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Author : Thomas C. Bruneau,Steven C. Boraz Publisher : University of Texas Press Page : 410 pages File Size : 43,6 Mb Release : 2009-04-20 Category : Political Science ISBN : 9780292783416
Reforming Intelligence by Thomas C. Bruneau,Steven C. Boraz Pdf
These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states. Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.
Intelligence Reform After Five Years by Richard A. Best Pdf
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 was the most significant legislation affecting the U.S. intelligence community since 1947. Enacted in the wake of 9/11, the act attempted to ensure closer coordination among intelligence agencies esp. in regard to counterterrorism efforts. It established the position of Dir, of Nat. Intell. (DNI) with extensive authority to coordinate the nation¿s intelligence effort. The DNI speaks for U.S. intelligence, briefs the Pres., has authority to develop the budget for the nat. intelligence effort, and manage appropriations made by Congress. Contents of this report: Intro.; Background; The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004; Positive Assessment; Negative Views; An Alternative View; Future Direction.
In From Mandate to Blueprint, Thomas Fingar offers a guide for new federal government appointees faced with the complex task of rebuilding institutions and transitioning to a new administration. Synthesizing his own experience implementing the most comprehensive reforms to the national security establishment since 1947, Fingar provides crucial guidance to newly appointed officials. When Fingar was appointed the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis in 2005, he discovered the challenges of establishing a new federal agency and implementing sweeping reforms of intelligence procedure and performance. The mandate required prompt action but provided no guidance on how to achieve required and desirable changes. Fingar describes how he defined and prioritized the tasks involved in building and staffing a new organization, integrating and improving the work of sixteen agencies, and contending with pressure from powerful players. For appointees without the luxury of taking command of fully staffed and well-functioning federal agencies, From Mandate to Blueprint is an informed and practical guide for the challenges ahead.
Democratization of Intelligence by Peter Gill,Michael Andregg Pdf
This comparative analysis of the sometimes fraught process of achieving democratic governance of security intelligence agencies presents material from countries other than those normally featured in the Intelligence Studies literature of North America and Europe. Some of the countries examined are former Communist countries and several in Latin America are former military regimes. Others have been democratic for a long time but still experience widespread political violence. Through a mix of single-country and comparative studies, major aspects of intelligence are considered, including the legacy of, and transition from, authoritarianism; the difficulties of achieving genuine reform; and the apparent inevitability of periodic scandals. Authors consider a range of methodological approaches to the study of intelligence and the challenges of analysing the secret world. Finally, consideration is given to the success – or otherwise – of intelligence reform, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions of control and oversight. This book was originally published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.
The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform by Brent Durbin Pdf
Examining the political foundations of American intelligence policy, this book develops a new theory of intelligence adaptation to explain the success or failure of major reform efforts since World War II. Durbin draws on careful case histories of the early Cold War, the Nixon and Ford administrations, the first decade after the Cold War, and the post-9/11 period, looking closely at the interactions among Congress, executive branch leaders, and intelligence officials. These cases demonstrate the significance of two factors in the success or failure of reform efforts: the level of foreign policy consensus in the system, and the ability of reformers to overcome the information advantages held by intelligence agencies. As these factors ebb and flow, windows of opportunity for reform open and close, and different actors and interests come to influence reform outcomes. Durbin concludes that the politics of US intelligence frequently inhibit effective adaptation, undermining America's security and the civil liberties of its citizens.
Author : Paul R. Pillar Publisher : Columbia University Press Page : 433 pages File Size : 45,7 Mb Release : 2011-09-06 Category : Political Science ISBN : 9780231527804
Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy by Paul R. Pillar Pdf
A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.
Intelligence Governance and Democratisation by Peter Gill Pdf
This book analyses changes in intelligence governance and offers a comparative analysis of intelligence democratisation. Within the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR), academics have paid significant attention to both the police and military. The democratisation of intelligence structures that are at the very heart of authoritarian regimes, however, have been relatively ignored. The central aim of this book is to develop a conceptual framework for the specific analytical challenges posed by intelligence as a field of governance. Using examples from Latin America and Europe, it examines the impact of democracy promotion and how the economy, civil society, rule of law, crime, corruption and mass media affect the success or otherwise of achieving democratic control and oversight of intelligence. The volume draws on two main intellectual and political themes: intelligence studies, which is now developing rapidly from its original base in North America and UK; and democratisation studies of the changes taking place in former authoritarian regimes since the mid-1980s including security sector reform. The author concludes that, despite the limited success of democratisation, the dangers inherent in unchecked networks of state, corporate and para-state intelligence organisations demand that academic and policy research continue to meet the challenge. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, democracy studies, war and conflict studies, comparative politics and IR in general.
Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan's Transitional Democracy by Frédéric Grare,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Pdf
"The purpose of the present report is to analyze the intelligence agencies' role in Pakistan's political life through a better understanding of the agencies' objectives and mechanisms. Because Pakistan's civilian governments have been victims of the agencies' manipulation in the past, the new and very fragile government cannot ignore the decisive role of the intelligence agencies in Pakistani politics if it wants to counter the direct and more subtle manifestations of military control. The domestic political role of intelligence agencies is always a combination of three elements: militarization, comprehensive political surveillance, and state terror. The intensity and relative importance of each component varies over time and according to the specific situations in each country, but all three are always present. Terror as it applies to individuals or groups can be carried out by proxies and is intermittent, but it remains an essential element of the system. An intelligence agency's reputation for ruthlessness is often as important as its actual efficiency. The reform of the intelligence agencies is therefore imperative, and the depoliticization of the intelligence process is as much an element of national reconciliation as of consolidation of power."--P. 1.
Us Intelligence Community Reform Studies Since 1947 by Michael Warner,J. Kenneth McDOnald Pdf
The publication of The 9/11 Commission Report, the war in Iraq, and subsequent negotiation of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 have provoked the most intense debate over the future of American intelligence since the end of World War II. For observers of this national discussion—as well as of future debates that are all but inevitable—this paper offers a historical perspective on reform studies and proposals that have appeared over the course of the US Intelligence Community's evolution into its present form. We have examined the origins, context, and results of 14 significant official studies that have surveyed the American intelligence system since 1947. We explore the reasons these studies were launched, the recommendations they made, and the principal results that they achieved. It should surprise no one that many of the issues involved—such as the institutional relationships between military and civilian intelligence leaders—remain controversial to the present time. For this reason, we have tried both to clarify the perennial issues that arise in intelligence reform efforts and to determine those factors that favor or frustrate their resolution. Of the 14 reform surveys we examined, only the following achieved substantial success in promoting the changes they proposed: the Dulles Report (1949), the Schlesinger Report (1971), the Church Committee Report (1976), and the 9/11 Commission Report (2004). Having examined these and other surveys of the Intelligence Community, we recognize that much of the change since 1947 has been more ad hoc than systematically planned. Our investigation indicates that to bring about significant change, a study commission has had to get two things right: process and substance. Two studies that had large and comparatively rapid effects—the 1949 Dulles Report and the 1971 Schlesinger Report—were both sponsored by the National Security Council. The 9/11 Commission, with its public hearings in the midst of an election season, had even more impact, while the Church Committee's effects were indirect but eventually powerful. It's perhaps worth noting that a study commission whose chairman later became DCI, as in the case of Allen Dulles and James Schlesinger, is also likely to have a lasting influence. Finally, studies conducted on the eve of or during a war, or in a war's immediate aftermath, are more likely to lead to change. The 1947 National Security Act drew lessons from World War II, and it was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that brought about the intelligence reforms the Dulles Report had proposed over a year earlier. The 1971 Schlesinger Report responded to President Nixon's need to cut spending as he extracted the United States from the Vietnam War. The breakdown of the Cold War defense and foreign policy consensus during the Vietnam War set the scene for the Church Committee's investigations during 1975–76, but the fact that US troops were not in combat at the time certainly diminished the influence of its conclusions. In contrast, the 9/11 Commission Report was published at the height of a national debate over the War on Terror and the operations in Iraq, which magnified its salience. Finally, in the substance of these reports, one large trend is evident over the years. Studies whose recommendations have caused power in the Intelligence Community to gravitate toward either the Director of Central Intelligence or the Office of the Secretary of Defense—or both—have generally had the most influence. This pattern of increasing concentration of intelligence power in the DCI and Secretary of Defense endured from the 1940s through the 1990s, whether Democrats or Republicans controlled the White House or Congress. When a new pattern of influence and cooperation forms, we are confident that future reform surveys will not hesitate to propose ways to improve it.
In the aftermath of September 11 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) embarked on a program to reform its intelligence and national security programs. Many experts agree the FBI has made progress in some areas (dissemination of raw intelligence), but some believe that the FBI has shown little progress in other areas (establishing an integrated and proactive intelligence program) while the FBI's budget increased by 68 per cent from 2001-2005. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has recommended, and the White House has approved, the establishment of a National Security Service within the FBI. This Service would integrate the FBI's Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Division with the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Whether this organisational change will yield substantive results is an open question. This book analyses the FBI's overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation of intelligence reform initiatives in the field.
