Privatization And Corporate Control In The Czech Republic
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Privatization and Corporate Control in the Czech Republic by Clemens Schütte Pdf
The book discusses the role of the most important players in corporate control including the big bank-centred financial groups, capital markets, the board model of Czech corporations and the institutional base of debt control and minority shareholder protection. It also reveals the conflict of political intentions and real-time developments.
The Governance of Privatization Funds by Saul Estrin,Marko Simoneti,Andreja B”hm Pdf
Privatization investment funds are the key feature of mass privatization programmes in transitional economies. This book offers a thorough survey of mass privatization programmes in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, supported with extensive empirical analysis. The study of 'top-down' privatization funds in Poland and 'bottom-up' funds in the Czech Republic and Slovenia offers different solutions to the problem of how to improve the governance of privatization funds.
Privatization, Corporate Governance and the Emergence of Markets by E. Rosenbaum,F. Bönker,H. Wagener Pdf
The volume focuses on privatisation in transition countries, addressing issues ranging from corporate governance to the relationship between privatisation and the emergence of markets, from a multi-disciplinary perspective. The contributors investigate both the theoretical groundwork of privatisation and enterprise restructuring as well as recent empirical evidence. The contributions show that changes in ownership titles are but one part of the story, being closely interwoven as they are with the transformation of corporate governance, enterprise restructuring, network transformation and the emergence of markets.
The mass privatization scheme put information about enterprise values in the public domain by allowing increasingly informed bidders to interact. This quickly differentiated enterprises with favorable prospects from those with unfavorable prospects. The design of the program served the objectives of speed and equity more than those of corporate governance.
Ownership and Corporate Governance by Stijn Claessens,Simeon Djankov,Gerhard Pohl Pdf
The Czech Republic's mass-privatization scheme improved the management of privatized firms by concentrating ownership. And contrary to expectations, banks with an (indirect) equity stake in a privatized firm have a positive influence on the firm's corporate governance. The Czech Republic's mass-privatization scheme changed the governance of many firms in a short time. Claessens, Djankov, and Pohl show that mass privatization was effective in improving firm management because of the concentrated ownership structure that resulted. For a cross section of 706 firms for the period 1992-95, they find that the more concentrated the firm's ownership, the higher the firm's market valuation and profitability. Large ownership through bank-sponsored investment funds and strategic investors appears to be particularly important in improving corporate governance and turning firms around. They find no evidence that market valuation or profitability were lower for firms in which investment funds sponsored by a firm's main bank represented a large ownership stake. It is often argued that the firm's main bank having (indirect) ownership control could represent a conflict of interest. The empirical analysis here shows, quite the contrary, that such indirect ownership control has a significant positive influence. On balance, banks that had an (indirect) equity stake in a firm have a positive influence on the firm's corporate governance. This paper - a joint product of the Office of the Regional Vice President, East Asia and Pacific, and the Finance and Private Sector Development Division Division, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa Technical Department - was presented at the International Symposium on Capital Markets and Enterprise Reform in Beijing, November 8-9, 1996.
Private Ownership and Corporate Performance by Anonim Pdf
The assumption behind privatisation in eastern Europe and elsewhere is that private ownership improves corporate performance. We focus on comparing the performance of state firms with either private or privatised firms operating under reasonably similar conditions in three countries of eastern Europe. We supplement this comparison by an examination of the relative performance of privatised and state firms in the period before the former were privatised. Our empirical results confirm the hypothesis that the effect of ownership change is particularly pronounced on the revenue side of corporate performance. In general, we find that firms with outsider owners significantly outperform the firms with insider owners on most performance measures, and that the employees are particularly ineffective owners (indeed less effective than the state). Subscribe to publications email alerts.
The Politics of Greed by Andrew Harrison Schwartz Pdf
With the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, it seemed that market capitalism had triumphed and that democracy might replace authoritarian regimes. Economic reformers in the former Eastern Bloc rushed to liberalize prices and transfer state assets to private hands. They assumed that private owners in a market setting would have no choice but to behave rationally—that is, to invest in restructuring privatized enterprises so as to maximize profits. They also assumed that these owners would perceive a stable institutional environment as conducive to economic success and thus become a powerful lobby in favor of the rule of law, paving the way for democracy. The post-communist reality turned out to be very different. Private owners found that in a weak state with limited laws and regulations and ineffective corporate governance structures, it was more lucrative to steal enterprise assets and exploit opportunities for arbitrage than to restructure enterprises. The lesson learned is that not all forms of private ownership are the same. As this book's in-depth political history of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates, the way that assets are privatized matters, both with respect to national economic performance and the successful development of the rule of law. Andrew Harrison Schwartz had unprecedented access to high-level Czech government officials during the Czech Republic's privatization process. This book is the result of the unique insights he gained and the innovative analytical framework he subsequently developed—ownership regime theory—which for the first time places ownership structures at the center of political transition analysis. Engaging and important, The Politics of Greed applies ownership regime theory to a broad range of post-communist privatization cases, including those of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine.
