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Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental by M. Gerken Pdf
Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important.
Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance by Pieranna Garavaso,Nicla Vassallo Pdf
Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo investigate Gottlob Frege's notion of thinking (das Denken) to provide a new analysis of a largely unexplored area of the philosopher's work. Confronting Frege's deeply seated and widely emphasized anti-psychologism, Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance claims that the objective human science that Frege proposed can only be possible through a nuanced notion of thinking as neither merely psychological nor merely logical. Focusing on what Frege says about thinking in many passages from his works, Garavaso and Vassallo argue that Frege was engaged with issues that are still alive in contemporary debates, such as the definition of knowledge and the necessary role of language in conceptual thinking and in the expression of thoughts. Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance is essential not only for those interested in a new and original reading of Frege’s philosophy, but also for anyone engaged in epistemology, logic, psychology, philosophy of language, and the history of analytic philosophy.
Author : Peter J. Graham,Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen Publisher : Oxford University Press, USA Page : 407 pages File Size : 49,5 Mb Release : 2020-02-19 Category : Philosophy ISBN : 9780198713524
Epistemic Entitlement by Peter J. Graham,Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen Pdf
For most of the twentieth century, philosophers have explored the nature and extent of our knowledge - especially our knowledge of the world grounded in sense-perceptual experience. Can we be sure that our experience of the world is enough to ground our knowledge of an external reality? Areour everyday beliefs about our world warranted well enough for knowledge? What if we're all in The Matrix? This volume collects cutting-edge essays, written by leading philosophers, which address these fundamental questions about our place in the world. Through sustained reflection on two kinds ofwarrants - entitlements and justifications - they all seek to understand the nature and extent of our knowledge. Even if we were not able to justify our knowledge of the external world, we are nevertheless entitled to our view of external reality.
Our ability to attribute mental states to others ("to mentalize") has been the subject of philosophical and psychological studies for a very long time, yet the role of language acquisition in the development of our mentalizing abilities has been largely understudied. This book addresses this gap in the philosophical literature. The book presents an account of how false belief reasoning is impacted by language acquisition, and it does so by placing it in the larger context of the issue, how language impacts cognition in general. The work provides the reader with detailed and critical literature reviews, and draws on them to argue that language acquisition helps false belief reasoning by boosting the ability to create schemata that facilitate processing of information in some social contexts. According to this framework, it is a combination of syntactic clues and cultural narratives that helps the child to solve the classic false belief task. The book provides a novel, original account of how language helps false belief reasoning, while also giving the reader a broad, precise and well-documented picture of the debate around some of the most fundamental issues in social cognition.
On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, Mikkel Gerken presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics, while also contributing to epistemology. For example, Gerken develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion and moreover, critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, this volume develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, critical epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging sub-field that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: The empirical study of folk epistemology.
Epistemic Uses of Imagination by Christopher Badura,Amy Kind Pdf
This book explores a topic that has recently become the subject of increased philosophical interest: how can imagination be put to epistemic use? Though imagination has long been invoked in contexts of modal knowledge, in recent years philosophers have begun to explore its capacity to play an epistemic role in a variety of other contexts as well. In this collection, the contributors address an assortment of issues relating to epistemic uses of imagination, and in particular, they take up the ways in which our imaginings must be constrained so as to justify beliefs and give rise to knowledge. These constraints are explored across several different contexts in which imagination is appealed to for justification, namely reasoning, modality and modal knowledge, thought experiments, and knowledge of self and others. Taken as a whole, the contributions in this volume break new ground in explicating when and how imagination can be epistemically useful. Epistemic Uses of Imagination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students who are working on imagination, as well as those working more broadly in epistemology, aesthetics, and philosophy of mind.
Critical Thinking and Epistemic Injustice by Alessia Marabini Pdf
This book argues that the mainstream view and practice of critical thinking in education mirrors a reductive and reified conception of competences that ultimately leads to forms of epistemic injustice in assessment. It defends an alternative view of critical thinking as a competence that is normative in nature rather than reified and reductive. This book contends that critical thinking competence should be at the heart of learning how to learn, but that much depends on how we understand critical thinking. It defends an alternative view of critical thinking as a competence that is normative in nature rather than reified and reductive. The book draws from a conception of human reasoning and rationality that focuses on belief revision and is interwoven with a Bildung approach to teaching and learning: it emphasises the relevance of knowledge and experience in making inferences. The book is an enhanced, English version of the Italian monograph Epistemologia dell’Educazione: Pensiero Critico, Etica ed Epistemic Injustice.
