Assessment Of The Nuclear Programs Of Iran And North Korea
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Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea by Jungmin Kang Pdf
When we are looking at proliferation cases, there are a number of lessons – positive and negative – learnt. First, facts reported by the IAEA are essential for the international community in assessing the compliance and risks of possible clandestine activities. Second, the IAEA verification scheme is biting when it fully exercises its verification rights, and when it is provided with the requisite cooperation. Third, when countries face questions raised by the IAEA, those that chose to turn the course and / or cooperated to remove concerns and ambiguities resolved their nuclear dossiers in a satisfactory manner and fairly swiftly. Fourth, when states adopt the course of confrontation, as are currently the cases with Iran, Syria and North Korea, the situation becomes more complicated and more difficult to resolve. Fifth, dragging non-compliance and challenging of the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors erodes the international non-proliferation regime. This book addresses two proliferation cases, Iran and North Korea providing extensive snapshots on the currently known nuclear programs, and analyses failures and weaknesses of past verification activities, and makes innovative suggestions for ways forward.
North Korea, Iran and the Challenge to International Order by Patrick McEachern,Jaclyn O’Brien McEachern Pdf
This book examines and compares the political situations in North Korea and Iran, and the contemporary security challenges posed by their illicit nuclear aspirations. While government officials, including a series of American presidents, strategic policy documents and outside analysts have repeatedly noted that North Korea and Iran occupy a similar challenge, the commonality has largely been left unexplored. This book argues that North Korea and Iran are uniquely common in the world today in their illicit nuclear aspirations in violation of their legal commitments made under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The work evaluates alternative arguments, some of which sustain that the two states should be grouped together based on other metrics, such as nuclear powers that sponsor terrorist organizations or nuclear states that violate human rights, and find alternative explanations do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Drawing on newly declassified documents and Iranian and North Korean sources, the book provides a comprehensive and comparative assessment of the two states’ social, historical, economic, and domestic political structures and situation to make these determinations. Furthermore, it reviews the nuclear issue stemming from Iran and North Korea and the efforts to constrain these programs. The book concludes with specific policy recommendations that apply diplomatic lessons learned from dealing with Iran to North Korea and vice versa. This book will be of interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international security, foreign policy and International Relations.
North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, while Iran is poised to acquire them in the next decade. How the United States and other nations seek to roll back these burgeoning nuclear powers is among the most urgent issues of the day. At stake is regional security in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, America's standing abroad, and prospects for nuclear non-proliferation. This book offers complementary international perspectives on these threats and the peaceful responses to grapple with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. Leading authorities provide balanced analyses—together with new chronologies and maps—that make the volume an invaluable reference for all those interested in understanding options available in dealing with Iran and North Korea. The contributors to this volume offer complementary international perspectives on the critical security issues that stem from the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea. No other work combines the analysis of the two countries and explores the threat posed by each to regional stability and world order. The book examines how and why attempts to curb the nuclear programs and broader political ambitions of each nation have failed. It also examines how each nation, in its own way, has managed to defy the world's preponderant power, the United States, as well as other major powers and the United Nations. And it offers analysis on where the fractured and oscillating relations with these two nettlesome actors are heading and the long-term implications of their current trajectories for nuclear proliferation, deterrence, alliance management, regional security, and world order.
Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes by Gary Samore Pdf
The possibility that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapons capability poses a significant threat to the stability of the Middle East and a potential challenge to the long-term viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 2003, diplomatic efforts by the EU-3 (United Kingdom, France and Germany) have succeeded in suspending the sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, but prospects for reaching a permanent agreement with the Iranian government are uncertain. If the EU-3 effort collapses, a number of policy options will be given more serious consideration, including sanctions, containment, regime change and military action. This IISS ‘Strategic Dossier’ on Iran’s strategic weapons programmes provides an objective technical assessment of Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities, as well as its ballistic missile programme. The dossier evaluates what is known and what is not known about these capabilities and projects potential future developments. In addition, the dossier provides a history of democratic efforts over the last three decades, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and examines different options for current diplomatic efforts. Each chapter has been written and reviewed by recognised international experts in their respective fields. The IISS does not advocate any particular policy option for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. The objective of Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment is to assess, as accurately and dispassionately as possible, Iran’s capabilities and evaluate the pros and cons of different policy options in the order to foster a well-informed policy debate.
