Hard Lessons The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Government Printing Office
Page : 480 pages
File Size : 55,9 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : History
ISBN : MINN:30000008510715

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Hard Lessons by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Author : United States. Department of State,Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
Page : 478 pages
File Size : 40,7 Mb
Release : 2009-02
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1780393490

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Hard Lessons by United States. Department of State,Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Presents a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents. The report examines the pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. The report provides thirteen lessons applicable to contingency relief and reconstruction operations, which should create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to these activities.

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 47,6 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : Economic assistance, American
ISBN : 0160808170

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Hard Lessons by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was-or was not-done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the "Surge" in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003.

Author : Stuart W. Bowen
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 508 pages
File Size : 52,8 Mb
Release : 2009-05
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN : 9781437912746

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Hard Lessons: the Iraq Reconstruction Experience by Stuart W. Bowen Pdf

A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.

Author : Stuart Bowen
Publisher : CreateSpace
Page : 486 pages
File Size : 42,7 Mb
Release : 2009-02-02
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1470108119

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Hard Lessons by Stuart Bowen Pdf

Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 through the fall of 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather, it arises from our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report presents a chronological history of the reconstruction program, threading together a number of themes including: * the enormous challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts * the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction strategy * the turbulence engendered by continual personnel turnover at every level * the waste caused by inadequate contracting and program management practices * the poor integration of interagency efforts caused by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort. The text of this report-through vignette, interview, and factual detail-explicates these themes by, in turn, laying out the blinkered and disjointed prewar planning for postwar Iraq; the CPA's large and ultimately too ambitious expansion of the reconstruction program; the security-driven reprogrammings required by the exploding insurgency; the strongly resourced response of the surge; and the rise of Iraq's role in its own reconstruction. Hard Lessons answers some important questions about the U.S. relief and reconstruction program in Iraq: * Did the program meet the goals it set for itself? Was the program grossly burdened by waste and fraud? Why did reconstruction efforts so often fail to meet their mark?The research for Hard Lessons comprised interviews with hundreds of individuals and the review of thousands of documents. SIGIR reached out to virtually every major player in the Iraq reconstruction experience and almost all agreed to be interviewed or provide useful responses. Among others, Secretaries Powell, Rumsfeld, Gates, and Rice; USAID Administrator Natsios and Deputy Administrator Kunder; Deputy Secretaries Wolfowitz, England, Armitage and Negroponte; Under Secretary Feith; Ambassadors Bremer, Khalilzad, Crocker, Jeffrey, Satterfield, Speckhard, Taylor, and Saloom; and Generals Garner, Abizaid, McKiernan, Strock, Eaton, Sanchez, Casey, Petraeus, Odierno, Chiarelli, Dempsey, and McCoy were all interviewed by SIGIR or gave helpful information or advice. We also interviewed Iraqi leaders, including former Prime Ministers Allawi and Ja'afari, Deputy Prime Ministers Chalabi and Salih, Ambassador Sumaida'ie, Judge Radhi, and Minister Baban. Equally important to the study, SIGIR staff interviewed hundreds of military members, government officials, and civilian contractors who carried out the "brick and mortar" work of Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report also draws on the body of SIGIR audits, inspections, and investigations, as well as reports from other investigative bodies.

Author : United States Government US Army
Publisher : CreateSpace
Page : 374 pages
File Size : 52,8 Mb
Release : 2013-03-18
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1482741237

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Hard Lessons: the Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a Report of SIGIR, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction by United States Government US Army Pdf

Since the March 2003 invasion, the Congress appropriated about $50 billion in taxpayer dollars for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. This generous provision funded a continuously evolving rebuilding program that sought, among other things, to restore Iraq's essential services, establish new security forces, create a free-market economy, and put the country on the path to achieving an effective democracy. Some of the initiatives succeeded but others did not. Hard Lessons, the first comprehensive account of the Iraq reconstruction effort, reviews in detail the United States' rebuilding program, shedding light on why certain programs worked while others fell short of goals. Since 2003, the U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $50 billion for the support of relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including the restoration of the country's oil and electricity sectors, the establishment of new security forces, and the strengthening of Iraq's capacity to govern itself. A number of federal agencies-including SIGIR, the U.S. Army Audit Agency, the Inspectors General of the Directorates of Defense, State, and USAID, and the Government Accountability Office-have conducted oversight of and reporting on the expenditure of funds for Iraq relief and reconstruction activities. This extensive body of work is available in studies, reports, audits, inspections, and congressional testimony covering issues that arose during the expenditure of U.S. government funds for or in Iraq. They range from the meticulous analysis of specific projects to broad overviews of entire programs and sectors. Most included recommendations for improving the management of reconstruction efforts now and in the future. In 2008, the Congress established the independent, bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting to study U.S. wartime contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its mandate is to study, assess, and make recommendations concerning contracting for "the reconstruction, logistical support, and performance of security functions" in both theaters from 2003 to the time of the commission's final report in 2010. Its objectives include assessing "the systemic problems identified with interagency wartime contracting," identifying instances of waste, fraud, and abuse and "ensuring accountability for those responsible.

