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Sensitive Covert Action Notifications by Alfred Cumming Pdf
Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to 8 Members of Congress -- the ¿Gang of Eight¿ (G8) -- when the Pres. determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. Partial contents of this report: Requirements for Notifications of Sensitive Covert Actions to Congress; Additional G8 Requirements; When Prior Notice to the G8 is Withheld; Directors of National Intell. and CIA Critical of G8 Notifications For Non-Covert Actions; House Intell. Committee Replaces G8 Procedure in FY 2010 Intell. Authorization Act; G8 Notifications: The Historic Record; Conclusion: Striking a Balance. Charts and tables.
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon may have expanded its counter-terrorism intell. activities as part of the global war on terror. The DoD may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intell. activities that would statutorily qualify as ¿covert actions (CA),¿ and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intell. committees. Contents of this report: Intro.; Background; Post 9/11 Concerns; Current Statute Governing CA; Exceptions Under the Statutory Definition of CA; Traditional Military Activities ; Routine Support of Traditional Military Activities; House Intell. Committee Calls on DoD to Inform Committee of Intell. Activities; Policy Issues for the 111th Congress.
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications by Alfred Cumming Pdf
Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. Congress, in approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those 'rare' cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of its intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible. In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. On July 8, 2009, the executive branch issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) in which it stated that it strongly objected to the House Committee's action to replace the Gang of Eight statutory provision, and that the President's senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act if the committee's language was retained in the final bill. The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements. Although the executive branch has not issued a Statement of Administration Policy with regard to the Senate's bill, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair has indicated that he would recommend that the President veto the bill if the covert action notification changes contained in the bill remained in final legislation. Congress has not acted on the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bill. With Congress considering possible changes in covert action congressional notifications, this report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight.
Author : William J. Daugherty Publisher : University Press of Kentucky Page : 330 pages File Size : 54,8 Mb Release : 2006-06-02 Category : Political Science ISBN : 0813191610
Daugherty addresses the public perception of the CIA as a rogue agency that initiates unsanctioned, risky, covert action programs. The 17-year veteran operations officer with the CIA produces evidence to disprove this notion.
Allan E. Goodman,Twentieth Century Fund. Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy,Bruce D. Berkowitz
Author : Allan E. Goodman,Twentieth Century Fund. Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy,Bruce D. Berkowitz Publisher : Twentieth Century Foundation Page : 172 pages File Size : 45,7 Mb Release : 1992 Category : History ISBN : STANFORD:36105000366794
The Need to Know by Allan E. Goodman,Twentieth Century Fund. Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy,Bruce D. Berkowitz Pdf
This report offers new assumptions for the new era in American Foreign affairs in light of the bold changes that occurred throughout the world during the early nineties.
Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 by United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Pdf
National Security Intelligence and Ethics by Seumas Miller,Mitt Regan,Patrick F. Walsh Pdf
This volume examines the ethical issues that arise as a result of national security intelligence collection and analysis. Powerful new technologies enable the collection, communication and analysis of national security data on an unprecedented scale. Data collection now plays a central role in intelligence practice, yet this development raises a host of ethical and national security problems, such as privacy; autonomy; threats to national security and democracy by foreign states; and accountability for liberal democracies. This volume provides a comprehensive set of in-depth ethical analyses of these problems by combining contributions from both ethics scholars and intelligence practitioners. It provides the reader with a practical understanding of relevant operations, the issues that they raise and analysis of how responses to these issues can be informed by a commitment to liberal democratic values. This combination of perspectives is crucial in providing an informed appreciation of ethical challenges that is also grounded in the realities of the practice of intelligence. This book will be of great interest to all students of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies, foreign policy and international relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
H.R. 1013, H.R. 1371, and other proposals which address the issue of affording prior notice of covert actions to the Congress by United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Legislation Pdf
H.R. 3822, to strengthen the system of Congressional oversight of intelligence activities of the United States by United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Legislation Pdf
William Michael Reisman,Reisman, William Michael Reisman,William Michael, Reisman,James E. Baker
Author : William Michael Reisman,Reisman, William Michael Reisman,William Michael, Reisman,James E. Baker Publisher : Yale University Press Page : 264 pages File Size : 51,8 Mb Release : 1992-01-01 Category : Law ISBN : 0300050593
Regulating Covert Action by William Michael Reisman,Reisman, William Michael Reisman,William Michael, Reisman,James E. Baker Pdf
Covert activity has always been a significant element of international politics. This book attempts to assess the lawfulness of covert action under US and international law and faces the implications for democratic states that covert operations pose.
Soviet Covert Action (the Forgery Offensive) by United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Subcommittee on Oversight Pdf
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions by Anonim Pdf
Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as "covert actions," and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only "clandestine activities." Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute "passive" intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is "active," in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target.