Secondary Privatization in Transition Economies by Iraj Hoshi,Richard Woodward Pdf
Privatization was the fundamental pillar of transition from plan to market in former socialist countries. But little is known about the fate of companies that were privatized in large scale privatization schemes such as mass privatization or management-employee buyouts. This is the first original study aiming to fill this gap. It assesses wholesale privatization schemes in three leading transition countries - the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia - in terms of the evolving concentration of ownership and relations to firm performance.
Privatization and Corporate Governance by I. J. Alexander Dyck Pdf
This paper surveys the issues and devises an analytical framework for policy makers and policy advisors concerned with strengthening corporate governance structures in privatization. The analytical framework highlights the explicit and implicit protections that support effective governance. Data from international studies provide governance benchmarks against which the approach of privatization programs in developed, developing and transition economies can be compared. The evidence suggests that where privatization has been viewed as a success, policy makers have, for the most part, followed international governance benchmarks. Weak performance, in contrast, has been accompanied by insufficient attention to governance concerns in the initial privatization design. The paper identifies rationales for these initial deviations and explores miscalculations associated with these rationales. The paper ends with some tentative policy implications about privatization design and ways to address governance difficulties after privatization.
Privatisation and Structural Change in Transition Economies by Yelena Kalyuzhnova,Wladimir Andreff Pdf
Privatisation and Structural Change in Transition Economies brings together specialists from different areas (governance, regulation, macro-econometrics, micro-econometrics, enterprise culture, foreign direct investment, technology transfer) to focus on the many different aspects of the privatization process in transition economies. The book does not dwell on the administrative or procedural aspects of privatisation. Instead it attempts to understand the bigger picture in terms of underlying policy environment and supporting legal and economic measures which helped to a large extent to determine the eventual success or failure of privatization programmes.
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices by Stijn Claessens Pdf
February 1995 More concentrated ownership is generally expected to improve corporate governance. Evidence from Czechoslovakia's mass privatization program supports this hypothesis. Equity prices in the Czech and Slovak Republics are higher when a domestic or foreign investor has majority firm ownership, and lower when ownership is shared among many investors. The 1992 Czechoslovakia mass privatization program involving about 1,500 enterprises and implemented through a voucher scheme with competitive bidding was a bold step in changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy. It represents a clear test case of one approach, and other countries may benefit from its lessons. At the time, much skepticism was voiced about mass privatization: it would lead to diffuse ownership, and no effective corporate governance would result. But innovative forces led to the emergence of investment funds that collected much of the individuals' voucher points, leading to a much more concentrated ownership structure. It has been expected that this concentrated ownership would lead to improved corporate governance. But the jury is still out. So far, only limited and largely anecdotal evidence is available on the impact investment funds have on the way firms are being managed. Too little time has passed and too many shocks have occurred (for example, the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics) to expect to find discernible changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance. An alternative approach is to investigate whether firms that ended up with more concentrated ownership -- and possibly improved governance -- sell for higher prices, either in the last voucher round or in the secondary market since then. In a forward-looking financial market, one can expect prices to incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance and associated dividends to shareholders. Put differently, one would expect that two firms with different shareholding structures, but otherwise identical, would trade at different prices -- with the firm with a more concentrated ownership, and presumably better corporate governance, trading at a higher price. On a cross-sectional basis, ownership structure may thus be significant in explaining (relative) share prices. Claessens explores this line of reasoning. Controlling for a number of firm and sector-specific variables, he finds that: * Majority ownership by a domestic or foreign investor has a positive influence on firm prices. * Firms with many small owners have lower prices. * Ownership by many small-scale investors makes it easier for any single investor to establish effective control, but such control does not necessarily translate into higher prices. Claessens provides two possible explanations of why higher prices appear to be associated only with majority ownership by a single investor: * The corporate legal framework and the difficulty in collecting proxy votes in the Czech and Slovak Republics may prevent a small investor from making the necessary changes in the way firms are managed, thus keeping prices low. * Commercial banks are both managers of investment funds and creditors of individual firms. Funds managers may face conflicts of interest and not be interested in increasing the value of equity alone but also the value of credits. This could explain why prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment funds have effective control. This paper -- a product of the Private Sector and Finance Team, Technical Department, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa Regions -- is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study corporate governance in transition economies.
