The Pentomic Era The U S Army Between Korea And Vietnam
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The Pentomic Era by Andrew J. Bacevich,National Defense University,NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC. Pdf
In his history of the Army in the years between the Korean and Vietnam wars, Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Bacevich. US Army, accents the Army's mindfulness of the implications of nuclear warfare. The Army's concern, reflecting a complex mixing of institutional, strategic, and operational considerations, led to major changes in Army organization, doctrine, and weapons. The author argues that during these years, the Army not only survived an institutional identity crisis-grappling to comprehend and define its national security role in a subsequently directed the Army to perform. Viewing itself as an instrument for intervention in highly politicized conflicts of limited scale would have enabled the Army over the long run to equip, organize, and train its soldiers in ways far more pertinent to what they actually have been called on to do.
The Pentomic Era by A. J. Bacevich,National Defense University Press Pdf
An analysis of the Army1s post-Korea, pre-Vietnam era. Discusses the Army1s concern about the implications of nuclear warfare between the Korean and the Vietnam war. The author argues that during these years, the Army not only survived an institutional identity crisis, but grew to meet new challenges by pioneering the development of rockets and missiles. 25 photos and figures. Extensive bibliography. Index.
The Pentomic Era: the U. S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam by A. J. Bacevich Pdf
This essay is a brief history of the U.S. army during the years immediately following the Korean War. For many in our own time that period-corresonding to the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency-has acquired an aura of congenial simplicity. Americans who survived Vietnam, Watergate, and painful economical difficulties wistfully recall the 1950s as a time when the nation possessed a clearly-charted course and had the will and the power to follow it.
Department of Defense,U. S. Military,U. S. Government
Author : Department of Defense,U. S. Military,U. S. Government Publisher : Unknown Page : 108 pages File Size : 48,9 Mb Release : 2017-04-29 Category : Electronic ISBN : 1521185913
The Pentomic Era by Department of Defense,U. S. Military,U. S. Government Pdf
Although atomic weapons helped win World War Two in the Pacific, they raised the question of whether these weapons altered the nature of warfare, or simply warfare's destructive dimensions. Responsibility for nuclear weapons development became a central issue in US service politics, particularly between the Army and Air Force during the early years of the Eisenhower administration. In his history of the Army in the years between the Korean and Vietnam wars, Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich, US Army, accents the Army's mindfulness of the implications of nuclear warfare. The Army's concern, reflecting a complex mixing of institutional, strategic, and operational considerations, led to major changes in Army organization, doctrine, and weapons. The author argues that during these years, the Army not only survived an institutional identity crisis--grappling to comprehend and define its national security role in a nuclear age--but grew to meet new challenges by pioneering the development of rockets and missiles. This analysis of the Army's post-Korea, pre-Vietnam era contributes valuable insights to the study of recent US military history. Especially important is the caution that military professionals temper their enthusiasm for technological progress with an eye to those elements of warfare that remain changeless.This is a brief history of the US Army during the years immediately following the Korean War. For many in our own time that period -- corresponding to the two terms of the Eisenhower presidency -- has acquired an aura of congenial simplicity. Americans who survived Vietnam, Watergate, and painful economic difficulties wistfully recall the 1950s as a time when the nation possessed a clearly-charted course and had the will and the power to follow it. However comforting such views may be. the reality was far different. Many segments of America experienced the 1950s as anything but a Golden Age. Prominent among this group was the Army. Instead of the "good old days," the Army found the Eisenhower era to be one of continuing crisis. New technology, changing views of the nature of war, and the fiscal principles of the Eisenhower administration produced widespread doubts about the utility of traditional land forces. As Army officers saw it, these factors threatened the well-being of their Service and by implication endangered the security of the United States.This essay explores the nature of those threats and of the Army's response to them. By design, this essay is selective and interpretive. It does not provide a complete narrative of events affecting the Army after Korea. It excludes important developments such as foreign military assistance, the growth of Army aviation, and the impact of alliance considerations on American military policy. As a result, the history that follows is neither comprehensive nor definitive. What value it may possess derives instead from its explication of themes that retain some resonance for an Army in later decades confronted with its own challenges.A great institution like the Army always is in transition. And though the character of reform is seldom as profound as the claims of senior leaders or the Army Times may suggest, in the 1950s change often matched the hyperbole of its advocates. The Army found itself grappling for the first time with the perplexing implications of nuclear warfare; seeking ways of adapting its organization and doctrine to accommodate rapid technological advance; and attempting to square apparently revolutionary change with traditional habits and practical constraints of the military art. In retrospect, we may find fault with the Army's response to these challenges. If so, we have all the more reason to concern ourselves with how the Service derived the answers that it did. To a striking extent, challenges similar to those of the 1950s have returned to preoccupy the Army today.
