The Reconstruction Of Iraq After 2003

Author : Hideki Matsunaga
Publisher : World Bank Publications
Page : 134 pages
File Size : 44,8 Mb
Release : 2019-05-20
Category : Social Science
ISBN : 9781464813917

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The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 by Hideki Matsunaga Pdf

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq’s reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014—that is, after the United States†“led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq’s reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors—specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom—as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Government Printing Office
Page : 480 pages
File Size : 47,5 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : History
ISBN : MINN:30000008510715

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Hard Lessons by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Author : Hideki Matsunaga
Publisher : Mena Development Report
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 47,5 Mb
Release : 2019
Category : Social Science
ISBN : 1464813906

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The Reconstruction of Iraq After 2003 by Hideki Matsunaga Pdf

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq's reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014--that is, after the United States+"led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq's reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors--specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom--as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

Author : Mokhtar Lamani,Bessma Momani
Publisher : Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press
Page : 298 pages
File Size : 49,9 Mb
Release : 2010-10-26
Category : History
ISBN : 9781554587254

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From Desolation to Reconstruction by Mokhtar Lamani,Bessma Momani Pdf

Iraq’s streets are unsafe, its people tormented, and its identity as a state challenged from within and without. For some, Iraq is synonymous with internal hatred, bloodshed, and sectarianism. The contributors to this book, however, know another Iraq: a country that was once full of hope and achievement and that boasted one of the most educated workforces in its region—a cosmopolitan secular society with a great tradition of artisans, poets, and intellectuals. The memory of that Iraq inspired the editors of this volume to explore Iraq’s current struggle. The contributors delve into the issues and concerns of building a viable Iraqi state and recognize the challenges in bringing domestic reconciliation and normalcy to Iraqis. From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq’s Troubled Journey examines Iraq’s reality after the 2003 US-led invasion. It begins by relating Iraq’s modern social and political history prior to the invasion and then outlines the significant challenges of democratization and the creation of an Iraqi constitution, which will be necessary for Iraq to become a strong and effective state. Co-published with the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI).

Author : Stuart Bowen
Publisher : CreateSpace
Page : 486 pages
File Size : 48,5 Mb
Release : 2009-02-02
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 1470108119

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Hard Lessons by Stuart Bowen Pdf

Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 through the fall of 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather, it arises from our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report presents a chronological history of the reconstruction program, threading together a number of themes including: * the enormous challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts * the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction strategy * the turbulence engendered by continual personnel turnover at every level * the waste caused by inadequate contracting and program management practices * the poor integration of interagency efforts caused by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort. The text of this report-through vignette, interview, and factual detail-explicates these themes by, in turn, laying out the blinkered and disjointed prewar planning for postwar Iraq; the CPA's large and ultimately too ambitious expansion of the reconstruction program; the security-driven reprogrammings required by the exploding insurgency; the strongly resourced response of the surge; and the rise of Iraq's role in its own reconstruction. Hard Lessons answers some important questions about the U.S. relief and reconstruction program in Iraq: * Did the program meet the goals it set for itself? Was the program grossly burdened by waste and fraud? Why did reconstruction efforts so often fail to meet their mark?The research for Hard Lessons comprised interviews with hundreds of individuals and the review of thousands of documents. SIGIR reached out to virtually every major player in the Iraq reconstruction experience and almost all agreed to be interviewed or provide useful responses. Among others, Secretaries Powell, Rumsfeld, Gates, and Rice; USAID Administrator Natsios and Deputy Administrator Kunder; Deputy Secretaries Wolfowitz, England, Armitage and Negroponte; Under Secretary Feith; Ambassadors Bremer, Khalilzad, Crocker, Jeffrey, Satterfield, Speckhard, Taylor, and Saloom; and Generals Garner, Abizaid, McKiernan, Strock, Eaton, Sanchez, Casey, Petraeus, Odierno, Chiarelli, Dempsey, and McCoy were all interviewed by SIGIR or gave helpful information or advice. We also interviewed Iraqi leaders, including former Prime Ministers Allawi and Ja'afari, Deputy Prime Ministers Chalabi and Salih, Ambassador Sumaida'ie, Judge Radhi, and Minister Baban. Equally important to the study, SIGIR staff interviewed hundreds of military members, government officials, and civilian contractors who carried out the "brick and mortar" work of Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report also draws on the body of SIGIR audits, inspections, and investigations, as well as reports from other investigative bodies.

Author : Mokhtar Lamani
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 128 pages
File Size : 53,5 Mb
Release : 2010
Category : Iraq
ISBN : OCLC:1058004201

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From Desolation to Reconstruction by Mokhtar Lamani Pdf

Annotation. 'From Desolation to Reconstruction' examines Iraq's reality after the 2003 US-led invasion. It relates Iraq's modern social & political history prior to the invasion & then outlines the challenges of democratization & the creation of an Iraqi constitution, necessary for Iraq to become a strong & effective state.

Author : Nora Bensahel
Publisher : Rand Corporation
Page : 313 pages
File Size : 50,8 Mb
Release : 2008
Category : History
ISBN : 9780833044587

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After Saddam by Nora Bensahel Pdf

This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.

