Companions In Guilt Arguments In Metaethics

Author : Christopher Cowie,Rach Cosker-Rowland
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 224 pages
File Size : 55,9 Mb
Release : 2019-09-24
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780429846410

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Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics by Christopher Cowie,Rach Cosker-Rowland Pdf

Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a ‘companion’, and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge. Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.

Author : H. Lillehammer
Publisher : Springer
Page : 230 pages
File Size : 44,7 Mb
Release : 2007-05-22
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780230590380

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Companions in Guilt by H. Lillehammer Pdf

This is a systematic study of 'companions in guilt' arguments in moral philosophy. Lillehammer distinguishes between two distinct forms of these, which he calls 'arguments by entailment' and 'arguments by analogy' respectively. For each strategy, Lillehammer examines three of its most prominent manifestations in contemporary ethical thought.

Author : Russ Shafer-Landau
Publisher : Oxford University Press on Demand
Page : 333 pages
File Size : 40,8 Mb
Release : 2003-06-19
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780199259755

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Moral Realism by Russ Shafer-Landau Pdf

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.

Author : Terence Cuneo
Publisher : Clarendon Press
Page : 272 pages
File Size : 41,7 Mb
Release : 2010-03-04
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780191614811

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The Normative Web by Terence Cuneo Pdf

Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny their existence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts exist. And if moral facts exist, then moral realism is true. In so arguing, Cuneo provides not simply a defense of moral realism, but a positive argument for it. Moreover, this argument engages with a wide range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. If the central argument of The Normative Web is correct, antirealist positions of these varieties come at a very high cost. Given their cost, Cuneo contends, we should find realism about both epistemic and moral facts highly attractive.

Author : Jonas Olson
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 226 pages
File Size : 41,9 Mb
Release : 2014
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780198701934

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Moral Error Theory by Jonas Olson Pdf

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.

Author : Justin Clarke-Doane
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 208 pages
File Size : 55,8 Mb
Release : 2020-03-12
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780192556806

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Morality and Mathematics by Justin Clarke-Doane Pdf

To what extent are the subjects of our thoughts and talk real? This is the question of realism. In this book, Justin Clarke-Doane explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally. He argues that, contrary to widespread belief, our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified than our moral beliefs. It is also incorrect that reflection on the genealogy of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral antirealist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical antirealist as well. And, yet, Clarke-Doane shows that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together — and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense that mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the objective questions in the neighborhood of factual areas like logic, modality, grounding, and nature are practical questions too. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage.

Author : Simon Blackburn
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 349 pages
File Size : 51,7 Mb
Release : 2010-09-30
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
ISBN : 9780199548057

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Practical Tortoise Raising by Simon Blackburn Pdf

Simon Blackburn presents a selection of his philosophical essays from 1995 to 2010. He offers engaging and illuminating discussions of a wide range of topics, including moral philosophy, the theory of meaning, pragmatism, and the theory of reason and reasoning.

Author : Christopher Cowie
Publisher : Routledge
Page : 122 pages
File Size : 53,6 Mb
Release : 2019-11-18
Category : Business & Economics
ISBN : 9780429886652

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The Repugnant Conclusion by Christopher Cowie Pdf

The Repugnant Conclusion is a controversial theorem about population size. It states that a sufficiently large population of lives that are barely worth living is better than a smaller population of high quality lives. This is highly counter-intuitive. It implies that we can improve the world by trading quality of life for quantity of lives. Can it be defended? Christopher Cowie explores these questions and unpacks the controversies surrounding the Repugnant Conclusion. He focuses on whether the truth of the Repugnant Conclusion turns - as some have claimed - on the uncomfortable claim that many people’s lives are actually bad for them and that even privileged people lead lives that are only just worth living. Highly recommended for those interested in ethics, applied ethics and population studies The Repugnant Conclusion will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as economics, development studies, politics and international relations.