Author : Robert A. Doughty Publisher : Unknown Page : 68 pages File Size : 50,6 Mb Release : 1979 Category : Military art and science ISBN : UIUC:30112003275200
When the Army drafted Elvis in 1958, it set about transforming the King of Rock and Roll from a rebellious teen idol into a clean-cut GI trained for nuclear warfare. Brian Linn traces the origins, evolution, and ultimate failure of the army’s attempt to reinvent itself for the Atomic Age, and reveals the experiences of its forgotten soldiers.
Contents: Intro.: The Post WWII Army; Overview; Chap. 1: The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army and the Conceptual Challenge of the Nuclear Age; The Army and the ¿New Look¿; The Dual-Capability Conundrum; Kennedy Admin.; Chap. 2: Reorienting the Army ¿ After Vietnam: Nixon Admin. and Defense; The STEADFAST Reorg.; Doctrinal Ferment; Meeting the Army¿s Educational Needs; Towards Army 86; Operational Art and AirLand Battle; Chap. 3: A Strange New World -¿ Army after the Cold War: Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Act; Army of the 1990s; Doctrinal Revision; The New Louisiana Maneuvers; The Debate Intensifies; Force XXI Campaign; Doctrine as an Engine of Change?; From Quadrennial Review to Quadrennial Review.
Exploring the growth of the Marines from disadvantaged to elite force, this history “offers an excellent analysis of how the marines became the Marines.” (Publishers Weekly) The Marine Corps has always considered itself a breed apart. This undying faith in its own exceptionalism is what has made the Marines one of the sharpest, swiftest tools of American military power. Aaron O’Connell focuses on the period from World War II to Vietnam, when the Marine Corps transformed itself from America’s least respected to its most elite armed force. Venerating sacrifice and suffering, privileging the collective over the individual, Corps culture was saturated with romantic and religious overtones that had enormous marketing potential in a postwar America energized by new global responsibilities. Capitalizing on this, the Marines curried the favor of the nation’s best reporters, befriended publishers, courted Hollywood and Congress, and built a public relations infrastructure that would eventually brand it as the most prestigious military service in America. But as O’Connell suggests, the Corps’ triumphs did not come without costs, including a culture of violence that sometimes spread beyond the battlefield. “A significant and original contribution to both the military history of the Cold War and the ongoing conversation about the militarization of American culture.” —Beth Bailey, author of America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force “Takes readers inside the culture of the Corps.” —Nathaniel Fick, author of One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer “Insightful.” —Library Journal “A powerful account of the relationship between fighting war and preserving peace, viewed through the lens of the stories that built support for both.” —Kirkus Reviews “Absorbing.” —The Wall Street Journal
Author : Christopher M. Gacek Publisher : Columbia University Press Page : 516 pages File Size : 50,5 Mb Release : 1994 Category : History ISBN : 0231096569
This study examines the disparities between the two dominant American political-military approaches to the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. The first approach argues that if force is employed, it should be used at whatever level necessary to achieve decisive military objectives. The second approach argues that certain limits to the use of force may be necessary and acceptable. Case studies illustrate how the basic disagreements between the two approaches influence policy-making and military decisions. Included in the text is discussion of Vietnam, Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.
This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)
A Shot in the Dark: A History of the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group by Paul J. Cook Pdf
This book presents the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) as an example of successful change by the Army in wartime. It argues that creating the AWG required senior leaders to create a vision differing from the Army’s self-conceptualization, change bureaucratic processes to turn the vision into an actual unit, and then place the new unit in the hands of uniquely qualified leaders to build and sustain it. In doing this, it considers the forces influencing change within the Army and argues the two most significant are its self-conceptualization and institutional bureaucracy. The work explores three major subject areas that provide historical context. The first is the Army’s institutional history from the early 1950s through 2001. This period begins with the Army seeking to validate its place in America’s national security strategy and ends with the Army trying to chart a path into the post-Cold War future. The Army’s history is largely one of asymmetric warfare. The work thus examines several campaigns that offered lessons for subsequent wars. Some lessons the Army took to heart, others it ignored. As the AWG was a direct outgrowth of the failures and frustrations the Army experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq, the book examines these campaigns and identifies the specific problems that led senior Army leaders to create the AWG. Finally, the work chronicles the AWG’s creation in 2006, growth, and re-assignment from the Army staff to a fully-fledged organization subordinate to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in 2011 to its deactivation. This action resulted not from the unit’s failure to adapt to a post-insurgency Army focusing on modernization. Rather, it resulted from the Army failing to realize that while the AWG was a product of counterinsurgency, it provided the capability to support the Army during a period of great strategic and institutional uncertainty.