In Intelligence Reform: A Question of Balance, Col John D. Bansemer shares his penetrating insights into reforming the US intelligence community (IC) to improve its performance. He offers valuable guidelines for thoughtful action on this perennial concern. The events of 9/11/2001 resulted in national soul searching as we attempted to understand how such terrible events could happen. Congress investigated these events, and the 9/11 Commission studied them. Although the commission ultimately made 41 recommendations, the ones that called yet again for reform of the IC captured the most attention in both the press and Congress. Why has intelligence reform been called for so often over the years? Why has it proven so difficult to improve the performance of intelligence agencies to anyone's lasting satisfaction? In addressing these questions, there is a direction that Bansemer wisely does not take, namely attempting to sort out the relative roles of intelligence failures and operational failures. Surely future studies of Hurricane Katrina will illustrate, through an example of nearly laboratory purity, that operational failures can occur even with nearly perfect intelligence, hence that intelligence reform may well need to go hand in-hand with operational reform to improve overall performance. Bansemer examines the performance of the US intelligence community by focusing on underlying tensions that are not unique to the IC but that occur also within any large organization. Understood this way, reform looks less like a choice among polar preferences and more like a question of altering balances, each of which stems from unavoidably competing interests within an organization. One touchstone of Bansemer's analysis is the Goldwater- Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986. The GNA exemplifies one way to attempt reform of a large organization that harbors specialized and competing interests-in this case the Department of Defense (DOD) with its component military services. On the record, Congress and the 9/11 Commission had elements of the GNA in mind when they crafted their legislation and recommendations, respectively. The novel insight from Bansemer's analysis is its finding that while there may be some commonality in the symptoms (i.e., the reasons for reform) between the DOD and the IC, the recommended course of treatment may not be universally applicable. Crucial particulars of organizational structures, culture, and incentives all play a role in the success of any reform effort in improving performance. Another key element of Bansemer's analysis is the question of why intelligence reform has so rarely met the expectations of the reformers recommending change. He finds that this phenomenon has less to do with broad organizational structure and more with tensions among elements of the organization. In the case of the IC these tensions are heightened, relative to those in the DOD, with its four military services by virtue of the presence in the intelligence "community" of a larger number of much more loosely affiliated elements with much more diverse missions belonging to many government departments, including State, Treasury, and Homeland Security.
The Intelligence Archipelago by Melanie M. H. Gutjahr Pdf
In this book, Melanie Gutjahr addresses the documentation surrounding the history of U.S. national intelligence reform efforts, going back almost to the beginning of post-WWII intelligence. She examines the question of whether the intelligence community appears capable of reshaping itself quickly and effectively enough to cope with 21st century expressions of globalization. Finding a negative answer to that question, she goes on to address the prospect that Congress may generate the wherewithal to effect a transformation in intelligence matters by building on the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads by Roy Godson,Ernest R. May,Gary James Schmitt Pdf
"U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads presents fresh, divergent perspectives on topics ranging from the very purpose of intelligence to pressing policy concerns about weapons proliferation, economic espionage, and threats posed by nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations. Contributors include high-ranking officials from the CIA, FBI, and the departments of State and Defense, as well as leading academic specialists such as Joseph Nye, Abram Shulsky, and James Q. Wilson."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved
The Intelligence Archipelago by Melanie M. H. Gutjahr Pdf
This study addresses the future of the Intelligence Community in light of 21st century issues/challenges/threats. In addressing this issue, the author reviews many of the chief intelligence reform proposals or legislative activities during the early years of the U.S. intelligence service and throughout the Cold-War era, to include the turbulent mid-1970s, on into the 1990s, and concludes with a review of the recommendations from the Joint Inquiry Report and the 9/11 Commission Report leading to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. At issue is whether these ongoing schemes for reform, including the new legislation, are sufficient for the effective operation of the Community in a globalized environment. The methodology used in this study is principally historical analysis and review of primary and secondary source documents interpreted through the lens of the author, who has over two decades of experience in the Intelligence Community, as a tactical and strategic Army signals intelligent (SIGINT) officer, DOD contractor, and federal government systems engineer. The analysis is informed by interviews with select military and civilian professionals, academics, and other professionals. The author's intent is that this study further stimulates debate on the future of the Intelligence Community and its primacy in assessing current and future threats to our national security. If the Community is unwilling to make visible changes that are recognizable and understandable to the "talking heads" and more importantly to the American public, then a wake-up notice will come from outside the Community through executive order or congressional legislation. This study presents an argument for rational, professionally based, but overdue intelligence reform.