Getting Ready for Nuclear-Ready Iran by Anonim Pdf
Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran's nuclear program, Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran's nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran's continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats. These questions are the focus of this volume. The book is divided into four parts. The first presents the endings of the NPEC's working group on Iran. It reflects interviews with government officials and outside specialists and the work of some 20 regional security experts whom NPEC convened in Washington to discuss the commissioned research that is contained in this book. Some of this report's endings to keep Iran and others from overtly deploying nuclear weapons or leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are beginning to gain official support. The U.S. Government, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an increasing number of allies now support the idea that states that violate the NPT be held accountable for their transgressions, even if they should withdraw from the treaty. There also has been increased internal governmental discussion about the need to clarify what should be permitted under the rubric of "peaceful" nuclear energy as delineated under the NPT. The remaining report recommendations, which were presented in testimony before Congress in March of 2005, remain to be acted upon.
The Iran-North Korea Strategic Alliance by Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives Pdf
The long history of secret cooperation between Iran and North Korea in violation of international law stretches back for decades. North Korea first sold Iran ballistic missiles during the 1980s during Iran's war with Iraq. By the end of the 1980s, North Korea and China were supplying Iran with about 70 percent of its arms. Move to the 1990s, and Iran and North Korea had moved onto working together to develop long-range ballistic missiles. By the beginning of the 2000s, the Iranians were giving North Korea sensitive data from their own missile tests to improve the North Korean missile systems. This history of very close cooperation on ballistic missiles only has the potential to grow and deepen as a result of the Iranian nuclear deal. There is a growing evidence that Iran and North Korea have not only been cooperating on missile programs but also in the nuclear field. The media reports, as far as back as 1993, that there are indications that the Iranians financed North Korea's nuclear program with $500 million in return for nuclear technology. The strong relationship between Iran and North Korea was forged in secrecy. We do not even know the full extent of their working together. What we do know is that now that the world has given the Iranian nuclear program an apparent stamp of approval, North Korea has a lot to gain from the Iranians as well.
Redefining Success: Applying Lessons in Nuclear Diplomacy from North Korea to Iran by Ferial Ara Saeed,National Defense University Pdf
The United States has no good options for resolving the North Korean and Iranian nuclear challenges. Incentives, pressures, and threats have not succeeded. A military strike would temporarily set back these programs, but at unacceptable human and diplomatic costs, and with a high risk of their reconstitution and acceleration. For some policymakers, therefore, the best option is to isolate these regimes until they collapse or pressures build to compel negotiations on U.S. terms. This option has the veneer of toughness sufficient to make it politically defensible in Washington. On closer scrutiny, however, it actually allows North Korea and Iran to continue their nuclear programs unrestrained. It also sacrifices more achievable short-term goals of improving transparency and securing vulnerable nuclear materials to the uncertain long-term goal of denuclearization. Yet these short-term goals are deemed critical to U.S. national security in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). North Korea and Iran are very different states that share at least one crucial similarity: decades of estrangement from Washington and U.S. efforts to isolate them from the international community. They also play destabilizing roles in the regions they inhabit, lack respect for basic democratic freedoms, and maintain policies antagonistic to the United States, its friends, and its allies. It is hardly surprising that the Washington consensus still supports isolation. What is striking, however, is the pronounced international consensus in favor of engagement, which sharply constrains an already limited U.S. policy arsenal. Assessing two decades of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea and nearly a decade of efforts with Iran, it is clear that Washington needs a more promising strategy. Nothing short of a paradigm shift away from denuclearization is required to alter the pattern of bad outcomes in both cases. The new paradigm, predicated on strong bipartisan support, would recognize the national security advantages of a negotiated nuclear pause as a prelude to denuclearization. Allowing North Korea and Iran to retain their current nuclear capability would give them an important incentive to cooperate with international monitoring aimed at improving the transparency of their nuclear programs and capabilities, and securing vulnerable nuclear materials—the goals identified by the NPR and QDR as vital to national security. Denuclearization would remain the publicly declared—and indeed desired—endstate of negotiations, but an outcome requiring a long time horizon to achieve. In the meantime, a nuclear pause diminishes the risk of further nuclear advances by these states and brings North Korea and Iran “inside the tent” through international monitoring. It also buys time to develop new policy mechanisms to further contain their programs. More crucially, it could open up political space in both states for moderation overall, including accommodation (vice defiance) of international demands, especially on the nuclear issue. This comparative study of U.S. nuclear diplomacy toward North Korea and Iran suggests that the North Korea case offers policymakers crucial lessons applicable to Iran. It provides policy recommendations based on four key conclusions: that a common paradigm (nuclear pause) must be applied to both states; that nuclear deals negotiated with international outliers like North Korea and Iran must draw on widely accepted policy or practice; that these deals should be linked to political/diplomatic strategies relevant to the domestic and regional policy context of each state; and that the success of a nuclear pause must be judged by whether it accomplishes nuclear policy goals, not broader policy goals. Time is of the essence. North Korea's leadership transition could prove destabilizing to the region, and Iran's enrichment capability is steadily advancing.
