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Political Credibility and Economic Development by Silvio Borner,Aymo Brunetti,Beatrice Weder Pdf
Why have the economies of some developing countries fallen back while others have advanced? Why have so many stabilization and structural adjustment programs failed to deliver growth dividends? This book shows that there is a common and valid answer: political credibility defined as the predictability of the institutional rules of the game. This case is not only argued theoretically but also found to be confirmed by empirical analysis. Ten case studies pitting Latin American countries against Southeast Asian ones reveal the sources of political credibility. Economic openness is the necessary precondition, long-term reputation or democratic participation the sufficient one. Despite the seemingly superior strength of authoritarian reputation democratic control is the more successful road.
Coalition Politics and Economic Development by Irfan Nooruddin Pdf
"Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics"--
Coalition Politics and Economic Development by Irfan Nooruddin Pdf
Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.
Credibility of Rules and Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector by Gregory Kisunko Pdf
April 1997 An indicator of the credibility of rules is constructed from broad cross-country survey data and it is shown that low credibility is associated with lower rates of growth and investment. Economic theory and case study evidence have long suggested that institutional factors, such as well-defined property and contract rights, may be crucial in explaining differences in economic performance across countries. Much of the recent discussion about governance has, for example, focused on the role of corruption and its consequences for investment and growth. By comparison, the empirical literature relating institutional factors with growth has been relatively scarce and has mainly concentrated on crude proxies such as political instability and macroeconomic volatility. The problem of most of these variables in that they inadequately capture the uncertainties that are relevant for entrepreneurs. Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder propose new measures of institutional uncertainty based on the subjective evaluations of entrepreneurs. They surveyed the private sector in a broad cross-section of countries. The survey was designed to capture institutional factors such as the predictability of rules, entrepreneurs' fears of policy surprises and reversals, their perception of safety and security of property, the reliability of the judiciary, and their problems with bureaucratic corruption. The authors construct and test a summary indicator of the credibility of rules, as well as its components in standard cross-country growth and investment regressions. The main findings: The overall indicator of credibility is significantly related with higher rates of investment and growth. The credibility indicator calculated for the subsample of small local companies is even more closely related to the growth performance. The subindicators security of persons and property and predictability of rule-making are most closely associated with growth. The indicators of corruption, perceived political instability, and predictability of judiciary enforcement are most closely associated with investment. Preliminary results for an extended sample - including transition economies - indicate that institutional factors may also help to explain differences in economic performance in these countries. This paper - a product of the Office of the Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, Development Economics- was produced as a background paper for World Development Report 1997 on the role of the state in a changing world. The study was funded in part by the Research Support Budget under the research projects Cross-Country Indicators of Institutional Uncertainty (RPO 680-51), and Indicators of Government Quality as Perceived by the Private Sector (RPO 681-52).
This book addresses the question of how political capacity of the government of a developing country affects its ability to implement structural adjustments in its economy in response to external pressures. It builds on the inductive foundation of comparative case studies and speculative insights.
Beyond Legal Origin and Checks and Balances by Philip Keefer Pdf
The existing literature emphasizes and contrasts the role of political checks and balances and legal origin in determining the pace of financial sector development. This paper expands substantially on one aspect of this debate: the fact that government actions that promote financial sector development, whether prudent financial regulation or secure property and contract rights, are public goods and sensitive to political incentives to provide public goods. Tests of hypotheses emanating from this argument yield four new conclusions. First, two key determinants of those incentives-the credibility of pre-electoral political promises and citizen information about politician decisions-systematically promote financial sector development. Second, these political factors, along with political checks and balances, operate in part through their influence on the security of property rights, an argument asserted but not previously tested. Third, contrary to findings elsewhere in the literature, the political determinants of financial sector development are significant even in the presence of controls for legal origin. Finally, and again in contrast to the literature, the evidence here suggests that legal origin primarily proxies for political phenomena. Legal origin is a largely insignificant determinant of financial sector development when those phenomena are fully taken into account.
Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism by Philip Keefer,Razvan Vlaicu Pdf
"Keefer and Vlaicu demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. Politicians can overcome their credibility deficit in two ways. First, they can build reputations. This requires that they fulfill preconditions that in practice are costly--informing voters of their promises, tracking those promises, and ensuring that voters turn out on election day. Alternatively, they can rely on intermediaries--patrons--who are already able to make credible commitments to their clients. Endogenizing credibility in this way, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises. They also argue that in the absence of political credibility, political reliance on patrons enhances welfare in the short run, in contrast to the traditional view that clientelism in politics is a source of significant policy distortion. However, in the long run reliance on patrons may undermine the emergence of credible political parties. The model helps to explain several puzzles. For example, public investment and corruption are higher in young democracies than old; and democratizing reforms succeeded remarkably in Victorian England, in contrast to the more difficult experiences of many democratizing countries, such as the Dominican Republic. This paper--a product of the Growth and Investment Team, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the political economy of development"--World Bank web site.
The Political Dimension of Economic Growth by Silvio Borner,Michael Kaser,Martin Paldam Pdf
The state and its institutions are crucial for economic development: for better and for worse. This insight informs this important, up-to-date and authoritative survey of new trends in growth economics and the widely divergent economic performance of developing countries - for example, between Latin America and South-east Asia - which seemed to be similarly placed just a generation ago. The decisive role of the political dimension in economic growth seems clear but there are many challenges to be met in getting an analytical handle on the precise determinants and in testing empirically for this. This is the challenge taken up by the international team of contributors.
Aymo Brunetti,Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Development Centre
Author : Aymo Brunetti,Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Development Centre Publisher : Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Page : 164 pages File Size : 53,7 Mb Release : 1997 Category : Economic development ISBN : UCSD:31822025794108
