwhelming landslide just six months earlier, had accepted the resignations of his top aides--the chief of staff H. R. Haldeman and the domestic policy chief John Ehrlichman--just three days earlier. Haldeman and Ehrlichman had enforced the president's will and protected him from his rivals and his worst instincts for four years. Without them, Nixon stood alone, backed by a staff that lacked gravitas and confidence as the Watergate scandal snowballed. Nixon needed a savior, someone who would lift his fortunes while keeping his White House from blowing apart. He hoped that savior would be his deputy national security adviser, Alexander Haig, whom he appointed chief of staff. But Haig's goal was not to keep Nixon in office--it was to remove him. In Haig's Coup, Ray Locker uses recently declassified documents to tell the true story of how Haig orchestrated Nixon's demise, resignation, and subsequent pardon. A story of intrigues, cover-ups, and treachery, this incisive history shows how Haig engineered the "soft coup" that ended our long national nightmare and brought Watergate to an end.
"Pacy and enthralling." —Financial Times "Tells the story brilliantly." —Senator Joseph I. Lieberman "Stimulating and insightful...will no doubt find a permanent place on the Arab-Israeli bookshelf." —Michael Oren, New York Times bestselling author of Six Days of War October 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, a conflict that shaped the modern Middle East. The War was a trauma for Israel, a dangerous superpower showdown, and, following the oil embargo, a pivotal reordering of the global economic order. The Jewish State came shockingly close to defeat. A panicky cabinet meeting debated the use of nuclear weapons. After the war, Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned in disgrace, and a 9/11-style commission investigated the “debacle.” But, argues Uri Kaufman, from the perspective of a half century, the War can be seen as a pivotal victory for Israel. After nearly being routed, the Israeli Defense Force clawed its way back to threaten Cairo and Damascus. In the war’s aftermath both sides had to accept unwelcome truths: Israel could no longer take military superiority for granted—but the Arabs could no longer hope to wipe Israel off the map. A straight line leads from the battlefields of 1973 to the Camp David Accords of 1978 and all the treaties since. Like Michael Oren’s Six Days of War, this is the definitive account of a critical moment in history.
Détente in Cold War Europe by Elena Calandri,Daniele Caviglia,Antonio Varsori Pdf
The Mediterranean sea has been a key geopolitical territory in the global international relations of the twentieth century; of crucial importance to the US, the Middle East and in the history of the EU. As Cold War documents become declassified and these archives become accessible to western historians, this volume reassesses the secret war waged over three decades for control of the Mediterranean Sea. An 'American lake' in the 1950s, a battlefield for influence in the Cold War of the 1960s, and an increasingly important political arena for the oil-rich Gulf States in the 1970s, the Mediterranean offers a focal point around which the major themes and narratives of Cold War history were constructed. "Detente in Cold War Europe" draws together detailed analyses of the major moments of post-WWII history through the prism of the Mediterranean - including the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the Soviet role in the Yom Kippur war, the Cyprus emergency of 1974, US-Soviet detente and US-Israeli relations under President Nixon. This book is a vital work for historians of the twentieth century and for those seeking to understand the importance of the Mediterranean in the political history of the Cold War.
In US foreign policy, conflict has replaced diplomacy. At home, wars on crime, drugs, immigration, and terrorism dissolve barriers between law enforcement and combat. Tracing the origins of militarized policy to post-Vietnam fears of waning US power, Osamah Khalil argues that it is time to discard forever wars and invest in political solutions.