Author : Richard Rowland
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 256 pages
File Size : 55,8 Mb
Release : 2019-02-07
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780192570222

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The Normative and the Evaluative by Richard Rowland Pdf

Many have been attracted to the idea that for something to be good there just have to be reasons to favour it. This view has come to be known as the buck-passing account of value. According to this account, for pleasure to be good there need to be reasons for us to desire and pursue it. Likewise for liberty and equality to be values there have to be reasons for us to promote and preserve them. Extensive discussion has focussed on some of the problems that the buck-passing account faces, such as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem. Less attention, however, has been paid as to why we should accept the buck-passing account or what the theoretical pay-offs and other implications of accepting it are. The Normative and the Evaluative provides the first comprehensive motivation and defence of the buck-passing account of value. Richard Rowland argues that the buck-passing account explains several important features of the relationship between reasons and value, as well as the relationship between the different varieties of value, in a way that its competitors do not. He shows that alternatives to the buck-passing account are inconsistent with important views in normative ethics, uninformative, and at odds with the way in which we should see practical and epistemic normativity as related. In addition, he extends the buck-passing account to provide an account of moral properties as well as all other normative and deontic properties and concepts, such as fittingness and 'ought', in terms of reasons.

Author : Christopher Cowie
Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA
Page : 245 pages
File Size : 43,5 Mb
Release : 2019-10-23
Category : Ethics
ISBN : 9780198842736

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Morality and Epistemic Judgment by Christopher Cowie Pdf

Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist, so they are all false. This is the moral error theory, a deeply troubling yet plausible view that is now one of the canonical positions in moral philosophy. The most compelling argument against it is the argument from analogy. According to this, the moral error theory should be rejected because it would seriously compromise our practice of making epistemic judgments-judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence-and could undermine systematic thought and reason themselves. Christopher Cowie provides a novel assessment of the recent attention paid to this topic in moral philosophy and epistemology. He reasons that the argument from analogy fails because moral judgments are unlike judgments about how we ought to form and revise our beliefs in light of our evidence. On that basis, a moral error theory does not compromise the practice of making epistemic judgments. The moral error theory may be true after all, Cowie concludes, and if it is then we will simply have to live with its concerning consequences.

Author : Bart Streumer
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 256 pages
File Size : 43,6 Mb
Release : 2017-08-11
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780191088957

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Unbelievable Errors by Bart Streumer Pdf

Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory. He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.

Author : Terence Cuneo
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 66 pages
File Size : 53,9 Mb
Release : 2020-07-23
Category : Social Science
ISBN : 9780192540171

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A Dictionary of Ethics by Terence Cuneo Pdf

This authoritative dictionary contains clear, concise definitions of over 150 key terms from ethical theory and touches upon a variety of relevant subfields including meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. It addresses a number of sub topics which have been under-represented within current literature, including the ethics of eating, feminist ethics, and disability ethics. Other entries cover relevant contemporary concepts, such as care ethics, moral nativism, and constitutivism, offering a thorough and accessible understanding to those working in conjunction with relevant fields. A Dictionary of Ethics is a valuable reference resource for academics, practitioners, and students of moral philosophy, applied ethics, and public policy. It will also be of interest to readers looking to familiarize themselves with ethical terms and the concepts they express.

Author : Cheryl Misak
Publisher : Oxford University Press
Page : 360 pages
File Size : 53,5 Mb
Release : 2016-08-12
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780191020049

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Cambridge Pragmatism by Cheryl Misak Pdf

Cheryl Misak offers a strikingly new view of the development of philosophy in the twentieth century. Pragmatism, the home-grown philosophy of America, thinks of truth not as a static relation between a sentence and the believer-independent world, but rather, a belief that works. The founders of pragmatism, Peirce and James, developed this idea in more (Peirce) and less (James) objective ways. The standard story of the reception of American pragmatism in England is that Russell and Moore savaged James's theory, and that pragmatism has never fully recovered. An alternative, and underappreciated, story is told here. The brilliant Cambridge mathematician, philosopher and economist, Frank Ramsey, was in the mid-1920s heavily influenced by the almost-unheard-of Peirce and was developing a pragmatist position of great promise. He then transmitted that pragmatism to his friend Wittgenstein, although had Ramsey lived past the age of 26 to see what Wittgenstein did with that position, Ramsey would not have like what he saw.

Author : Wouter Floris Kalf
Publisher : Springer
Page : 246 pages
File Size : 55,9 Mb
Release : 2018-05-30
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9783319772882

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Moral Error Theory by Wouter Floris Kalf Pdf

This book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with ‘schmoral’ judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls ‘the fundamental desire’; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.

Author : Eddy Zemach
Publisher : Penn State Press
Page : 237 pages
File Size : 47,5 Mb
Release : 2010-11-01
Category : Philosophy
ISBN : 9780271040875

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Real Beauty by Eddy Zemach Pdf