Optimal Prudential Regulation Of Banks And The Political Economy Of Supervision
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Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision by Mr. Thierry Tressel,Thierry Verdier Pdf
We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles.
Author : Vincent P. Polizatto Publisher : World Bank Publications Page : 37 pages File Size : 41,9 Mb Release : 1990 Category : Banking law ISBN : 8210379456XXX
Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision by Vincent P. Polizatto Pdf
To establish an effective program of banking supervision and prudential regulation, the public policy role of bank supervision must be clearly defined and understood and actions taken along several parallel tracks to strengthen the bank supervisory process, the legal framework, accounting and auditing, and the institutions themselves.
Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision by S. Eijffinger,Donato Masciandaro Pdf
ÔThis Handbook is a must read for policy makers and practitioners alike as well as excellent reading for advanced academic courses in international banking.Õ Ð Allard Bruinshoofd, SUERF ÔThis collection of papers is essential reading for anyone interested in central banking, regulation and supervision. Sylvester Eijffinger and Donato Masciandaro have brought together contributions from the leading academics, central bankers and regulators, providing the most up-to-date analysis of this critical subject.Õ Ð Paul Mizen, University of Nottingham, UK This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis. The crisis has raised new questions about the compatibility of monetary and financial stability, which are changing the face of central banking and its relationships with the architecture of financial regulation and supervision. The Handbook explores on both the economics and political economy of the topic, in order to understand how and why reforms of the role of the central banks can be designed and implemented. The general suggestion is that future effectiveness of the central banking architecture will depend on its ability to ensure the consistency between the monetary actions in normal and extraordinary times. Consequently the possible paths in the central bank strategies and tactics, as well as in the classic concepts of independence, accountability and transparency, are analyzed and discussed. With chapters written by outstanding scholars in economics, this lucid Handbook will appeal to academics, policymakers and practitioners, ranging from central bankers and supervisory authorities to financial operators. Among the academics it would be of particular interest to financial and monetary economists (including postgraduate students), but the institutional slant and the central theme of relations between economics, institutional settings and politics will also be invaluable for political scientists.
Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision by Mr.Thierry Tressel,Mr.Thierry Verdier Pdf
We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and there is a need for prudential regulation. We show that the optimal capital ratio depends on the macro-financial cycle, and that, in presence of production externalities, it should be complemented by a constraint on asset allocation. We show that the political process tends to exacerbate excessive risk taking and credit cycles.
Financial Regulation at the Crossroads by Panagiotis Delimatsis,Nils Herger Pdf
This book brings outstanding expertise and provides insightful perspectives from nineteen authors with diverse backgrounds, including officials from international organizations, national regulators, and commercial banking, as well as academics in law, economics, political economy, and finance. The authors not only shed light on the causes of the financial turmoil, but also present thoughtful proposals that contribute to the future policy debate, and discuss opportunities that financial services can offer in funding activities which raise standards of living through initiatives in microfinance, renewable energy, and food distribution. The contributions to this volume tackle several of the thorniest issues of financial regulation in a post-crisis environment, such as: the mechanics of contagion within the financial system and the role of liquidity; moral hazard when large financial institutions are no longer subject to the disciplinary effects of bankruptcy; bank capital requirements; management compensation; design of bank resolution schemes; a function-centric versus institution-centric regulatory approach; subsidization and compatibility of stimulus packages with EU rules on state aid; trade finance and the role of the GATS prudential carve-out; and the role of financial services in promoting human rights or combating climate change.
Financial Stability Policy in the Euro Zone by Gundbert Scherf Pdf
Due to the lack of political salience that financial stability policy enjoys in tranquil economic times, this policy field lends itself particularly well to capture – the more so the more important the role of banks is in the financial system. Gundbert Scherf’s research focuses on this nexus between integrated banking, supranational monetary policy and national banking regulation. He finds that national level differences in financial systems and related institutions explain and drive variation in regulatory financial stability policy across countries.
Since banking systems play a crucial role in maintaining the overall health of the economy, the adverse effects of poorly supervised systems may be quite severe. Without some form of vigilant external oversight, banking systems could fall prey to excessive risk taking, moral hazard, and corruption. Prudential supervision provides that oversight, using government regulation and monitoring to ensure the soundness of the banking system and, by extension, the economy at large. The contributors to this thoughtful volume examine the current state of prudential supervision, focusing on fundamental issues and key pragmatic concerns. Why is prudential supervision so important? What kinds of excess must it guard against? What particular forms does it take? Which of these are the most effective deterrents against mismanagement and system overload in today's rapidly shifting financial climate? The contributors foresee a continued movement beyond simple regulatory rules in banking and toward a more active evaluation and supervision of a bank's risk management practices.