Essays in Collective Epistemology by Jennifer Lackey Pdf
We often talk about groups believing, knowing, and testifying. For instance, we ask whether the Bush Administration had good reasons for believing that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, or whether BP knew that its equipment was faulty before the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Epistemic claims of this sort often have enormously significant consequences, given the ways they bear on the moral and legal responsibilities of collective entities. Despite the importance of these epistemic claims, there has been surprisingly little philosophical work shedding light on these phenomena, their consequences, and the broader implications that follow for epistemology in general. Essays in Collective Epistemology aims to fill this gap in the literature by bringing together new papers in this area by some of the leading figures in social epistemology. The volume is divided into four parts and contains ten articles written on a range of topics in collective epistemology. All of the papers focus on fundamental issues framing the epistemological literature on groups, and offer new insights or developments to the current debates: some do so by providing novel examinations of the epistemological relationship that groups bear to their members, while others point to new, cutting edge approaches to theorizing about concepts and issues related to collective entities. Anyone working in epistemology, or concerned with issues involving the social dimensions of knowledge, should find the papers in this book both interesting and valuable.
Systemic Actions in Complex Scenarios by James Ming Chen,Edit Fabó,Emilia Ferone Pdf
What is the contribution of General System Theory to the macro-level understanding of economic, social and technological changes in our epoch from a multidimensional perspective? What is the contribution of Social Action Theory on a micro-scale? Can complex scenario analyses, although based upon uncertainty and unpredictability, offer a viable toolkit for managing these transformations? This book contains twelve chapters, dealing with these questions from various points of view. It brings together essays in sociology, economics, law and humanities to provide as complete a representation as possible of the current global situation. The theoretical framework adopted here is that the systemic approach provides the most effective tool both for understanding social phenomena and elaborating policy-modelling strategies for decision makers that are supposed to tackle social criticalities.
Logic, Rationality, and Interaction by Patrick Blackburn,Emiliano Lorini,Meiyun Guo Pdf
This LNCS book is part of the FOLLI book series and constitutes the proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, LORI 2019, held in Chongqing, China, in October 2019. The 31 papers presented in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 56 submissions. They focus on the following topics: agency; argumentation and agreement; belief revision and belief merging; belief representation; cooperation; decision making and planning; natural language; philosophy and philosophical logic; and strategic reasoning.
Foundations of an Ethics of Belief by Anne Meylan Pdf
In our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand, too, that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The goal of this study is to illustrate the foundations that allow for these kinds of judgments.
Agency and Joint Attention by Janet Metcalfe,Herbert S. Terrace Pdf
Human infants do not seem to be born with concepts of self or joint attention. One basic goal of Agency and Joint Attention is to unravel how these abilities originate. One approach that has received a lot of recent attention is social. Some argue that by virtue of an infant's intense eye gaze with her mother, she is able, by the age of four months, to establish a relationship with her mother that differentiates between "me" and "you." At about twelve months, the infant acquires the non-verbal ability to share attention with her mother or other caregivers. Although the concepts of self and joint attention are nonverbal and uniquely human, the question remains, how do we establish metacognitive control of these abilities? A tangential question is whether nonhuman animals develop abilities that are analogous to self and joint attention. Much of this volume is devoted to the development of metacognition of self and joint attention in experiments on the origin of consciousness, knowing oneself, social referencing, joint action, the neurological basis of joint attention, the role of joint action, mirror neurons, phenomenology, and cues for agency.
Handbook of Epistemic Cognition by Jeffrey A. Greene,William A. Sandoval,Ivar Bråten Pdf
The Handbook of Epistemic Cognition brings together leading work from across disciplines, to provide a comprehensive overview of an increasingly important topic: how people acquire, understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts. Research into inquiry, understanding, and discovery within academic disciplines has progressed from general models of conceptual change to a focus upon the learning trajectories that lead to expert-like conceptualizations, skills, and performance. Outside of academic domains, issues of who and what to believe, and how to integrate multiple sources of information into coherent and useful knowledge, have arisen as primary challenges of the 21st century. In six sections, scholars write within and across fields to focus and advance the role of epistemic cognition in education. With special attention to how researchers across disciplines can communicate and collaborate more effectively, this book will be an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the future of knowledge and knowing. Dr. Jeffrey A. Greene is an associate professor of Learning Sciences and Psychological Studies in the School of Education at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Dr. William A. Sandoval is a professor in the division of Urban Schooling at the UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies. Dr. Ivar Bråten is a professor of Educational Psychology at the Faculty of Educational Sciences at the University of Oslo, Norway.
In the first in-depth study of the transcendental argument for decades, Free Will and Epistemology defends a modern version of the famous transcendental argument for free will: that we could not be justified in undermining a strong notion of free will, as a strong notion of free will is required for any such process of undermining to be itself epistemically justified. By arguing for a conception of internalism that goes back to the early days of the internalist-externalist debates, it draws on work by Richard Foley, William Alston and Alvin Plantinga to explain the importance of epistemic deontology and its role in the transcendental argument. It expands on the principle that 'ought' implies 'can' and presents a strong case for a form of self-determination. With references to cases in the neuroscientific and cognitive-psychological literature, Free Will and Epistemology provides an original contribution to work on epistemic justification and the free will debate.