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"When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German Army annihilated a substantial part of the Red Army. Yet the Soviets rebounded to successfully defend Moscow in late 1941, defeat the Germans at Stalingrad in 1942 and Kursk in 1943, and deliver the deathblow in Belarus in 1944 ... Walter Dunn examines these four pivotal battles and explains how the Red Army lost a third of its prewar strength, regrouped, and beat one of the most highly trained and experienced armies in the world"--Page 4 of cover.
Author : Walter S. Dunn Jr. Publisher : Stackpole Books Page : 200 pages File Size : 50,5 Mb Release : 2007-10-17 Category : History ISBN : 9781461751748
Stalin's Keys to Victory by Walter S. Dunn Jr. Pdf
An important reevaluation of World War II on the Eastern Front Detailed look at how the Soviet Union created more new divisions in a few months than the U.S. did during the entire war More than 60 tables list losses, tank and weapon production, and unit formation, with special emphasis on rifle and tank divisions and brigades When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German Army quickly annihilated a major portion of the Red Army. Yet the Red Army rebounded to successfully defend Moscow in late 1941, defeat the Germans at Stalingrad in 1942 and Kursk in 1943, and deliver the deathblow in Belarus in 1944. Dunn examines these 4 battles while explaining how the Soviets lost a third of their prewar army yet returned to beat one of the most highly trained and experienced armies the world has ever seen.
This book documents dictator Joseph Stalin's brilliant tactics as well as missteps in taking preemptive actions that guaranteed ultimate victory over the German invaders. It also covers the policies implemented after the war that made the Soviet Union a menace to world peace and led to collapse of Soviet rule. A detailed reexamination of historical facts indicates that Stalin could deserve to be regarded as a "great leader." Yet Stalin clearly failed as his nation's leader in a post-World War II milieu, where he delivered the Cold War instead of rapid progress and global cooperation. It is the proof of both Stalin's brilliance and blunders that makes him such a fascinating figure in modern history. Today, most of the Russian population acknowledges that Stalin achieved "greatness." The Soviet dictator's honored place in history is largely due to Stalin successfully attending to the Soviet Union's defense needs in the 1930s and 1940s, and leading the USSR to victory in the war on the Eastern Front against Nazi Germany and its allies. This book provides an overdue critical investigation of how the Soviet leader's domestic and foreign policies actually helped produce this victory, and above all, how Stalin's timely support of a wartime alliance with the Western capitalist democracies assured the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945.
In October 1941 Hitler launched Operation Typhoon the German drive to capture Moscow and knock the Soviet Union out of the war. As the last chance to escape the dire implications of a winter campaign, Hitler directed seventy-five German divisions, almost two million men and three of Germany's four panzer groups into the offensive, resulting in huge victories at Viaz'ma and Briansk - among the biggest battles of the Second World War. David Stahel's groundbreaking new account of Operation Typhoon captures the perspectives of both the German high command and individual soldiers, revealing that despite success on the battlefield the wider German war effort was in far greater trouble than is often acknowledged. Germany's hopes of final victory depended on the success of the October offensive but the autumn conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Red Army ensured that the capture of Moscow was anything but certain.
"History has tended to measure war's winners and losers in terms of its major engagements, battles in which the result was so clear-cut that they could be considered "decisive." Cannae, Konigsberg, Austerlitz, Midway, Agincourt-all resonate in the literature of war and in our imaginations as tide-turning. But these legendary battles may or may not have determined the final outcome of the wars in which they were fought. Nor has the "genius" of the so-called Great Captains--from Alexander the Great to Frederick the Great and Napoleon--played a major role. Wars are decided in other ways. Cathal J. Nolan's The Allure of Battle systematically and engrossingly examines the great battles, tracing what he calls "short-war thinking," the hope that victory might be swift and wars brief. As he proves persuasively, however, such has almost never been the case. Even the major engagements have mainly contributed to victory or defeat by accelerating the erosion of the other side's defences. Massive conflicts, the so-called "people's wars," beginning with Napoleon and continuing until 1945, have consisted of and been determined by prolonged stalemate and attrition, industrial wars in which the determining factor has been not military but mataeriel. Nolan's masterful book places battles squarely and mercilessly within the context of the wider conflict in which they took place. In the process it help corrects a distorted view of battle's role in war, replacing popular images of the "battles of annihilation" with somber appreciation of the commitments and human sacrifices made throughout centuries of war particularly among the Great Powers. Accessible, provocative, exhaustive, and illuminating, The Allure of Battle will spark fresh debate about the history and conduct of warfare."--Provided by publisher.
Purity and Compromise in the Soviet Party-State by Daniel Stotland Pdf
This work offers new ways of conceptualizing the decision-making paradigm of the Soviet party-state that was defined by the persistent shortage of qualified manpower that afflicted the Russian elite. The traditional Russian problems of under administration, combined with the unique features of the Soviet political system, resulted in a dichotomy between practical and ideological demands. The WWII era, examined in this book, provides a microcosm of pressures facing the Kremlin and illustrates the cyclical nature of policy formation forced on it by the paradoxes of the system. As the party’s responsibilities expanded into specialized economic and military areas, political experts increasingly depended on the specialized professionals. These trends grew increased drastically during the war. An unexpected consequence of the party’s expansion into economic or military professions was the discovery that cooptation worked both ways and many party members become managers rather than ideological overseers. Throughout the existential crisis of the system—the war and its aftermath—the party would find itself in a fundamental conflict over its identity, challenged over its role both vis-a-vis the state and its own priorities. After an abortive attempt to reverse the wartime trends, a new paradigm was articulated by the party during the last five years of Stalin's reign. This resulted in the emergence of a new elite consensus which envisioned the party as integral and invasive economic actor. This shift in the party’s identity was the price of maintaining centralized political power and came at the expense of the focus on ideological purity. In the long term, however, the diminished role of ideology robbed the party of its core value system and steadily eroded its legitimizing and self-energizing power. Over time, the new consensus would undermine the very foundations of the party-state construct. Yet if the USSR was to survive as a modern, industrialized state, the accommodation with the technocrats was necessary. The contradiction between ideological and pragmatic aims was inherent to the system, and demanded an eventual choice between the long-term health of the state and that of the party.
