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This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.
A Theory of Strategic Ambiguity: Credibility, Transparency, and Dual Deterrence by Brett V. Benson Pdf
Intuition and international relations theory both affirm that commitments should be firm and transparent in order to be credible. Because ambiguity is believed to cut against the credibility of the commitment, it is commonly assumed that ambiguous commitments are inimical to cooperation and invite conflict. Why then do states often choose to make commitments that are deliberately ambiguous? The tension between the current state of international relations theory and empirical international politics presents a puzzle: anomalous ambiguous commitments occur despite prevailing theoretical predictions that they should undermine the credibility of the commitment by signaling weakness, creating incentives for opportunism, and, increasing the chances for misperception. My research uses formal theory, surveys, and cases studies to model and test three-party security agreements to demonstrate that the form of commitment is often a strategic choice, and, under certain conditions, ambiguous commitments can actually outperform firmer and more transparent alternatives. I demonstrate that under certain conditions deliberately ambiguous security commitments can work to deter challengers from destabilizing the status quo when transparently communicated alternatives would have the unintended consequence of bringing about the very outcome they are designed to prevent. In making this argument, my dissertation research makes three significant contributions to the study of international politics. First, it shifts our focus from credibility to variation in the type of commitment. Second, it challenges our intuition and scholarly presumption that information and transparency are strictly better by identifying some conditions under which actors are better off being ambiguous. Third, it distinguishes between various deterrence strategies for addressing dual deterrence dilemmas. In addition to the general contributions to the study of international politics, my research also adds to our understanding of the historical strategic interactions between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists and offers insights and policy implications regarding the ongoing security tensions between China and Taiwan.
Through the examination of different themes and subjects the book provides an in depth analysis of the concept of deterrence and its utility in dealing effectively with current threats. Although the concept of deterrence precedes the Cold War, in modern times and in its traditional form deterrence is seen as the product of the Cold War, which transformed 'narrow' deterrence approaches into widespread orthodoxy. Increasingly however emerging threats and challenges call into question the traditional concept of deterrence. There are many elements that challenge the concept of deterrence and its effectiveness. For instance it is not just that the concept can be ambiguous and broad, but also there have to be a number of conditions for it to be successfully implemented. This collection contributes to a growing field of research in a relatively under-studied area of interrogating the concept of deterrence itself through a multi-disciplinary approach. Through the use of primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews, this book covers a wide range of disciplinary approaches on deterrence and the contributors cover a broad array of subjects. The research assembled here focuses on deterring extremism, conflict resolution and diplomacy, investigating technological developments, effects of globalisation, social movements, economics, the relationship of resilience to effective deterrence, and the associated complexity of contemporary interdependencies to create a contextualised concept of modern deterrence. Social science and historical methodologies are utilized to gain a comprehensive cross-section of analysis that will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the use of deterrence as a national security strategy, as well as highlighting the various types of power available for use by the state to create multi-faceted deterrence in order to deal effectively and efficiently with complex emerging challenges.
Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior by Abram N. Shulsky Pdf
China's recent reforms have led to unprecedented economic growth; if this continues, China will be able to turn its great potential power into actual power. The result could be, in the very long term, the rise of China as a rival to the United States as the world's predominant power; in the nearer term, China could become a significant rival in the East Asian region. In this context, the issue for U.S. policy is how to handle a rising power, a problem that predominant powers have faced many times throughout history. It is the contention of this report that the future Sino-U.S. context will illustrate many of the problems of deterrence theory that have been discussed in recent decades; deterrence theory will be, in general, more difficult to apply than it was in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War context. The key may be to seek nonmilitary means of deterrence, i.e., diplomatic ways to manipulate the tension to China's disadvantage.
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent by Matthew Jones Pdf
Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government’s strategic nuclear policy from 1945 to 1964. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, this volume examines how British governments after 1945 tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic nuclear capability, and the debates this provoked in official circles. Against a background of evolving British ideas about deterrence during the Cold War, it focuses on the strategic, political and diplomatic considerations that compelled governments, in the face of ever-increasing pressures on the defence budget, to persist in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and to deploy a credible nuclear force, as the age of the manned bomber gave way to the ballistic missile. Particular attention is given to controversies over the portion of the defence budget devoted to the deterrent programme, the effects of the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration after 1958, increasing reliance on the United States for nuclear delivery systems, the negotiations that led to the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the supply of Polaris, and discussions within the Western Alliance over the control of nuclear forces. By the time of the October 1964 election, when this volume concludes, previous dismissal of the prospects for successful ballistic missile defence were giving way to growing doubts over the long-term effectiveness of the Polaris system in its role as an independent deterrent, several years before it was due to enter service with the Royal Navy. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War history, nuclear proliferation and international relations.
National Research Council,Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences,Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications,Naval Studies Board
Author : National Research Council,Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences,Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications,Naval Studies Board Publisher : National Academies Press Page : 244 pages File Size : 53,5 Mb Release : 1997-05-02 Category : Technology & Engineering ISBN : 9780309056397
Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence by National Research Council,Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences,Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications,Naval Studies Board Pdf
Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centersâ€"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
The United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence by Jeremy Stocker Pdf
In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.