Author : United States. Department of State,Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
Page : 478 pages
File Size : 41,8 Mb
Release : 2009-02
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 1780393490

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Hard Lessons by United States. Department of State,Inspector General Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Presents a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents. The report examines the pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. The report provides thirteen lessons applicable to contingency relief and reconstruction operations, which should create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to these activities.

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 51,9 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : Economic assistance, American
ISBN : 0160808170

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Hard Lessons by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was-or was not-done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the "Surge" in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003.

Author : Gordon W. Rudd
Publisher : University Press of Kansas
Page : 478 pages
File Size : 50,9 Mb
Release : 2011-05-30
Category : History
ISBN : 9780700617791

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Reconstructing Iraq by Gordon W. Rudd Pdf

When President George W. Bush stood on the decks of the U.S.S. Lincoln in May 2003 and announced the victorious end to major combat operations in Iraq, he did so in front of a huge banner that proclaimed "Mission Accomplished." American forces had successfully removed the regime of Saddam Hussein with "rapid decisive operations"-and yet the United States was unprepared to effectively replace that regime. Gordon Rudd's excellent history reveals why in stark detail. Between the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that May, the Allied forces struggled to plug the governance gap created by the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. Plugging that gap became the job of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Cobbled together with staff from diverse federal agencies and military branches, ORHA was led by Jay Garner, a key figure in assisting Kurdish refugees following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Garner and ORHA were given mere weeks to stabilize a nation that had come completely apart at the seams. Iraq's infrastructure was in such a shambles-thanks to years of poor maintenance, international sanctions, and massive looting-that the mission was doomed to fail from the start. Rudd, field historian for ORHA and CPA, offers a critical look at this impossible effort. He shows that, while military planning for the invasion of Iraq had been conducted for over a decade, planning for regime replacement was haphazard at best. The result was an unnecessarily large loss of lives, treasure, time, and American prestige, despite the inspired efforts of Garner and his staff. Based on nearly 300 interviews and time on the ground in Iraq, Rudd's account also provides an unsettling look at the awkward transition from ORHA to CPA, revealing how Ambassador Paul Bremer managed to make things even worse. Garner here emerges as both heroic and tragic, a charismatic leader of great enthusiasm who took on a task of grand proportions but was poorly served by those who chose him for the mission. As Rudd makes clear, the key lesson of this experience is that regime removal solves nothing without effective regime replacement. That lesson, learned the hard way, serves as a cautionary tale for our engagement in future foreign conflicts.

Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 23 pages
File Size : 43,7 Mb
Release : 2006
Category : Iraq War, 2003-2011
ISBN : OCLC:236188394

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Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government by United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Pdf

Author : Anonim
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 44 pages
File Size : 40,7 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Electronic
ISBN : 9781428916432

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Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War by Anonim Pdf

David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration's conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers -- criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups -- were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. The authors draw attention to a variety of lessons, including the danger that the imperatives of "force protection" may sacrifice the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.

Author : Conrad C. Crane
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 88 pages
File Size : 54,8 Mb
Release : 2003
Category : Democratization
ISBN : IND:30000139803153

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Reconstructing Iraq by Conrad C. Crane Pdf

Author : Christopher Kinsey
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 194 pages
File Size : 41,5 Mb
Release : 2009-09-10
Category : History
ISBN : 9781135220174

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Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq by Christopher Kinsey Pdf

Private Contractors and the Reconstruction of Iraq examines the controversial role of military contractors in the reconstruction of Iraq. When 'Operation Iraqi Freedom' was launched in March 2003, few, if any, of the Coalition's political leaders could have envisaged that within a few months the number of private contractors engaged to keep the troops supplied would exceed their actual combat strength. This alternative 'army' was not only to become the largest assemblage of contractors in living memory to accompany a military force into a war zone, but was also responsible for a fundamental transformation of how military logistics were delivered. This book explains how and why the US and UK governments became so dependent upon military contractors during the war in Iraq. It also examines the ramifications this new dependency will have on future military operations, as the conflict in Iraq has shown that private contractors are now indispensable to the attainment of both the military and political objectives of war. Finally, the book discusses what advantages and disadvantages these companies have brought to the reconstruction of Iraq, and what lessons need to be learned from this experience. This book will be of great interest to students of military and strategic studies, Middle Eastern politics and international security, and as well as policymakers and military professionals. Christopher Kinsey is a lecturer in international security at King's College London, Defence Studies Department, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. His previous publications include Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies (Routledge: 2006)

Author : James D. Savage
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Page : 305 pages
File Size : 48,6 Mb
Release : 2013
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9781107039476

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Reconstructing Iraq's Budgetary Institutions by James D. Savage Pdf

Consistent with the literature on state building, failed states, peacekeeping and foreign assistance, this book argues that budgeting is a core state activity necessary for the operation of a functional government. Employing a historical institutionalist approach, this book first explores the Ottoman, British and Ba'athist origins of Iraq's budgetary institutions. The book next examines American pre-war planning, the Coalition Provisional Authority's rule-making and budgeting following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the mixed success of the Coalition's capacity-building programs initiated throughout the occupation. This book sheds light on the problem of 'outsiders' building states, contributes to a more comprehensive evaluation of the Coalition in Iraq, addresses the question of why Iraqis took ownership of some Coalition-generated institutions, and helps explain the nature of institutional change.