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Alternative Theories of Competition by Jamee K. Moudud,Cyrus Bina,Patrick L. Mason Pdf
This book takes a radically different approach to the analysis of competition by rejecting the perfect vs. imperfect competition dichotomy and draws on the insights of classical political economists such as Marx, Schumpeter, Hayek and Andrews.
A General Theory of Competition by Shelby D. Hunt Pdf
Hunt convincingly demonstrates that competition is not about dividing up limited resources but about creating more resources and thus competition is pro-society. This truly interdisciplinary book successfully develops a general theory of competition which is rich in explanatory breadth and depth. Consequently, executives and entrepreneuers, management consultants, public makers, and scholars and students in economics, law, political science, and business should read and study this book. —Robert F. Lusch, University of Oklahoma This book develops a new theory of competition. This theory – labeled "resource-advantage theory" – stems from no single research tradition, but draws on several different traditions in economics, management, marketing, and sociology. In this ground-breaking volume, Shelby Hunt articulates R-A theory, uses the theory to explain and predict economic phenomena, and shows how (and why) it explains and predicts such phenomena.
Media Competition and Coexistence by John W. Dimmick Pdf
This volume considers how media firms, as well as entire industries, exist and persist over time despite what often seems to be intense competition for such resources as audiences and advertisers. Addressing competition within and among media organizations and industries, including broadcasting, cable, and the Internet, author John W. Dimmick studies the media industries through the niche theory lens, developed by bioecologists to explain competition and coexistence. He examines the targets of the different media--audience, advertisers, money--and how they compete, using examples from a variety of studies. Each chapter incorporates relevant economic constructs into the analytic framework. This approach includes the use of economics of scale to explain selection and firm mortality in newspapers and movie theaters; the application of the transaction costs concept to explicate the rise of advertising agencies; the employment of the strategic group concept in analyzing the niche breadth strategy; and the measurement of gratifications-utilities. A comprehensive overview of the determinants of media competition and coexistence, Media Competition and Coexistence: The Theory of the Niche offers unique insights for scholars, students, researchers, and practitioners in media economics, management, and business.
Theories of Imperfectly Competitive Markets by Luis C. Corchon Pdf
This book presents the theory of Industrial Organization in a unified and concise way. It presents the main models and results in the area, using game theory as a unifying theoretical background. Besides corrections and new sections, the new edition contains a new chapter on games of incomplete information. More than 200 excercises help the reader to understand the results of the book.
Author : Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Publisher : MIT Press Page : 145 pages File Size : 42,8 Mb Release : 2017-11-16 Category : Business & Economics ISBN : 9780262036931
The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy by Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. Pdf
A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
A Unified Theory of Party Competition by James F. Adams,Samuel Merrill III,Bernard Grofman Pdf
This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.
Competition and Growth by Philippe Aghion,Rachel Griffith Pdf
Though competition occupies a prominent place in the history of economic thought, among economists today there is still a limited, and sometimes contradictory, understanding of its impact. In Competition and Growth, Philippe Aghion and Rachel Griffith offer the first serious attempt to provide a unified and coherent account of the effect competition policy and deregulated entry has on economic growth. The book takes the form of a dialogue between an applied theorist calling on "Schumpeterian growth" models and a microeconometrician employing new techniques to gauge competition and entry. In each chapter, theoretical models are systematically confronted with empirical data, which either invalidates the models or suggests changes in the modeling strategy. Aghion and Griffith note a fundamental divorce between theorists and empiricists who previously worked on these questions. On one hand, existing models in industrial organization or new growth economics all predict a negative effect of competition on innovation and growth: namely, that competition is bad for growth because it reduces the monopoly rents that reward successful innovators. On the other hand, common wisdom and recent empirical studies point to a positive effect of competition on productivity growth. To reconcile theory and evidence, the authors distinguish between pre- and post-innovation rents, and propose that innovation may be a way to escape competition, an idea that they confront with microeconomic data. The book's detailed analysis should aid scholars and policy makers in understanding how the benefits of tougher competition can be achieved while at the same time mitigating the negative effects competition and imitation may have on some sectors or industries.
Political Competition by John E ROEMER,John E Roemer Pdf
John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties and he models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional.
Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory by Lester G Telser Pdf
This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools.Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is ""the theory of the core of the market,"" and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality.Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.
Concerned primarily with oligopoly, this work includes a general study of pricing in three different markets--perfect competition, perfect monopoly, and imperfect competition. The solutions of these markets offered by Cournot, Smithies, Chamberlin, Stackelberg, Fellner, and Robinson are presented mathematically, followed by the author's own version of the theory of rational pricing in oligopoly. Previous authors have not allowed for all the variables arising from profit and price situations in the market. Here, more realistic assumptions and more complex analyses indicate that sellers in oligopoly situations do not always need to arrange specific agreements--hence, that "administered" pricing does not inevitably occur when the market is dominated by a few producers.
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition by Edward Chamberlin Pdf
Chamberlain's classic work, now in its eighth edition, continues to influence the fundamental thinking of economists and businessmen, and for the best of reasons: It is a basic treatise in theory which, unlike traditional theories of "perfect competition," deals with the economic world we live in, including both price and nonprice competition, oligopoly, various degrees of monopoly, "differentiated" products, advertising, etc. Its influence has spread extensively as well as intensively--to new theoretical problems, such as economic dynamics and development, and to the analysis of an increasingly wide range of the so-called "applied" fields. In this eighth edition of The Theory of Monopolistic Competition Professor Chamberlain has added three new appendices: The Definition of Selling Costs; Numbers and Elasticities; and The Origin and Early Development of Monopolistic Competition Theory. The index has been extensively revised and expanded. In successive earlier editions the author compiled a bibliography of 1497 items. He also added a new treatment of the cost curve of the firm, discussing in particular some current misconceptions as to the role of the laws of proportions and of the divisibility of factors in relation to economics and diseconomies of scale, and advancing a broader theory which assigns to both proportions and scale their proper roles.