The Prudential Regulation of Banks by Mathias Dewatripont,Jean Tirole Pdf
The Prudential Regulation of Banks applies modern economic theory to prudential regulation of financial intermediaries. Dewatripont and Tirole tackle the key problem of providing the right incentives to management in banks by looking at how external intervention by claimholders (holders of equity or debt) affects managerial incentives and how that intervention might ideally be implemented. Their primary focus is the regulation of commercial banks and S&Ls, but many of the implications of their theory are also valid for other intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension funds, and securities funds. Observing that the main concern of the regulation of intermediaries is solvency (the relation between equity, debt, and asset riskiness), the authors provide institutional background and develop a case for regulation as performing the monitoring functions (screening, auditing, convenant writing, and intervention) that dispersed depositors are unable or unwilling to perform. They also illustrate the dangers of regulatory failure in a summary of the S&L crisis of the 1980s. Following a survey of banking theory, Dewatripont and Tirole develop their model of the capital structure of banks and show how optimal regulation can be achieved using capital adequacy requirements and external intervention when banks are violated. They explain how regulation can be designed to minimize risks of accounting manipulations and to insulate bank managers from macroeconomic shocks, which are beyond their control. Finally, they provide a detailed evaluation of the existing regulation and of potential alternatives, such as rating agencies, private deposit insurance, and large private depositors. They show that these reforms are, at best, a complement, rather than a substitute, to the existing regulation which combines capital ratios with external intervention in case of insolvency. The Prudential Regulation of Banks is part of the Walras Pareto Lectures, from the Universiy of Lausanne.
Bank Regulation and Supervision by James R. Barth,Gerard Caprio,Ross Levine Pdf
This paper uses our new database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to assess the relationship between specific regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. The paper examines: (i) regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce; (ii) regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry; (iii) regulations on capital adequacy; (iv) deposit insurance system design features; (v) supervisory power, independence, and resources, (vi) loan classification stringency, provisioning standards, and diversification guidelines; (vii) regulations fostering information disclosure and private-sector monitoring of banks; and (viii) government ownership. The results, albeit tentative, raise a cautionary flag regarding government policies that rely excessively on direct government supervision and regulation of bank activities. The findings instead suggest that policies that rely on guidelines that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert corporate control work best to promote bank development, performance and stability.
The Political Economy of Local Regulation by Alberto Asquer,Franco Becchis,Daniele Russolillo Pdf
This book offers theoretical and methodological guidelines for researching the complex regulation of local infrastructure, utilities and public services in the context of rapid urbanisation, technological change, and climate change. It examines the interactions between regulators, public officers, infrastructure and utilities firms, public service providers, citizens, and civil society organisations. It contains contributions from academics and practitioners from various disciplinary perspectives and from many regions of the world, illustrated with case studies from several sectors including water, natural gas and electricity distribution, local public transport, district heating, urban waste, and environmental services.
Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises by Jihad Dagher Pdf
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Exploring the Dark Side of FinTech and Implications of Monetary Policy by Ahmed, Sheraz,Addae, John Agyekum,Ofori, Kwame Simpe Pdf
FinTech has revolutionized the way financial services are delivered and consumed in the modern world and the use of central bank digital currencies is gaining traction. With these new advancements, further study is required to ensure they are utilized appropriately and reach their full potential. Exploring the Dark Side of FinTech and Implications of Monetary Policy examines recent advancements in central bank digital currency and many FinTech applications and discusses FinTech trends, possibilities, and challenges as well as different moral, ethical, and social issues. Covering key topics such as digital economy, monetary policy, and sustainability, this reference work is ideal for managers, industry professionals, business owners, entrepreneurs, policymakers, researchers, scholars, practitioners, instructors, and students.
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.,International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department
Author : International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.,International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department Publisher : International Monetary Fund Page : 64 pages File Size : 49,7 Mb Release : 2013-10-06 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : 9781498341714
Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy - Background Paper by International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Dept.,International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department Pdf
The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.
Politically Robust Financial Regulation by Mr.Itai Agur Pdf
The deferred recognition of COVID-induced losses at banks in many countries has reignited the debate on regulatory forbearance. This paper presents a model where the public's own political pressure drives regulatory policy astray, because the public is poorly informed. Using probabilistic game stages, the model parameterizes how time consistent policy is. The interaction between political motivations and time consistency is novel and complex: increased policy credibility can entice the politically-motivated regulator to act in the public's best interest, or instead repel it from doing so. Considering several regulatory instruments, the paper probes the nexus of political pressure, perverse bank incentives and time inconsistent policy.