A gripping and authoritative revisionist account of the German Winter Campaign of 1941–1942 Germany’s winter campaign of 1941–1942 is commonly seen as its first defeat. In Retreat from Moscow, a bold, gripping account of one of the seminal moments of World War II, David Stahel argues that instead it was its first strategic success in the East. The Soviet counteroffensive was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. Despite being pushed back from Moscow, the Wehrmacht lost far fewer men, frustrated its enemy’s strategy, and emerged in the spring unbroken and poised to recapture the initiative. Hitler’s strategic plan called for holding important Russian industrial cities, and the German army succeeded. The Soviets as of January 1942 aimed for nothing less than the destruction of Army Group Center, yet not a single German unit was ever destroyed. Lacking the professionalism, training, and experience of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army’s offensive attempting to break German lines in countless head-on assaults led to far more tactical defeats than victories. Using accounts from journals, memoirs, and wartime correspondence, Stahel takes us directly into the Wolf’s Lair to reveal a German command at war with itself as generals on the ground fought to maintain order and save their troops in the face of Hitler’s capricious, increasingly irrational directives. Excerpts from soldiers’ diaries and letters home paint a rich portrait of life and death on the front, where the men of the Ostheer battled frostbite nearly as deadly as Soviet artillery. With this latest installment of his pathbreaking series on the Eastern Front, David Stahel completes a military history of the highest order.
Myths of the Cold War: Amending Historiographic Distortions provides a corrective for the distortions and omissions of many previous domestic and foreign (including Russian) studies of the Cold War, especially those published since 2000. The “present interest” motivation in Weeks's analysis is gaining a clear understanding of the bi-polar, $4 trillion, nuclear-war-threatening standoff that lasted over 40 years after World War II until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Without such knowledge and understanding of this dangerous conflict, any future encounter of the cold-war type with another nation-state is liable to be construed in confusing ways just as the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was. The consequence of such misunderstanding in the historiographic sense as well as in policy-making at the highest level is that the populations of the contending powers will have distorted conceptions of the reasons for the confrontation. The result of this, in turn, is skewed tendentiousness that masks concrete, underlying causes of intense inter-state contention. Practical benefits thus flow from an unprejudiced analysis of the past Cold War with Communist Russia. This understanding can help prevent a future conflict, such as one with Communist China, which some reputed sinologists are currently predicting, as well as one with post-Soviet Russia. Conversely, if a new cold war is imposed on the West, a clearer understanding of the post-World War II archetypical Cold War will be edifying.
The War Against the Working Class by Will Podmore Pdf
This book traces the history of revolutions and counterrevolutions since 1917, in Russia, Korea, Vietnam, China, the countries of Eastern Europe, and Cuba. I present the evidence of their achievements and describe the wars they were forced to fight in self-defence. We can learn from the efforts and the errors of the pioneers, even though their conditions of being pre-industrial and dependent societies were very different from Britain’s today. The hope is that this book will provoke thought about the future of our nation in order to help us to decide what we need to do, not to copy but to create.
Authoritative study of the battleship in World War II. Stirring episodes of naval combat. Covers the famous chase after the Bismarck, the sinking of the Scharnhorst, the coastal bombardments on D-Day, and other actions.
The First Day on the Eastern Front by Craig W. H. Luther Pdf
Sunday, June 22, 1941: three million German soldiers invaded the Soviet Union as part of Hitler’s long-planned Operation Barbarossa, which aimed to destroy the Soviet Union, secure its land as lebensraum for the Third Reich, and enslave its Slavic population. From launching points in newly acquired Poland, in three prongs—North, Central, South—German forces stormed western Russia, virtually from the Baltic to the Black Sea. By late fall, the invasion had foundered against Russian weather, terrain, and resistance, and by December, it had failed at the gates of Moscow, but early on, as the Germans sliced through Russian territory and soldiers with impunity, capturing hundreds of thousands, it seemed as though Russia would fall. In the spirit of Martin Middlebrook’s classic First Day on the Somme, Craig Luther narrates the events of June 22, 1941, a day when German military might was at its peak and seemed as though it would easily conquer the Soviet Union, a day the common soldiers would remember for its tension and the frogs bellowing in the Polish marshlands. It was a day when the German blitzkrieg decimated Soviet command and control within hours and seemed like nothing would stop it from taking Moscow. Luther narrates June 22—one of the pivotal days of World War II—from high command down to the tanks and soldiers at the sharp end, covering strategy as well as tactics and the vivid personal stories of the men who crossed the border into the Soviet Union that fateful day, which is the Eastern Front in microcosm, representing the years of industrial-scale warfare that followed and the unremitting hostility of Germans and Soviets.