The Oxford Handbook of Criminological Theory by Francis T. Cullen,Pamela Wilcox Pdf
This handbook presents a series of essays that captures not the past of criminology, but where theoretical explanation is headed. The volume is replete with ideas, discussions of substantive topics with salient theoretical implications, and reviews of literatures that illuminate avenues along which theory and research evolve.
Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation by Stephan Frühling,Andrew O’Neil Pdf
In an era of great power competition, the role of alliances in managing escalation of conflict has acquired renewed importance. Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate means for deterrence and controlling escalation, and are central to US alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. However, allies themselves need to better prepare for managing escalation in an increasingly challenging geostrategic and technological environment for the US and its allies. While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US alliances differ. This book brings together leading experts from Europe, Northeast Asia, the United States and Australia to focus on these challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence and potential escalation pathways in America’s 21st century alliances. ‘Nuclear weapons play an important role in deterrence and preventing military conflict between great powers, while also posing an existential threat to humanity. It is vital that we have a nuanced understanding of this important challenge, so that such weapons are never used. This book offers many important perspectives and makes a significant contribution to the overall debate about these powerful weapons.’ — The Hon Julie Bishop, Chancellor, The Australian National University, Former Foreign Minister of Australia ‘This timely book identifies a wide range of challenges US alliances both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic face as they seek to ensure the value of US extended deterrence, particular the US nuclear umbrella, against China and Russia. This unique collection of chapters written by experts in US allies in both regions presents widely varying security perceptions and priorities. To understand such differences is the key to globally strengthen the US alliance systems, which are a significant advantage Washington enjoys over the two competitors.’ — Yukio Satoh, former President of The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) ‘This is a timely and thoughtful collection of essays that should serve to jumpstart public discussion and debate—the absence of which is widely noted and much bemoaned. Each contributor examines an aspect of the complicated, multifaceted nuclear debate by discussing the range of dilemmas from deterrence to disarmament. The various views set out here are more relevant than ever as Russia, China and the United States flex their nuclear muscles in new and sometimes dangerous ways. This book should be read by anyone interested in the preventing the use of nuclear weapons and understanding complexities of alliances in an increasingly dangerous world.’ — Madelyn Creedon, former Principal Deputy Administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs
Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction by Antulio J. Echevarria II Pdf
Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Antulio J. Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated to include an expanded chapter on manipulation through cyberwarfare and new further reading.
Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia by Rizwana Abbasi,Zafar Khan Pdf
This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.
"Crawford explains the political dynamics of pivotal deterrence and the conditions under which it is likely to succeed, while examining some of its most impressive feats and failures. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's agile approach to the 1870s Eastern Crisis, which prevented war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, is contrasted with Britain's ambiguous and ill-fated maneuvers to deter Germany and France in July 1914. Shifting to the 1960s Cold War, Crawford explores the successes and setbacks in U.S. efforts to prevent NATO allies Greece and Turkey from fighting over Cyprus and to defuse the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan."--BOOK JACKET.
In May 1998, in reaction to India’s nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum ‘credible’ deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan’s nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region’s changed/changing strategic environment. After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan’s nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan’s doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence. Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research.
Author : Keith B. Payne Publisher : University Press of Kentucky Page : 184 pages File Size : 51,6 Mb Release : 2014-07-11 Category : Political Science ISBN : 9780813148434
Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age by Keith B. Payne Pdf
Keith Payne begins by asking, "Did we really learn how to deter predictably and reliably during the Cold War?" He answers cautiously in the negative, pointing out that we know only that our policies toward the Soviet Union did not fail. What we can be more certain of, in Payne's view, is that such policies will almost assuredly fail in the Second Nuclear Age -- a period in which direct nuclear threat between superpowers has been replaced by threats posed by regional "rogue" powers newly armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The fundamental problem with deterrence theory is that is posits a rational -- hence predictable -- opponent. History frequently demonstrates the opposite. Payne argues that as the one remaining superpower, the United States needs to be more flexible in its approach to regional powers.
Ambiguities of Empire by Robert Holland,Sarah Stockwell Pdf
This book comprises essays offered by friends, colleagues, and former students in tribute to Andrew Porter, on the occasion of his retirement from the Rhodes Chair in Imperial History at the University of London. The contributors, including many distinguished historians, explore through a variety of case studies ‘ambiguities of empire’ and of imperial and quasi-imperial relationships, reflecting important themes in Professor Porter’s own writing. Whilst the range of articles reflects the breadth of Andrew Porter’s scholarly collaborations and interests, the chapters focus in particular on two aspects of imperial history which have been the subject of his particular attention: religion and empire and the end of empire. The book contains original pieces on the history of British imperialism currently the subject of considerable scholarly attention. The book will be invaluable to students and scholars of empire, religion and colonialism. This book was published as a special issue of the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.