Author : Anonim
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 128 pages
File Size : 48,7 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:1231241171

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Hard Lessons :. by Anonim Pdf

Author : Anne Ellen Henderson
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 20 pages
File Size : 44,6 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Coalition Provisional Authority
ISBN : PURD:32754077956724

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The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq by Anne Ellen Henderson Pdf

Author : Dov S. Zakheim
Publisher : Brookings Institution Press
Page : 353 pages
File Size : 50,7 Mb
Release : 2013-07-10
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780815725466

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A Vulcan's Tale by Dov S. Zakheim Pdf

A firsthand account of how the Bush administration mismanaged its Afghan campaign, A Vulcan's Tale shines new and important light on the events and people behind the headlines in the immediate years following the September 11 attacks. The "Vulcans," so named by Condoleezza Rice, were eight foreign policy experts who advised George W. Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign. After Bush assumed the presidency, the Vulcans helped shape the administration’s foreign policy following 9/11, including the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. All were veterans of past administrations, having served under either Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, and they included among their ranks Dov Zakheim. Made comptroller and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense in 2001, Zakheim was also named the DoD’s coordinator for Afghan civilian reconstruction in 2002. In A Vulcan's Tale, Zakheim draws on his own participation and intimate knowledge to analyze how the United States missed critical opportunities while it struggled to manage two wars, particularly the seemingly endless endeavor in Afghanistan. In his view, the Bush administration's disappointing results in Afghanistan were partly attributable to the enormity of the challenges, certainly. But flawed leadership and deficiencies of management, understanding, and forethought all played their parts as well. The power of the purse proved to be especially damaging. The Office of Management and Budget was slow to fund Defense's efforts at the outset of the Afghan conflict and then inadequately funded the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, casting the die for several additional years of conflict. The invasion of Iraq siphoned off critical resources for Afghanistan, thereby further complicating that country's reconstruction. Even with public policy of the highest order, the devil still lurked in the details, as the DoD's "money man" was soon to discover while he struggled to fund and manage the reconstruction of civilian Afghanistan. A Vulcan's Tale is an authoritative, candid but fair account of how a wise and admirable goal can be waylaid by insufficient funding and ineffective coordination, with the result of faulty—or, at best, incomplete—implementation.

Author : Douglas Lovelace,Aziz Z. Huq
Publisher : Terrorism: Commentary on Secur
Page : 577 pages
File Size : 44,8 Mb
Release : 2010
Category : Law
ISBN : 9780199758197

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Discerning President Obama's National Security Strategy by Douglas Lovelace,Aziz Z. Huq Pdf

Volume 111 of Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents, Discerning President Obama's National Security Strategy, makes available documents from the first fifteen months of the Obama administration that provide insights into its developing national security strategy. Included are documents that include detailed intelligence estimates and strategies as well as documents that outline important lessons regarding stability and reconstruction in Iraq. Additional documents provide valuable insight into the Obama Administration's Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategy. General Editor Douglas Lovelace, an expert in U.S. military matters, elucidates the complexities of military spending and of counter-insurgency tactics.

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 100 pages
File Size : 42,7 Mb
Release : 2024-05-21
Category : Iraq
ISBN : STANFORD:36105222536943

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Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 48,7 Mb
Release : 2007
Category : Humanitarian assistance, American
ISBN : OCLC:712654431

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Iraq Reconstruction by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Author : United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 240 pages
File Size : 48,9 Mb
Release : 2011
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : UCSD:31822032520603

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Oversight of Reconstruction Contracts in Afghanistan and the Role of the Special Inspector General by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight Pdf

Author : Z. Laïdi
Publisher : Springer
Page : 338 pages
File Size : 55,9 Mb
Release : 2012-08-16
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781137020871

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Limited Achievements by Z. Laïdi Pdf

Through an analysis of the general principles of Obama's foreign policy, LaIdi shows how Obama has charted a realist course in the Middle East, in Europe, in diplomacy, and in war.

Author : Sam Beer
Publisher : Lulu.com
Page : 352 pages
File Size : 52,7 Mb
Release : 2017-02
Category : History
ISBN : 9781365483264

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The United States' Program for Agriculture in Post-Invasion Iraq by Sam Beer Pdf

In the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States embarked on the massive project of rebuilding and transforming the agricultural sector in that country. This program was as controversial as the invasion itself, being variously portrayed as the hands-on altruism of Farm Belt army reservists or the neocolonial subjugation of Iraqi farmers to American corporations. Agricultural "development" in Iraq (and simultaneously, in Afghanistan) was conducted differently than previous such projects-largely by contractors rather than USAID employees, and in close coordination with the occupying military forces. While a popular opinion has emerged against the invasion itself, there has been little retrospective discussion about the goals or methods of agricultural aid in Iraq. With close examination of the changes enacted, this book sets out to foster that discussion.