The Controversial History of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program by Charles River Charles River Editors Pdf
*Includes pictures *Includes online resources and a bibliography for further reading North Korea has long been the butt of jokes, and it has been a longstanding target of international criticism, but the startling satellite image was anything but amusing, for it demonstrated the truly catastrophic conditions North Koreans find themselves in. Statistics show that the average South Korean uses up to 10,162 kilowatt hours of power per year, whereas their neighbors in the north consume only 739. This is only one amongst a slew of stumbling blocks affecting the state, impeding it from proper progress. North Korea would be horrific enough if it was a fictional place, but its nuclear weapons program is all too real. On September 17, 2017, President Donald Trump, whose use of Twitter may be what he's best known for, tweeted another nickname of the type he has infamously coined for his opponents: "I spoke with President Moon of South Korea last night. Asked him how Rocket Man is doing. Long gas lines forming in North Korea. Too bad!" The "Rocket Man" in question, of course, was none other than the notoriously brutal and wildly erratic North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Un. In less than 24 hours, the viral tweet had not only racked up tens of thousands of retweets and triple the "likes," it had spawned countless Elton John-themed memes and inspired headlines from just about every news source around the world. Capitalizing on the viral nature of the controversial tweet, Trump repeated the nickname just a few days later in his speech before the UN General Assembly. He warned the congregation of fidgety ambassadors about the grave threats posed by North Korea's "depraved regime." "The United States had great strength and patience, but if forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea...Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime." Needless to say, the rumors regarding Iran's nuclear capabilities and the murky nature of the regime have understandably left many a nation and their leaders on the edge of their seats. The volatile nation's deep-seated loathing of the West, particularly the United States and Israel, have only added to the jitters worldwide. Experts insist that the Iranian propaganda program, which many say outrival even North Korea's, is chiefly responsible for entrenching into its masses this resentment of the West and their liberal ideals. For starters, Iranians are taught that the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, untouchable in the government's eyes, deserve their utmost respect and gratitude, as these are the intrepid warriors defending their country from the ceaseless threats of the Western infidels. Unlike North Korea, which proudly walls itself off from the rest of civilization, the Iranian propaganda mills are constantly refurbishing themselves so as to appeal to a younger and more impressionable demographic. Since the Iranian Revolution, Western nations and their intelligence agencies have struggled to fully grasp what goes on in Iran, and it has resulted in a situation that reads like a spy thriller. The last decade has featured the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, the use of sophisticated cyberattacks like Stuxnet, the construction of a hidden enrichment facility underneath a mountain, ongoing arguments over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, efforts to determine whether there was potential procurement and testing of materials that would be used in nuclear weapons, debates over ballistic missiles, and a 2015 agreement between Iran and several world powers that remains a controversial issue to this day. There is even substantial concern that Iran and North Korea are jointly working on their nuclear programs, with Iranian scientists witnessing North Korean nuclear weapons tests and North Korean scientists in Iran overseeing research and development.
Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Is Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons? The United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is "inherently reversible." U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions. Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1. Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium-the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel-a procedure called "reprocessing." Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing. How Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon? Then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon.
Iran's Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons by David Albright,Sarah Burkhard Pdf
"The Institute of Science and International Security’s new book Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons chronicles the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons. The book draws from original Iranian documents seized by Israel’s Mossad in 2018 in a dramatic overnight raid in Tehran. The “Nuclear Archive” allows deep insight into the country’s effort to secretly build nuclear weapons. The book relies on unprecedented access to archive documents, many translated by the Institute into English for the first time. The first part of the book concentrates on Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program in the early 2000s to build five nuclear weapons and an industrial complex to produce many more. By 2003, responding to growing pressure from European powers to freeze its publicly known nuclear programs and fearing a possible U.S. military attack, Iran’s leaders decided to downsize, but not stop, their secret nuclear weapons effort. The second part of the book discusses Iran’s nuclear path post-2003, revealing a careful plan to continue nuclear weapons work, overcome bottlenecks and better camouflage nuclear weapons development activities. Since 2003, the Islamic Republic’s nuclear scientists and weaponeers have concentrated on establishing capabilities to make weapon-grade uranium and developing more reliable, longer-range ballistic missiles."--Publisher description.
Official U.S. Reports on North Korea by U. S. Military,Department of Defense (DoD),U. S. Government Pdf
Two excellent reports are reproduced in this book: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy. Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - latest available report to Congress pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act from the Department of Defense (DoD). Contents: Executive Summary * Chapter One: Assessment Of The Security Situation * Key Developments In North Korean And Peninsular Security North Korean Security Perceptions * Chapter Two: Understanding North Korea's Strategy * Strategic Goals * National Strategy * Regional Objectives And Behavior * Chapter Three: The Capabilities And Modernization Goals Of North Korea's Military Forces * Overview * An Aging Force...With Emerging Capabilities * Chapter Four: Weapons Of Mass Destruction * Programs And Proliferation * North Korea's Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs * Proliferation * Conventional Arms And Missile Sales Nuclear Proliferation Interdicted Transfers. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) remains one of the most critical security challenges for the United States and the broader international community. In particular, North Korea's willingness to undertake provocative and destabilizing behavior, including attacks on the Republic of Korea (ROK), its continued development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and its proliferation of weapons in contravention of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) pose a serious threat to the United States, the region, and the world. Since assuming control in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has solidified his grip on power by embracing the coercive tools used by his father and grandfather. His regime has used force and the threat of force combined with inducements to quell domestic dissent and strengthen internal security; co-opt the North Korean military and elites; develop strategic military capabilities to deter external attack; and challenge the ROK and the U.S.-ROK Alliance. In April 2013, Kim announced the "byungjin" policy, which emphasizes the parallel development of the country's economy and nuclear weapons program, to reinforce his regime's domestic, diplomatic, economic, and security interests. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy - North Korea's Nuclear Test and Withdrawal from the Six Party Talks * Bush Administration-North Korean Agreements and Failure of Implementation * Implementation Process * Verification Issue * Kim Jong-il's Stroke and Political Changes Inside North Korea * Issues Facing the Obama Administration * North Korea's Nuclear Programs * Plutonium Program * Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Program * International Assistance * Nuclear Collaboration with Iran and Syria * North Korea's Delivery Systems * State of Nuclear Weapons Development
Institutional Effectiveness in International Regimes by Tuğba Özden Pdf
Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent ranking due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Contrary to North Korea, Iran is determined to stay as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. The question of this study is "why the processes of the NPT regime cannot specify the nature and scope of Iran's nuclear program?" The three main processes of the regime, which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the multilateral negotiations, are examined to determine the weaknesses of the regime. This study argues that the regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.
Assessing North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programmes by Lorenzo Mariani Pdf
2016 was a pivotal year for North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. Numerous tests carried out throughout the year demonstrate that the regime is on the verge of developing thermonuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the capability to launch missiles from ground facilities, submarines and mobile platforms. The US has responded by resorting to UN Security Council sanctions -- which have now become wide-ranging, having also been endorsed by China -- while in South Korea, more confrontational options have been proposed in recent months. The new leaderships in Washington and Seoul thus need to devise a new strategic approach to the DPRK's nuclear threat -- without, however, jeopardizing Northeast Asian stability, which has so far guaranteed economic growth and prosperity for the whole region.
The Iranian Nuclear Crisis by Seyed Hossein Mousavian Pdf
The first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and the international community, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir opens in 2002, as news of Iran's clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities emerge. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, previously the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and spokesman for Tehran's nuclear negotiating team, brings the reader into Tehran's private deliberations as its leaders wrestle with internal and external adversaries. Mousavian provides readers with intimate knowledge of Iran's interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency and global powers. His personal story comes alive as he vividly recounts his arrest and interrogations on charges of espionage. Dramatic episodes of diplomatic missions tell much about the author and the swirling dynamics of Iranian politics and diplomacy—undercurrents that must be understood now more than ever. As intense debate continues over the direction of Iran's nuclear program, Mousavian weighs the likely effects of military strikes, covert action, sanctions, and diplomatic engagement, considering their potential to resolve the nuclear crisis. Contents 1. The Origin and Development of Iran's Nuclear Program 2. The First Crisis 3. From Tehran to Paris 4. From the Paris Agreement to the 2005 Presidential Election 5. The Larijani Period 6. To the Security Council 7. Back to the Security Council and a New Domestic Situation 8. Iran Alone: The Jalili Period 9. U.S. Engagement 10. The Crisis Worsens 11. Conclusion
